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ABSTRACT 
 
McCullough, Benjamin Patrick. M.A., International and Comparative Politics Program, 
Wright State University, 2013. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: A Last Ditch Effort to 
Turn Around a Failing War 
 
As the United States moved closer to ending its military involvement in Afghanistan by 
the end of 2014, intense debate on the relevance and success of the United States’ 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in the country continues. Many observers have been 
quick to declare the strategy a failure without fully analyzing the critical components of 
COIN doctrine that are necessary for a campaign to succeed, and the extent to which 
those components were in place in Afghanistan. This study examines the case of 
Afghanistan by determining whether the U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy was 
successful in achieving the four main objectives identified by FM 3-24 as necessary for 
COIN’s success. This study also looks at whether or not the United States’ COIN strategy 
was successful in generating and maintaining the public support needed to carry out a 
prolonged counterinsurgency operation. By utilizing a mix of deductive logic based on 
contemporary COIN theory and currently available scholarly resources, government 
documents, and U.S. and ISAF military field reports, this study seeks to answer whether 
the counterinsurgency strategy devised by Generals David Petraeus and Stanley 
McChrystal was successful in achieving the four main objectives needed for the success 
of this strategy in Afghanistan. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 Back in 2001, the Taliban appeared to have been all but defeated. On October 7th, 
2001, “the United States invaded Afghanistan in retaliation for the September 11th 
attacks, and in a matter of months had overthrown the Taliban regime.”1 In December 
2001, Hamid Karzai had been appointed the interim Afghan president by a loya jirga 
(grand council), and in January 2002 the international community had agreed to provide 
extensive assistance to stabilize and rebuild the Afghan state. By mid-2002, U.S. SOF 
forces were chasing the last remnants of the Taliban out of the country and hunting down 
al Qaeda terrorists.2 “Some individuals involved in the early months of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) argued that it had revitalized the American way of war.”3 
 Unfortunately, the war in Afghanistan soon became a sideshow to the war in Iraq 
and “became hobbled by strategic drift, conflicting tactics, and too few troops.”4 Since 
2002, the United States has suffered over 2,335 Americans killed with many more 
seriously injured. Thousands of Afghans have been killed as well. The U.S. “has also 
spent close to $1 trillion trying to turn Afghanistan into a modern function state.”5 
Despite these efforts, Afghanistan continues to be plagued by Islamic extremism, tribal 
rivalry, and a Taliban insurgency that has shown little or no sign of giving up.
1 Theo Farrel & Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004-2012.” 
 International Affairs (July 12, 2013), 845. 
2 Donald P. Wright, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom 
 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 17. 
3 Henry A. Crumpton, “Intelligence and War: Afghanistan 2001-2002,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, 
 ed. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 177.  
4 Nathaniel C. Fick, & John A. Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition,” 
 http://www.cnas.org/node/648 [accessed January 18 - January 12, 2009], 1. 
5 Gian Gentile “America’s nation-building at Gunpoint,” Los Angeles Times, August 13, 2013. 
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 Of the various strategies the United States has used in Afghanistan over the past 
thirteen years, “the 2009 troop surge was by far the most ambitious and expensive.”6  
At the center of this Afghan surge was a protect-the-population counterinsurgency 
(COIN) strategy promoted by Generals David Petraeus, Stanley McChrystal, and Admiral 
Mike Mullen. “As recently as 2006, the country’s top generals were openly scorning 
COIN as a concept; and then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld all but banned the 
term’s utterance.”7 Despite being enormously controversial both inside and outside the 
defense and intelligence community, counterinsurgency soon became “enshrined as 
Army doctrine, and promoted at the highest levels of the Pentagon.”8 Much of this 
fanfare was due to the belief that the counterinsurgency strategy promoted by General 
Petraeus had helped to turn the tide in Iraq in 2007.9  
 At the heart of this new doctrine is Field Manual 3-24, jointly published by the 
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. Directed by General David Petraeus, whose COIN 
strategy is widely credited with pulling “Iraq from the abyss,”10 this manual embraces a 
model commonly referred to “clear, hold, and build.” This, in turn, “enables the 
implementation of political, social, and economic programs designed to reduce the appeal 
of the insurgency and ‘build’ the government’s legitimacy.”11 Army FM 3-24 also argues 
“that most active, passive, and potential supporters of an insurgency – whether they are 
6 Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” http://www.foreignaffa 
 irscom/print/136845 [accessed October 17 – September/October 2013], 1. 
7 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus.” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-
 kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus [accessed February 27 – February 12, 2013], 75. 
8Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, (New 
 York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 117. 
9 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus.” 75. 
10 Nathaniel C. Fick, & John A. Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition,” 
 http://www.cnas.org/node/648 [accessed January 18 - January 12, 2009], 1. 
11 Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm.” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63035/colin-h-
 kahl/coin-of-the-realm [accessed April 19 – December 2007], 170. 
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ideological, ethnic, or religious in character – can be won over through the provision of security, 
since citizens seek to ally with groups that can guarantee their safety.”12  
According to Colonel Paul Gentile (2013), Field Manual 3-24 has become the 
most talked about, praised, and influential military doctrine in generations.13   
“A typical American reader strolling through the aisles of a Barnes & Noble 
 bookstore can sip a latte while perusing army doctrine.”14 
 
Shortly after its release in December 2006, FM 3-24 was downloaded from the Internet 
more than 1.5 million times.15 “Samantha Power, a special advisor to President Obama, 
wrote a New York Times review of FM 3-24 in 2007, wherein she characterized the 
doctrine as a ‘21st Century strategy.”16 The University of Chicago also published a public 
edition that has a written endorsement from General Petraeus, who remarks that this 
manual is surely “on the bedside table of the President, Vice President, and the Secretary 
of Defense and according to the general, deserves a place on the bedside table of every 
American too.”17 
 Reinforced by retired four-star general Jack Kean and influential civilian analysts 
such as Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, Generals Petraeus, McChrystal and Admiral 
Mullen “confidently pointed to Field Manual 3-24 as the authoritative playbook for 
success in Afghanistan.”18 When President Obama outlined his new Afghanistan strategy 
and ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops during a speech at the United 
States Military Academy at West Point, New York on December 1, 2009, “the Pentagon 
12 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1-108. 
13Gian Gentile “America’s nation-building at Gunpoint,” Los Angeles Times, 1. 
14Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: The New 
 Press), 2. 
15Ibid., 2. 
16Ibid., 2. 
17 University of Chicago Press, The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
 (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press), xliii 
18 Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan,” 1. 
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was successful in ensuring that the major tenets of COIN doctrine were also incorporated 
into the revised operation plan.”19 
 The stated aim of this strategy was to “protect key parts of southern Afghanistan 
from Taliban advances: once that mission was completed, they would swing east to 
pacify areas around Kabul.”20 This “clear, hold, and build” strategy would also 
 “provide valuable time to expand the Afghan army, disburse reconstruction 
 assistance and create – in conjunction with the State Department – local 
 governments in places where there had been very little government influence, 
 reasoning that generating Afghan-led security and indigenous civil administration 
 would convince people to stop supporting the insurgency.”21 
  
Thus, with continuous outside efforts, supporters of the strategy argued, “the capacity of 
the Afghan government would steadily grow, the levels of U.S. and international 
assistance would decline, and the insurgency would eventually be defeated.”22 
 Between the years 2010 to 2012 the strategy is credited for inflicting heavy losses 
and pushing the Taliban out of large stretches of southern Afghanistan. At the same time 
the United States and international community “poured billions of dollars into short-term 
reconstruction projects, while accelerating the development of the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF).”23 Despite these efforts, Afghanistan continued to experience 
floundering reconstruction and widespread misgovernance. Moreover, the Taliban’s 
capability to carry out high profile attacks throughout most of the country showed that the 
insurgency not only survived the surge, but by some indicators had emerged even 
stronger. Thus, there was little fanfare from the White House or Pentagon when the last 
19 Ibid., 1. 
20 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Surge is Over,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/25 
 /the_afghan_surge_is_over [accessed April 24-September 25, 2012], 1. 
21 Frances Z. Brown, “Taking Stock of the Surge.” http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/26/taking 
 / _stock_of_the_surge_from_the_bottom_up [accessed January 20 – September 26, 2012], 4. 
22 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Surge is Over,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/25 
 /the_afghan_surge_is_over [accessed April 24-September 25, 2012], 1. 
23 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan,  37. 
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of the 30,000 surge troops sent overseas four years ago were withdrawn in September 
2012.24  Instead of issuing some grand proclamation of success, the job fell to then-
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta during a visit to New Zealand to announce that the last 
the of the surge troops dispatched by President Obama had left Afghanistan.25  
 With a majority of U.S. and NATO troops withdrawing in 2014, and the Obama 
administration indicating that the U.S. military will no longer be built for large-scale, 
counterinsurgency operations, many military observers, politicians, and critics have been 
quick to declare COIN a failure in Afghanistan and a strategy that has no role in future 
conflicts involving the United States.26 “For a military built on avoiding casualties with 
quick, decisive victories, many believe counterinsurgency veers far too close to nation-
building and other political tasks that soldiers are ill equipped to handle.”27 According to 
Karl W. Eikenberry (2011), it is  
 “sheer hubris to think that American military personnel without the appropriate 
 language skills and with only a superficial understanding of Afghan culture 
 could, on six-or 12-month tours, somehow deliver to Afghan villages 
 everything asked of them by FM 3-24. The typical 21-year old marine is hard-
 pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law; can he really be 
 expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder?”28 
 
Other critics of the Afghan COIN strategy attack it as “cynically justifying the United  
States’ continued presence in Afghanistan – neocolonialism dressed up in  
PowerPoint.”29          
 In many cases, Coalition operations “are seen as intrusive, unjustified, or using 
24 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Surge is Over,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/25 
 /the_afghan_surge_is_over [accessed April 24-September 25, 2012], 4 
25 Craig Whitlock, “Final ‘surge’ troops leave Afghanistan,” The Washington Post,  September 20,2012 
26 J. Dana Stuster, “To COIN or Not?” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/18/to_coin_or_not 
 [accessed October 17-March 18, 2013], 2. 
27 Ibid. 2. 
28 Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” 3. 
29 Fick & Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Ed”, 1. 
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excessive force; they caused some 2,500 civilian deaths between 2007 and 2010.”30 
Moreover, these operations are seen by many as expanding the authority of a predatory, 
illegitimate government.31 A final argument made by COIN critics is that although the 
Taliban suffered heavy losses in Afghanistan, they continue to remain active and have 
expanded their presence in the eastern and northern parts of the country.32 According to 
the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF], “insurgents launched more than twice 
as many attacks across the country in 2012 as they did in 2008 – an average of some 500 
attacks per week.”33  
 Despite these critiques, there are very few studies that have fully analyzed and 
examined the critical components of COIN doctrine identified by FM 3-24 needed to win 
a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Thus, what makes this study unique is that 
it examines the case of Afghanistan by determining whether or not the United States was 
successful in achieving the four main objectives identified by Field Manual 3-24 needed 
for the surge and its accompanying COIN strategy to prevail in Afghanistan: 
1. The United States needed to secure Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, while 
gaining its support in cracking down on insurgent sanctuaries on its soil. 
2. The United States had to win over the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan  
     people and in particular the Pashtun tribes. 
 3. The U.S. had to promote a more capable and stable Afghan National   
      Government.  
30 Waldman, Matt. “System Failure: The Underlying Causes of U.S. Policy-Making Errors in Afghanistan.”  
 International Affairs (February 26, 2013): 825. 
31 Ibid., 829. 
32 Bing, West, Learning From Our Wrong Turn: Why American Counterinsurgency has Proved to be 
 Unworkable,” http://.www.nationalreview.com/article/356323/learning-our-wrong-turn-bing-west 
 [accessed October 17 – August 21, 2013], 2 
33 Matt Waldman, “Taliban Qatar Office: A small Step Forward,” https://www.chathamhouse.org/media  
 /comment/view/192553 [accessed October 17-June 20. 2013], 2. 
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 4. Afghanistan’s National Security Forces (ANSF) had to be ready and willing to  
     assume control of areas that been cleared of insurgents by American troops. 
Therefore, the main research question to be addressed by this study is: “was the United 
States’ counterinsurgency strategy successful in achieving the four main objectives 
identified by Field Manual 3-24 needed to win in Afghanistan?” 
 Even though this research question will be the main focus of the paper, a list of 
secondary questions are needed to help in determining whether or not the U.S. was 
successful in meeting the four main objectives of the counterinsurgency strategy devised 
by Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal. Proponents of the U.S. Afghan 
counterinsurgency strategy with some merit have claimed that the experiment was too 
little, too late because “an industrial-strength COIN approach was not rigorously applied 
until eight years after the war began, and too little because even then, limits were placed 
on the size and duration of the surge, making it more difficult to change the calculations 
of Afghan friends and enemies.”34 Thus, secondary questions to be addressed by this 
study include: 
 1. Was the COIN strategy devised by Generals David Petraeus and Stanley  
     McChrystal and Admiral Mike Mullen fully implemented? 
 2. Was the United States able to achieve its primary objective of reversing the  
     Taliban’s momentum and training Afghanistan’s National Security Forces? 
 3. Was the U.S. able to promote a more capable and accountable Afghan  
                government?        
 4. Did the United States’ heavy reliance on Pakistan to reign in Afghan       
     insurgents and militants help or hinder the U.S. in its efforts to achieve the  
34 Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counterinsurgency,” 2. 
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     main objectives of its counterinsurgency strategy?      
 By utilizing a mix of deductive logic based on contemporary COIN theory and 
currently available scholarly resources, government documents, military field manuals, 
and U.S. & NATO military field reports, this study hypothesizes that the 
counterinsurgency strategy promoted by General David Petraeus, General Stanley 
McChrystal, and Admiral Mike Mullen was never fully implemented and this set the 
mission up for only partial success. More importantly, this study also argues that the 
population-centric strategy promoted by the military leadership was the wrong strategy to 
implement in Afghanistan due to conditions on the ground. 
8 
 
CHAPTER II: THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN AMERICAN COIN THEORY: POST-
VIETNAM TO IRAQ
The American Army of 2003 was organized, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat 
another conventional army; indeed, it had no peer in that arena. It was, however, 
unprepared for an enemy who understood that it could not hope to defeat the U.S. Army 
on a conventional battlefield, and who therefore chose to wage war against America from 
the shadows. 
-LTC John Nagl 
 
 According to Thomas X. Hammes (2005), “insurgency has been the most 
prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949.”1 Thus, most Americans believe that 
insurgency is a relatively modern phenomenon, invented by Mao Zedong and refined by 
his adversaries.2 In reality, “insurgencies have been around since the dawn of recorded 
history, as have the means used to suppress them.”3 That said, “the strategic significance 
of insurgency has ebbed and flowed over time.”4 
 Insurgency took on strategic significance at the beginning of the Cold War “as the 
Soviet Union looked to insurgencies as an indirect means of weakening the West.”5 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets backed multiple insurgencies in Africa and 
Latin America. Beginning in 1975, “Communist or Marxist regimes came to power in 
South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, 
1 Thomas X. Hammes, “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks,” Military Review (2006), 19. 
2 Steven Metz, “Counterinsurgency and American Strategy, Past & Future.” http://www.worldpolitics 
 review.com/Articles/11248/counterinsurgency-and-and-american-strategy-past-and future 
 [accessed March 9th – January 12, 2009], 1. 
3 Peter R, Mansoor, “From Baghdad to Kabul: The Historical Roots of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 
 http://origins.osu.edu/article/baghdad-kabul-historical-roots-us-counterinsurgency-doctrine,” 
 [accessed April 19- October 2009] 1. 
4 Steven Metz, “Counterinsurgency and American Strategy,” 1. 
5 Ibid., 1. 
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Grenada, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Suriname.”6 However, with the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, interest in insurgency declined as many Americans anticipated for them at 
least, that “the scourge of war was no more.”7 Unfortunately, the emergence of a fresh set 
of conflicts and the September 11th terrorist attacks dashed this promise. With the 9/11 
attacks, counterinsurgency once again took on strategic significance as terror groups such 
as al Qaeda (AQ) hoped to use insurgency as a means of overthrowing hostile regimes 
and replacing with ones that were more sympathetic to their cause. 8 Thus, 
counterinsurgency once again became the centerpiece of U.S. defense policy and military 
strategy.  
For most of its history, “the U.S. has been mediocre in counterinsurgency 
activities, if not actively hostile to the idea that it should even bother worrying about 
them.”9 These types of conflicts “seem utterly alien to those schooled in the history of 
America’s big wars – which is to say virtually anyone interested in American military 
history.”10 The big wars, especially the Civil War and World War II, are celebrated in 
numerous movies, books, and documentaries. As it happens, “these were America’s only 
experiences in total war in which the nation staked all of its blood and treasure to achieve 
the relatively quick and unconditional surrender of the enemy.”11 Some historians, 
military officials, politicians, and policy makers speak of an ‘American way of war: war 
that “annihilates the enemy, war that relies on advanced technology and massive 
6 Stephen J. Solarz, “Next Stop Angola,” http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/79546/next-stop- 
 angola-reagan-doctrine-communism-intervention [accessed October 27-December 02, 1985], 1. 
7 James Arnold, Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq 
 (New York: Bloomsburg Press, 2009), 1. 
8 Steven Metz, “Counterinsurgency and American Strategy, 2.  
9 Michael E. O’Hanlon, “America’s History of Counterinsurgency,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/  
 papers/2009/06/counterinsurgency-ohanlon [accessed October 10-June 2009], 1.  
10 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic 
 Books Press, 2002), 21. 
11 Ibid., 22. 
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firepower to minimize casualties among U.S. forces; war that results in total victory.”12  
 In the wake of the Vietnam War, “the Pentagon threw out the books on what they 
termed ‘low-intensity conflict’ and chose to focus instead on the prospect of a major 
conventional war with the Soviets.”13 The Army, in particular, “went back to its preferred 
focus on Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union and a possible high-end armored 
battle in the Fulda Gap of Germany.”14 According to Michael O’Hanlon (2011), the 
Army’s “equipment purchases, force structure decisions, approaches to training and 
institutional ethnos and culture remained focused almost entirely on classic maneuver 
warfare.15 The blitzkrieg victory in the 1991 Gulf War only reinforced this approach as 
the United States and its allies quickly routed Saddam’s forces in less than 96 hours of 
ground combat between February 24 and February 28, 1991. Even though Desert Storm 
proved the U.S. military “was ready for heavy air-ground battle,”16 it failed to 
foreshadow the types of conflicts that the United States would soon be fighting.  
 Shortly after the Vietnam War, “counterinsurgency thought, theory, and practice 
had been relegated to the special operations community, whose primary focus was on 
small-scale nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency and unconventional 
warfare.”17 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. did participate in a string of small 
wars in El Salvador, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. Despite the success the 
U.S. achieved during the invasions of Grenada and Panama in the 1980s and the bombing 
12 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 
 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 43. 
13 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus.” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459 /fred-
 kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus [accessed February 27- February 12, 2013], 76. 
14 O’Hanlon, “America’s History of Counterinsurgency.” 3. 
15 Ibid., 3. 
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 Janine Davidson, “Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency: Evolution and Debate,”  http:/ 
 /www.brookings.edu/media/research/files/papers/2009/0608%20counterinsurgency%20davidson/
 0608_counterinsurgency_davidson [accessed October 10 – June 8, 2009], 2. 
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of Libya in 1986, these campaigns were belittled as military operations other than war,  
abbreviated as MOOTW. Pronounced moot-wah, “MOOTW was a doctrinal term used in 
the 1990s by the American military to describe a large number of what they considered 
non-traditional tasks.”18  
 According to Janine David (2009), the Joint Publication for Operations 3-07: 
Joint Doctrine for Operations Other than War, defined the term as:  
 “operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of 
 military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to 
 complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and 
 occur before, during, and after war.”19 
 
JP 3-07also goes on to explain “that these missions can be either combat or non-combat 
and include missions as diverse as arms control, combating terrorism, support to counter-
drug operations, COIN, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, etc.”20 
  Even though a majority of today’s top military officers rose through the ranks 
fighting these small wars, “the diverse range of operations included under the category of 
MOOTW, combined with the military tradition of focusing primarily on major theater 
warfare, led to a popular joke among officers that ‘MOOTW’ really means, ‘military 
operations other than what we want to do.”21 Moreover, during a meeting of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCOS), then-chairman of the JCOS General John Shalikashvili, 
reportedly once muttered, “Real men don’t do mootwah.”22    
 Thus, little counterinsurgency doctrine existed when the U.S. invaded 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Instead, the U.S. military continued to stick to its 
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War 
 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing, June 16, 1995), 3. 
20 Janine Davidson, “Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency,” 8.  
21 Ibid., 8. 
22 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus.” 76. 
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conventional biases as the George W. Bush administration came up with a “light 
footprint” strategy designed to defeat the enemies and get out quickly to avoid getting 
bogged down. Even though U.S. forces were very successful in overthrowing the 
governments of the Taliban and of Saddam Hussein, the strategy soon “revealed its limits 
as Iraq began unraveling shortly after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime.”23   
 According to Peter Mansoor, “the shortage of U.S. ground forces, combined with 
the disbanding of the Iraqi army by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer meant that there were 
insufficient troops available to execute a counterinsurgency strategy that focused on the 
protection of the Iraqi people.”24 Instead, U.S. forces chose to focus on destroying 
insurgent forces and their hideouts.25 These operations did little to secure the population 
as militants would return to areas recently cleared by U.S. forces once they returned to 
their bases26  
 Frustrated with Iraq’s deteriorating security conditions, General George Casey 
pursued a totally different approach in the fall of 2004. Believing that U.S. forces were 
now viewed as a “virus infecting Iraqi society,”27 Casey chose to remove them from their 
outposts in Iraqi cities and move them to large forward operations bases (FOBs) on the 
outskirts.28 Thus, the U.S. pursued a policy of handing over security responsibilities to 
the newly created Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).      
 Unfortunately, “the lack of trained and ready Iraqi police and army units doomed 
23 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus.” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459 /fred-
 kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus [accessed February 27- February 12, 2013], 75. 
24 Peter R, Mansoor, “From Baghdad to Kabul: The Historical Roots of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” 
http://origins.osu.edu/article/baghdad-kabul-historical-roots-us-counterinsurgency-
doctrine/page/0/1 [accessed April 19-October 2009], 3. 
25 Ibid., 3. 
26 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 
 2006-2008 (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 13. 
27 Peter R, Mansoor, “From Baghdad to Kabul,” 3. 
28 Ibid., 3. 
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this policy from the beginning.”29 As U.S. and Coalition forces handed over 
responsibility to ISF units and withdrew to their bases, “Sunni insurgents and Shi’ite 
militias began taking control of large parts of Baghdad and other neighboring cities.”30 
Throughout 2004 and 2005, different factions such as Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army 
and al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had built up their organizations and had begun setting up 
death squads and checkpoints around their respective neighborhoods.31 Sunni extremists 
also “began using intimidation and other forms of ‘soft’ ethnic cleansing such as threats, 
physical intimidation, blackmail, seizure of property, raids on homes and businesses, 
checkpoints, kidnappings, and extortion to gain a foothold in Sunni areas throughout 
Baghdad from where they could launch attacks on Shi’ite communities.”32  
 Despite Coalition efforts, sectarian violence began to spread outside of Baghdad 
in early 2006, making it the most violent year in Iraq since the U.S. invasion in March 
2003.33 On February 22nd, 2006, Sunni insurgents affiliated with AQI detonated multiple 
explosives at the Al Askari Mosque effectively destroying its golden dome and severely 
damaging the mosque. Within hours of the bombing, 30 Sunni mosques were attacked in 
retaliation for the bombing.34 “As the cycle of violence progressed, secular Sunnis and 
Shiites, lacking genuine security from the government, came to support the sectarian 
militias.”35 This dynamic was “exacerbated by the U.S.’s steady transfer of power and 
responsibility to the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government, despite obvious signs that the 
29 Ibid., 3. 
30 Ibid., 4. 
31 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and the Evolving Insurgency,” http://csis. 
 org/files/media/csis/pubs/120614_iraq_update.pdf [accessed November 1 – December 2006], 3. 
32 Ibid., 3. 
33 John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S. at 
 War in Afghanistan and Iraq (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2012), 159. 
34Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence,” 4.  
35Nir Rose, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America’s Wars in the Muslin World, (New York:  
 Nation Books, 2010), 101. 
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government was acting as a sectarian player in the vicious civil war.”36    
 By the end of 2006, “there were well over 50 attacks and three car bombs per day 
on average in Baghdad alone.”37 U.S. troop deaths also increased to 3,003 and Iraqi 
ethno-sectarian civilian deaths are estimated to have increased to more than 150,000.38 
According to counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen (2009), “between September 
2006 and January 2007, civilian deaths peaked between 2,700 and 3,800 civilians killed 
per a month, with December 2006 being by far the worst month as killings peaked at 
around 125 per night, more than half of whom were people killed inside Baghdad city 
limits.”39 Thus, by the end of 2006 it appeared that war in Iraq was all but lost as the 
country teetered on the brink of a full-scale civil war.40    
 In an attempt to counter the ongoing insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the U.S. Military began work on a new COIN doctrine directed by Army general David 
Petraeus and Marine Corps general James Mattis on February 23rd, 2006. The same day 
that work began on the new COIN manual at Fort Leavenworth, -- Sunni insurgents had 
detonated multiple explosives at the Golden Mosque, sending Iraq to the brink of civil 
war and “giving Petraeus a greater sense of urgency.”41 Petraeus had heard stirrings that 
in a year’s time, he might be sent back to Iraq as the new U.S. commander there.42 Thus, 
“pushing the manual through a resistant army bureaucracy and corralling support for 
COIN among opinion leaders now appeared vital not only to shifting the military’s 
36 David H. Ucko, Militias, Tribes and Insurgents: The Challenge of Political Integration in Iraq, Conflict 
 Security, and Development, Vol. 8. No. 4, 357. 
37 David H. Petraeus, “How We Won in Iraq,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/29/david_ 
 petraeus_how_we_won_the_surge_in_iraq [accessed October 30th – October 30, 2013], 1. 
38 Darin E.W. Johnson, “2007 in Iraq: The Surge and Benchmarks – A New Way Forward,” 250 
39 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 126.  
40 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble, 56. 
41 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus,” 80. 
42 Paula Broadwell, All In: The Education of General David Petraeus (New York: Penguin Book Press, 
 2012), 126. 
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broader view of warfare, but also to avoiding catastrophe in Iraq.”43 To be able to 
implement his strategy in Iraq, however, “he would need the cover of officially 
sanctioned doctrine, which the field manual if accepted, would provide.”44 
 Put together “by a writing team of academics, military strategists, human rights 
lawyers, and journalists led by West Point history professor Conrad Crane,”45 United 
States Army and Marine Corps’ Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24/3-33.5) 
embraces a model commonly referred to as “clear, hold, and build.” It directs the military 
to support the “host nation” government in combating insurgents by “clearing” areas and 
then to transition to a law enforcement model to “hold” them.46 This, in turn, “enables the 
implementation of political, social, and economic programs designed to reduce the appeal 
of the insurgency and ‘build’ the government’s legitimacy.”47    
 Army FM 3-24 also argues that “most active, passive, and potential supporters of 
an insurgency – whether they are ideological, ethnic, or religious in character – can be 
won over through the provision of security, since citizens seek to ally with groups that 
can guarantee their safety.”48 Thus, the “population, rather than the insurgent movement, 
is the ‘center of gravity,’49 and the military’s primary objective is protecting the 
population. Instead of patrolling in armored vehicles and being stationed on large bases, 
soldiers must live side by side with the people they are protecting.50 Moreover, the 
military “must be ready to pick up the slack if civilian entities are slow to arrive, lack 
43 Ibid., 127. 
44 Ibid., 127. 
45 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 17. 
46U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Washington: Department 
 of Defense, 2006, 1-108 
47 Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm.” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63035/colin-h-kahl/coin-of-
 the-realm [accessed April 19 – December 2007], 170. 
48 Ibid., 171. 
49 Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm.” 171. 
50 Ibid., 171. 
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sufficient resources, or are incapable of conducting these activities in dangerous 
environments.”51  
 On December 16, 2006, the counterinsurgency doctrine manual that Generals 
Petraeus and Mattis had labored so hard to produce was finally published, “giving the 
U.S. military a new playbook for COIN operations and validating what many younger 
officers were discovering mistake by mistake at the tactical levels in Iraq.”52 Shortly after 
the 2006 midterm congressional elections, “President George W. Bush initiated a formal 
internal review of Iraq policy among his national security agencies to obtain policy 
options on a way forward in Iraq.”53 The congressional midterm elections of 2006 in 
which the Democrats took control of Congress from the Republican Party were viewed as 
a repudiation of the war.54  
 On January 4, 2007, President Bush delivered his long awaited speech on Iraq, 
The New Way Forward, during a primetime address. In the speech, Bush acknowledged 
“that despite the 2005 national elections in Iraq and the formation of a new Iraqi national 
unity government in 2006, Iraq had not made the security and political gains that he had 
hoped for.”55 Against this backdrop President Bush ordered a “surge” of 40,000 troops to 
provide greater security in order to facilitate greater political reconciliation at the national 
level.56            
 Shortly after his confirmation hearing on January 23rd, 2007, General Petraeus 
51 Ibid., 171. 
52 John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back, 164. 
53 Darin E.W. Johnson, “2007 in Iraq: The Surge and Benchmarks – A New Way Forward,” http://www 
 .wcl.american.edu/journal/ilr/24/documents/Johnson.pdf [accessed October 10 – December 8, 
 2012], 252. 
54 Ibid., 252. 
55 President George W. Bush, “The New Way Forward in Iraqi” [accessed October 10 – January 10, 2007], 
 http://w  ww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html (acknowledging that 
 the situation in Iraq was “unacceptable” to himself, as well as to the American people). 
56Darin E.W. Johnson, “2007 in Iraq: The Surge and Benchmarks – A New Way Forward,” 252. 
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went to see President Bush in the Oval Office. “Betting his presidency on the success of 
the surge, Bush described the commitment of additional forces as a ‘double down’ 
strategy.”57 Petraeus said it was more than that, according to a source briefed after the 
meeting. “This isn’t double down, Mr. President. It’s all in,” Petraeus stated.58 “And we 
need the whole U.S. government to go all in, not just the military.”59 At first, many 
experts viewed the “surge” as a simple reinforcement of American forces.60 However, 
this new strategy was in fact a “comprehensive counterinsurgency approach, a civil 
military campaign that featured a number of important elements.”61   
 At the premise of this new COIN strategy was the idea that the Iraqi population 
was the “center of gravity” that required protection.62 According to Generals Petraeus 
and Raymond T. Ordierno (commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq), this was necessary 
“in order to prevent an escalating cycle of sectarian combat, and also to elicit support 
from the population so that it would not provide large numbers of additional recruits to 
the insurgencies.”63 Another important component of the surge strategy was the “clear, 
hold, and build” concept which became the operative practice during Petraeus’s time in 
Iraq. As noted in FM 3-24, “U.S. forces could not kill or capture its way out of the 
industrial-strength insurgency that confronted U.S. troops in Iraq.”64 Hence, U.S. forces 
57 Paula Broadwell, All In: The Education of General David Petraeus, 129. 
58 Ibid., 129. 
59 Ibid., 129. 
60 John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S. at 
 War in Afghanistan and Iraq (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2012), 164. 
61 Octavian Manea, “Reflections on the “Counterinsurgency Decade”: Small Wars Journal Interview with 
General David H. Petraeus,” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591 
=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=175793 [accessed October 10-September 
1, 2013], 2. 
62 David H. Petraeus, “How We Won in Iraq,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/29/david_ 
 petraeus_how_we_won_the_surge_in_iraq [accessed October 30th – October 30, 2013], 4. 
63 Michael O’Hanlon, “America’s History of Counterinsurgency,” 4. 
64 Peter Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War,  
 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), xii. 
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had “to identify those insurgents and militia members who were ‘reconcilable,’ and then 
had to persuade them to become part of the solution in Iraq rather than a continuing part 
of the problem.”65  
  From January to June 2007, the surge forces gradually deployed to Iraq. Generals 
Petraeus and Ordierno ordered U.S. units to deploy off their FOBs “to establish smaller 
joint security stations and combat outposts in Iraqi neighborhoods and communities.”66 In 
conjunction with community leaders, “Coalition forces emplaced cement barriers to wall 
off neighborhoods and markets to impede the movement of insurgents, militiamen, and 
terrorists.”67 Iraqi units under the supervision of U.S. advisors also manned numerous 
checkpoints that made insurgent and terrorist movement more difficult and “provided 
much-needed security to the Iraqi people to protect them from terrorist violence and 
sectarian intimidation.”68 
 The U.S. military also partnered with Iraqi security forces in supporting local   
neighborhood watch groups nicknamed the “Sons of Iraq.” Despite having been created 
in late 2006, the Awakening movement “could not have survived or spread without the 
support of U.S. commanders and the Iraqi government.”69 According to Peter Mansoor 
(2013), “the arrival of U.S. reinforcements signaled renewed resolve and assured Sunni 
tribal leaders that they would not be abandoned once they turned their guns against al 
Qaeda-Iraq, as had happened once before.”70 Many U.S. commanders were hesitant to 
65 David H. Petraeus, “How We Won in Iraq,” 3. 
66 Peter R, Mansoor, “From Baghdad to Kabul,” 6. 
67 Raymond T. Ordierno, “The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later,” http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/  
 the-surge-in-iraq-one-year-later [accessed October 30-March 13, 2008], 3.  
68 Peter R, Mansoor, “From Baghdad to Kabul,” 6. 
69 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, & Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge, Why Did Violence  
 Decline in Iraq,”  https://www.princeton.edu/~jns/publications/BFS_2012_Testing_the_Surge _ 
 IS_37.1.pdf [accessed October 30-January 31, 2012], 11.  
70 Peter Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus,”266. 
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support these groups at first because “most of them had American blood on their 
hands.”71 Moreover, many Shia leaders including Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki had 
concerns over the spread of the movement into Baghdad and areas near predominantly 
Shiite or mixed communities.72 Thus, Maliki only allowed the United States to support 
awakenings in strictly Sunni areas such as Anbar Province at first.73   
 By the end of 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi government had more than 100,000 “Sons 
of Iraq” (more than 20,000 of them Shi’ite) on their payroll.74 The improved security and 
the increase of Iraqi security forces by more than 140,000 troops along with their 
improved capabilities, “emboldened Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to confront the Jaish 
al-Mahdi militia and bring the vast majority of southern and central Iraq under Iraqi 
government control.”75 Another main component of the surge strategy that helped to 
bolster the security gains made by U.S. and Iraqi forces was the intensive campaign of 
targeted operations to capture or kill key insurgent and militia leaders and operatives by 
U.S. and British Special Operations Forces.76 Under the command of then-Lt. General 
Stanley McChrystal, commander of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
and the Counter-Terrorism Special Operations Task Force, U.S. and British SOF units 
were “relentless in their pursuit of al Qaeda and other Sunni Arab extremist leaders, 
bomb makers, financiers, and propaganda cells – and of key Iranian-supported Shi’ite 
Arab extremists.”77          
 By the end of 2007, as many as 10 to 15 targeted operations were being carried 
71 David H. Petraeus, “How We Won in Iraq,” 6. 
72 Ibid., 266. 
73 Peter R, Mansoor, “From Baghdad to Kabul,” 1. 
74 David H. Petraeus, “How We Won in Iraq,” 6. 
75 Peter R, Mansoor, “From Baghdad to Kabul,” 6. 
76 Peter Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus, xiv. 
77 David H. Petraeus, “How We Won in Iraq,” 5. 
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out a night, “removing from the battlefield a significant proportion of the senior and 
midlevel extremist group leaders, explosives experts, planners, financiers, and organizers 
in in Iraq.”78 In less than a year civilian deaths had decreased by more than 70% as 
violence in Iraq had declined by 85% from its peak at the end of 2006.79 In the Baghdad 
Security Districts specifically, “ethno sectarian attacks and deaths decreased by more 
than 90 percent over the course of 2007.”80 
78 Ibid., 5. 
79 Raymond T. Ordierno, “The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later,” 3. 
80 Ibid., 3. 
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CHAPTER III: FROM VICTORY TO THE BRINK OF DEFEAT: THE UNITED 
STATES IN AFGHANISTAN 2001-2009 
As for the United States’ future in Afghanistan, it will be fire and hell and total defeat, God 
willing, as it was for their predecessors – the Soviets and before them, the British. 
 
-Mullah Omar 
 
 At the beginning of 2002, it appeared the Taliban had all but been defeated. In the 
previous three months “thousands had been killed by American bombs or wounded and 
left to die in their burned-out pickup trucks as the Taliban proved to be little match for 
overwhelming American firepower.”1 According to U.S. intelligence estimates, over 
3,000-4,000 Taliban fighters were killed during this timeframe.2 With the fall of Kabul, 
Kandahar, and other major cities, thousands more were captured by anti-Taliban militias 
including the Northern Alliance.3 Those who escaped death or capture fled to Pakistan4. 
Mullah Omar, with a handful of bodyguards, had gone underground, where he could 
easily avoid the infrequent U.S. military sweeps.5 Thus, the remnants of the Taliban who 
were able to escape into Pakistan were initially a demoralized lot.6 
1 Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” http://newamerica 
 .net/sites /newamerica.net/files/policydocs/kandahar_0.pdf [accessed November 12 – November 
 2010], 7. 
2 Carl Conetta, “Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the 
 Afghanistan War,” http://www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.html [accessed November 13 - J
 January 30, 2002], 4. 
3 Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” 8.  
4 Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Keuhn, “Separating the Taliban from al Qaeda: The Core of Success 
 in Afghanistan,” http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/gregg_sep_tal_alqaeda.pdf  [accessed 
 March 19-February 2011], 4. 
5 Thomas Ruttig, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Negotiations with the Taliban: History and Prospects for 
 the Future,” 6. 
6 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, 
 Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (New York: Penguin Books Limited, 2008), 268. 
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Many senior figures, “including some of Mullah Omar’s chief lieutenants were 
open to the possibility of reconciliation and abandoning the fight.”1 In November 2002, 
“the entire leadership, except for Mullah Omar, gathered in the city of Karachi, Pakistan 
to discuss possible reconciliation with the Afghan government.”2 This group included 
“Tayeb Agha, at one point Mullah Omar’s top aide; Mullah Beradar, the movement’s 
number two after the collapse of the Taliban regime, then already a powerful commander; 
Sayed Muhammad Haqqani, the former ambassador to Pakistan; Mullah Obaidullah, the 
defense minister; Mullah Abdul Razzak, the interior minister; and many others.”3   
 According to Anand Gopal (2010), “at this juncture, these leading Taliban 
members (as well as the rank and file) did not appear to view the government and its 
foreign backers as necessitating a 1980s-type jihad.”4 At the same time, Jalaluddin 
Haqqani, one of the most important Taliban military commanders fighting the Afghan 
government and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, sent his brother Ibrahim to Kabul to meet 
with American and Afghan government officials to inquire about the possibility of 
reconciliation.5  
 Despite these overtures, neither the United States nor the Afghan government saw 
any reason to engage with the Taliban as they considered them to be a spent force.6 
Instead, senior and mid-level Taliban “were hounded, a short-sighted tactic that helped to 
1 Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” 8. 
2 Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Keuhn, “Separating the Taliban from al Qaeda: The Core of Success 
 in Afghanistan,” http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/gregg_sep_tal_alqaeda.pdf  [accessed 
 March 19-February 2011], 5. 
3 Thomas Ruttig, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Negotiations with the Taliban: History and Prospects for 
 the Future,” http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Ruttig _Negotiatio 
 ns _With_The_Taliban_1.pdf [accessed November 13 – May, 2011], 6 
4 Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” 7. 
5 Vahid Brown & Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012, (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2013), 124. 
6 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the War Against the 
 Taliban (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009), 304. . 
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sow the first seeds of insurgency.”7 Many Taliban leaders were double crossed, handed 
over after being promised protection (such as Taliban deputy head of intelligence Abdul 
Haq Waseq) and harassed in their homes.8 Those detained or captured were usually 
mistreated by U.S. and Afghan forces. Moreover, “family members of Taliban and tribal 
elders fell victim to the abuses by individuals associated with the new interim 
government and were alienated and sidelined.”9 Thus, “the failure to grant amnesty to 
Taliban figures who had abandoned the movement and accepted the new Afghan 
government had repercussions far beyond the specific individuals targeted.”10 
 Soon “a sense began to develop among those formerly connected to the regime, 
from senior officials to rank-and-file fighters, that there was no place for them in the 
post-2001 society.”11 Believing that they lacked any other alternatives, many of those 
detained and targeted began reaching out to the Taliban leadership that was regrouping 
across the border in Quetta, Pakistan.12 Leaders such as Tayeb Agha, Mullah Obaidullah, 
and Mullah Beradar, “who were once open to the possibility of reconciliation, slipped 
back into Pakistan and became leading figures in the movement’s resurgence.”13  
 Many Afghans were initially supportive of the international intervention, 
particularly as the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) promised positive changes 
in their lives.14 “Barbershops, DVD stores, and hairdressers began to appear throughout 
Afghanistan as thousands of Afghans rushed out to get cell phones, radios, and television 
7 Kate Clark, “Talking to the Taliban: A British Perspective,” 3. 
8 Ibid., 3. 
9 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” w
 nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pubs/Johnson_CEFQ_May%2007.pdf  [accessed December 1 – May 
 2007], 97. 
10 Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” 7. 
11 Ibid.,” 7. 
12 Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Keuhn, “Separating the Taliban from al Qaeda,” 6.  
13 Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” 11.  
14 Ibid., 11. 
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sets.”15 Many Afghans were also very thankful for all of the aid and assistance being 
provided by foreign aid workers as they helped to build new schools, hospitals, and 
bridges. They also took advantage of new roads being built throughout the country.16  
 Between 2002 and 2004, this attitude began to change “as many Pashtuns became 
disenchanted with the ATA which was widely viewed as being controlled by the Panshiri 
Tajik Faction that held the government’s key ministries of defense, interior, and foreign 
affairs.”17 Pashtun “suspicions and mistrust of the government were further heightened”18 
by the Afghan Transitional Government’s inability to protect Pashtuns from abuses being 
carried out by insurgents and the various anti-Taliban militias. During the invasion the 
United States “driven by immediate military objectives,”19 entered alliances with a group 
of warlords and anti-Taliban commanders that “captured state apparatus for personal 
gain; warlords and semi-warlords often fought over shares of the state and monopolized 
access to the government, foreign forces, and resources, including contracts with those 
same forces.”20 The U.S. unknowingly became a pawn used by their Afghan partners to 
target their enemies.         
 Moreover, the new Afghan government, supported by the international 
community, “was plagued by entrenched corruption and nepotism.”21 According to 
Transparency International on their rates of corruption in 2002, Afghanistan ranked 179th, 
with only Somalia ranking lower.22 Despite his pledges to combat corruption, Hamid 
Karzai “did not support his anti-corruption squads when they attempted to arrest and 
15 Ibid., 196.  
16 Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified,” 196. 
17 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” 97. 
18 Ibid., 98. 
19 Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Keuhn, “Separating the Taliban from al Qaeda,” 8. 
20 Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Keuhn, “Separating the Taliban from al Qaeda,” 8.  
21 Ibid., 8. 
22 Ian S. Livingston & Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” 23. 
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remove corrupt ministers and governors, especially those officials who were friends.”23 
In addition,” the underpaid Afghan National Police (ANP) earned a reputation for 
demanding bribes which infuriated those they shook down and played into the hands of 
the Taliban.”24 Not surprisingly, Karzai began to appear weak and corrupt to many 
Afghans who grew to despise corrupt politicians, judges, and police who represented the 
local face of the Afghan government.25 His appeal began to diminish in the West as well 
as many foreign officials began referring to Afghanistan as “Corruptistan.”26 
 Many Afghans were also becoming upset over the lack of international aid being  
provided by the international community.27 Despite the spending of millions of dollars, a 
majority of Afghans continued to live in extreme poverty. According to Matt Waldman 
(2008), “far too much aid has been prescriptive and driven by donor priorities rather than 
responsive to evident Afghan needs and preferences.”28 Moreover, the average aid going 
to Afghanistan per person was $80, while postwar Bosnians, a far more advanced 
European people, received $275.”29 Yet, Afghanistan “was the poorest country in 
Eurasia, with a life expectancy in the low 40s and one of the world’s highest infant 
mortality rates.”30          
 Finally, a big source of frustration and fuel for the insurgency “was the heavy-
handed tactics of U.S. military operations in Pashtun areas of the country.”31 Despite 
warnings from many Afghan observers, such “hard-knock” operations continued to be 
23 Michael Huffman, “How the U.S. Lost the Corruption Battle in Afghanistan,” 6. 
24 Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified, 197. 
25 Dexter Filkins,“Inside Corrupt-istan: A Loss of Faith in Leaders,” New York Times, September 4, 2010. 
26 Ibid., 1. 
27 Matt Waldman, “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.ox 
 fam.org/ files/ACBAR_aid_effectiveness_paper_pdf [accessed December 7 – March 2008], 2. 
28 Ibid., 2. 
29 Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified, 198 
30 Ibid., 198.  
31 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy,” 97. 
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standard procedure for several years, alienating much of the populace.32 Meanwhile, the 
leadership at CENTCOM continued to view the Afghan conflict “as one of 
counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency, and conducted operations in the rural areas 
accordingly.”33 As one U.S. PRT leader commented, “Black Ops [Special Operations 
counterterrorism forces] do more damage in my province in one night than I can undo in 
six months.”34 
Taliban Resurgent: 2002-2008 
  Throughout the spring of 2002, the remnants of the Taliban that were able to 
escape into Pakistan began preparations “to launch the insurgency that Mullah Omar had 
promised during the Taliban’s last days in power.”35 Commanders such as Mullah 
Dadullah were sent to recruit new fighters from Pashtun villages in both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to launch a renewed “jihad” against the Afghan government and the U.S-led 
coalition. Many Pakistani tribesmen from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) also joined the resistance as “small mobile training camps were established 
along the border with Pakistan by al Qaeda and Taliban fighters to train recruits in 
insurgent warfare and terrorist tactics.”36       
 Upon reestablishing contact with his commanders, “Mullah Omar appointed a 
ten-man council known as the Quetta Shura (QS) or the Rahbari Shura (Supreme Taliban 
Shura) to coordinate strategy amongst the group.”37 The QS consists of four regional 
military councils located in Quetta, Peshawar, Miramshah, and Gerdi Jangal, and 
32 Mark Sedra, “The Forgotten War Shows No Sign of Abating,” http://fpif.org/the_forgotten_war_ 
 shows_ no_ sign_of_abating/ [accessed December 10 – April 1, 2003], 2. 
33 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy,” 97 
34 Mark Sedra, “The Forgotten War Shows No Sign of Abating,” 2. 
35 Griff Witte, “Afghanistan War, “2001-Present,” 2. 
36 Ibid., 2.  
37 Bill Roggio, “The Afghan Taliban’s Top Leaders,” http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/ 
 the_ talibans _top _lea.php [accessed September 3 – February 23, 2010], 1. 
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includes ten committees: Military, Finance, Political Affairs, Culture and Information, 
Interior Affairs, Prison and Refugees, Education Recruitment, Repatriation Committees, 
and the Ulema Council.38   
Figure 1: Taliban Regional Military Councils 
 
Source: Qazi, Shehzad H. “The Neo-Taliban,” p.7, http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_ 
Neo%20Taliban_Qazi_WEB.pdf. 
 
 Mullah Omar also appointed four senior commanders to reorganize the fighters in 
the southern provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul.39 These were Mullah 
Baradar Akhund, Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Usmani, Mullah Dadullah, and Mullah 
Abdul Razzaq. “All four men had close links to bin Laden and were known for their 
belief in global jihad.”40 In case he was captured or killed, Mullah Omar also appointed 
Usmani as his successor.41          
 In Afghanistan’s eastern Pashtun provinces the Taliban’s was headed by Saif ur-
Rahman Mansur, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani. They operated out 
38 Ibid.,1. 
39 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, 
 Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (Penguin Books Limited, 2008), 241. 
40 Shehzad H. Qazi, “The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency & the American Endgame in Afghanistan,” 
 http://www .ispu.org/pdfs/586_ispu%20report_neo%20taliban_qazi_web.pdf [accessed December 
 – February 2011], 7. 
41 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 241. 
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of Miramshah, in North Waziristan, one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In 
the 1980s, Haqqani was a major recipient of CIA money and arms routed through the 
ISI.42            
 After 9/11, “the ISI promoted Haqqani as a possible moderate Taliban, and he 
visited Islamabad under ISI protection to talk to the CIA, just before the U.S. invasion in 
October 2001.”43 During the invasion, the ISI asked the U.S. not to bomb Haqqani’s 
tribal home of Khost, “saying that a deal with him was still possible, but Haqqani was a 
firm believer in al Qaeda.”44 In 2002, U.S. SOF made at least three attempts to kill him, 
including bombing a mosque near his home, “an attempt that killed seventeen people-but 
he always seemed to be well tipped off before any U.S. attacks.”45  
Figure 2: Taliban Insurgent Groups 
 
 
Source: Qazi, Shehzad H. “The Neo-Taliban,” p.7, http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_  
 
The Taliban received another boost when the Iranian government allowed 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to leave his exile in Meshed, Iran. “Hekmatyar and his group 
Hizb-i-Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG) received extensive U.S. support against the Soviet Union, 
42 Jeffrey A. Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/ files/Haqq
 an i_Network_0.pdf [accessed December 8 – October 2010], 1. 
43 Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Keuhn, “Separating the Taliban from al Qaeda,” 8. 
44 Ibid., 8. 
45 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002 
 -2007, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 176 
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but turned against its mujahedin colleagues after the Communist government fell in 
1992.”46 The Taliban displaced HIG as the main opposition to the 1992-1996 Rabbani 
government.47 After secret talks with the ISI in Dubai, Hekmatyar returned to 
Afghanistan or Peshawar, Pakistan in February 2002.48 Shortly after returning to 
Afghanistan, the ISI allowed Hekmatyar to set up a base in the sprawling Shamshatoo 
refugee camp outside Peshawar, “where many of his former fighters lived.”49 He became 
an ally of the Taliban and al Qaeda, “yet never fully merged with either unit.”50 
 Throughout the fall and winter of 2002, hundreds of Taliban and foreign fighters 
began the long and dangerous journey back into Afghanistan. According to Ahmed 
Rashid (2008), the Taliban did not just slip back across the border in the winter of 
2002/2003; “they arrived in droves, by bus, taxi, and tractor, on camels and horses, and 
on foot.” 51 The Taliban also began to move weapons, ammunition, and food supplies in 
Afghanistan, adding to those stockpiles that they had stored away during their retreat in 
2001. U.S. and Afghan forces began increasingly to unearth caches of new weapons. “In 
November alone they uncovered 475 large and small weapons caches. In one cache, 
2,100 brand new AK 47 rifles were discovered along with 70,000 mortar shells and 
43,000 rockets.”52 
 Between 2004 and 2006, “Afghan groups developed a close relationship with 
Iraqi insurgent groups, who provided information on making and using various kinds of 
46 Global Security.Org, “Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party),” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/  
 para/hizbi-islami.htm, [accessed February 18-February 16, 2014], 2. 
47 Ibid., 2.  
48 Understandingwar.com, “Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG),” http://www.understandingwar.org/hizb-i-isla
 mi-gulbuddin-hig [accessed December 8 – October 2010], 2. 
49 Global Security.Org, “Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party),” 2. 
50 Ibid., 2. 
51 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 241. 
52 Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: American’s War in Afghanistan, (New York: W.W. Norton 
 & Company, 2010), 91. 
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remote-controlled devices and timers.”53 According to Brian Glyn Williams (2008), U.S. 
military leaders “noticed an increase in the use of Iraq-style IEDs in Afghanistan at this 
time”54 as Islamic militants in Iraq “furnished information through the internet and face-
to-face visits to the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups.”55  
 By 2006, “a full-bodied insurgency had developed in Afghanistan as the Taliban 
stepped up attacks with IEDs, and suicide bombers, as well as assassinations and 
kidnappings.”56 According to Seth G. Jones, “the overall number of insurgent-initiated 
attacks increased by 400 percent from 2002 to 2006, and the number of deaths from these 
attacks increased more than 800 during the same period.”57 Many of the attacks were 
against Afghan government officials, though others targeted civilians and Coalition 
forces. “The number of suicide attacks also quadrupled, remotely detonated bombings 
more than doubled, and armed attacks nearly tripled.”58  
 As the demands of combat grew, “differences between NATO allies over 
‘caveats’ – restrictions placed by some European governments on the activities in which 
their troops were authorized to engage –became rancorous.”59 According to David 
Auerswald and Stephen Saideman (2009), “there are between fifty and eighty known 
restrictions that constrain NATO commanders in Afghanistan.”60 However, the number 
53 Brian Glyn Williams, “Mullah Omar’s Missiles: A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in Afghanistan,”  
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/mullah-omars-missiles-field-report-
suicide-bombers-afghanistan [accessed December 23-Winter 2008], 5.  
54 Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad,” International Security 
 (Spring 2008), 35. 
55 Ibid., 25.  
56 Ibid., 7.  
57 Ibid., 7. 
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 monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf [accessed April 4-January 2008], 49.  
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 in Afghanistan,” http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20at%20War.pdf 
 [accessed December 23 – September 2009], 8. 
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of informal and unstated caveats is not known.61 At least “one nation may not deploy its 
troops at night. At least one country’s force was not allowed to participate in missions 
alongside the troops from a historical rival.”62 Some U.S. soldiers began referring to 
ISAF by a range of derogatory names such as “I Suck at Fighting,” “I Saw Americans 
Fighting,” “I Sunbathe at FOBS.”63 “The latter was a reference to the small, heavily 
fortified forward operating bases established in rural areas.”64 
 Moreover, commanders on the ground “were contending with unrealistic demands 
from their capitals to promote reconstruction and development, which they were unable 
to execute because of the growing insurgency, and the absence of aid officials, who were 
deterred by the lack of security.”65 American commanders had “access to substantial 
amounts of money that they could direct towards reconstruction projects, and were able 
to use these funds to advance tactical goals, but improvements that were made often 
could not be sustained.”66  
 Frustrated with continued violence, in 2007, NATO settled on a more integrated 
strategy involving pre-emptive combat and improved governance.67 During 2007, U.S. 
and ISAF forces, “bolstered by the infusion of 3,200 U.S. troops and 3,800 
NATO/partner forces, pre-empted an anticipated Taliban ‘spring offensive’ with 
Operation Achilles (March 2007) to expel militants from the Sangin district of northern 
61 David P. Auerswald & Stephen M. Saideman, “NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats 
 in Afghanistan,” 8. 
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Helmand Province and the area around the key Kajaki dam.”68 The Taliban “spring 
offensive” did not materialize.69 The operations (including Operation Silicon), had a 
major success on May 12, 2007, “when the purportedly ruthless leader of the Taliban 
insurgency in the south, Mullah Dadullah, was killed by British Special Forces during a 
raid on a compound in the volatile Helmand province.”70     
 To address “the widespread perception that the U.S. and NATO war effort in 
Afghanistan was failing,”71 the Bush administration concluded in early 2008 that the 
United States needed to focus more attention and resources on the Afghan situation than 
it had previously.72 Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen largely 
confirmed the view that the Afghan war was “under-resourced” in his December 11, 2007 
testimony in which he stated that, in Iraq, “the United States does what it must, while in 
Afghanistan, the United States does what it can.”73 Thus, in the first five months of 2008, 
the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan increased by over 80% with a surge of 21,643 
more troops, bringing the total number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan from 26,607 in 
January to 48,250 in June.74  
 By the end of 2008, there were over 65,000 U.S. and NATO troops in 
Afghanistan.75 In another significant move, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
“approved a plan to place almost all U.S. troops, including those performing OEF anti-
68 Ibid., 42. 
69 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, 
 Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (Penguin Books Limited, 2008), 394. 
70 Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-War Governance Security, and U.S. Policy,” http://www.law.  
 umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL30588_09102007.pdf [accessed January 18- 
 September 10, 2007], 1. 
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insurgent missions, under General David McKiernan’s NATO/ISAF command, in order 
to create unity of command, and to improve flexibility of deployment of U.S. forces 
throughout the battlefield.”76       
 Despite these changes in U.S. and NATO strategy, support for the Taliban 
continued to grow as the group regained most of the territory it had lost in 2001. 
According to testimony provided by then-Director of National Intelligence Mike 
McConnell to the Senate, “by the end of 2008, the Karzai government controlled only 
30% of the country, while the Taliban controlled 10%, and tribes and local groups 
controlled the remainder.”77 Like the mujahideen during the Afghan-Soviet war, the 
Taliban controlled the countryside while the government controlled the towns.78  
 Moreover, “3,276 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) detonated or were 
detected before blowing up in Afghanistan in 2008.79 This was a 45% increase compared 
to 2007.”80 The number of troops killed by bombs also more than doubled in 2008 from 
75 to 161.81 “The number of Taliban-related incidents per day also jumped by almost 50 
percent, as Afghanistan experienced 18.4 attacks per day in 2008 compared to 12.4 in 
2007.”82 Thus, by the end of 2008 a new strategy was needed to pull Afghanistan back 
from the brink of failure.  
A New Strategy is Needed: January-December 2009    
 When President Obama took office in January 2009, domestic opinion in the 
76 Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-War Governance Security, and U.S. Policy,” 24. 
77 Ibid., 22. 
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United States and Europe was turning against the war. “High unemployment rates and 
budget cutbacks at home, coupled with the deteriorating security in Afghanistan and 
Hamid Karzai’s flawed August 2009 reelection, soured Americans on the huge 
investment Washington had made in the Afghan war.”83 Over a thousand U.S. soldiers 
had been killed, thousands more wounded, and $120.9 billion had been spent since 
2001.84 “Many questioned whether it was worth sacrificing more lives and money on the 
deadlocked eight-year-long conflict."85 A poll conducted three months after Obama’s 
inauguration on April 25, 2009, showed that only 43 percent of Americans thought the 
Afghan war was worth fighting.86 “The disappointing trends in Afghanistan suggested 
that the percentage of Americans opposing the Afghan war would only grow.” 87  
 During the 2008 Presidential Election, “then-Senator Barack Obama repeatedly 
said the real front of the war against terrorists was on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border 
and not in Iraq.”88 Moreover, he believed “that the war in Afghanistan had been under-
resourced and marginalized in the five years since the invasion of Iraq.”89 Having 
campaigned on ending the war in Iraq, the new administration was aware that, within a 
year, the American public and media would consider the Afghan war “Obama’s war.”90 
Thus, Obama and his cabinet needed to come up with a strategy that would break the 
Taliban’s momentum, and produce success before the 2012 general elections.  
 Shortly after being sworn in, Obama immediately dispatched 17,000 more troops 
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to add to the 36,000 Americans already deployed in Afghanistan, and ordered a strategy 
review of the conduct of the war. Picked to lead this review was Bruce Riedel, a retired 
CIA analyst “who possessed a deep knowledge of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and had recently published a book about al Qaeda in South Asia.”91 Upon 
arriving in Washington, Riedel and his team immediately began work on coming up with 
policy recommendations for the review which soon became known as “AfPak.”  
 Findings from the AfPak review started to become public on March 27th as 
Obama stated that the core goal of any new U.S. strategy would be to “disrupt, dismantle, 
and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan.”92 Other recommendations made by 
the Riedel review included “the need to shift strategic focus to Pakistan—a country with 
a Muslim population of 180 million, an increasingly volatile and destructive insurgency 
of its own, and a military with an ever-growing number of nuclear weapons.”93 At the 
same time, “progress in Afghanistan was clearly linked to progress in Pakistan and vice 
versa.”94 Thirdly, the review did not set the defeat of the Taliban as an objective. Rather, 
“it said that the Taliban’s momentum must be reversed.”95 In order to achieve these 
objectives, Riedel and his team argued that a fully resourced civil-military 
counterinsurgency strategy was needed.96 
 On May 11th, President Obama made another unexpected move by firing General 
David McKiernan, then the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan.97 Believing 
“that a new commander was needed to implement the administration’s new AfPak 
91 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus,” 6. 
92 Ibid. 6. 
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strategy,”98 Obama followed the advice of Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff by appointing Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the former commander of Special 
Operations in Iraq. Even though the president had only met the general briefly and knew 
very little about him, “the Pentagon believed that McChrystal was the right man for the 
job due to his unique skill set in counterinsurgency.”99   
 “Having embraced counterinsurgency doctrine “with the zeal of a convert,”100 
McChrystal was “determined to place his personal stamp on Afghanistan.”101 Upon 
arriving in Kabul in June 2009, “McChrystal and his team set about changing the culture 
of ISAF by banning alcohol on all NATO bases, kicking out Burger King and other 
symbols of American excess, and threatening to turn the one piece of greenery at NATO 
headquarters in Kabul into a shooting range.”102 Even though few could argue with the 
appointment of Stanley McChrystal and the policy recommendations made by the Riedel 
review, many felt that the central “CT versus COIN” debate was far from being fully 
resolved. Thus, months of political wrangling lay ahead on what strategy the Obama 
administration should implement.103                                      
The McChrystal Assessment  
 One of the most important options being considered by the Obama administration 
during the fall of 2009 was a classified 66-page assessment written by General Stanley 
McChrystal on the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. “Seen by many as a 
searing indictment of American-led NATO military operations and a corrupt Afghan 
98 John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, & John K. Wood, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back, 229. 
99 Ann Scoot Tyson, “Gen. David McKiernan Ousted as Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan,” 1..  
100 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus,” 6 
101 Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General: The Rolling Stone profile of Stanley McChrystal that 
 changed history,” http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622  
 [accessed January 10-June 22, 2010], 3. 
102 Ibid., 3.  
103 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus,” 6. 
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civilian government, pitted against a surprisingly adaptive and increasingly dangerous 
insurgency,”104 McChrystal’ s report and recommendations met both support and 
criticism when delivered to senior policy makers on August 30.     
 Even though the assessment was conducted in response to a formal directive 
issued by SECDEF Gates on June 26, 2009,  
“many White House officials, including Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and senior 
political advisor David Axelrod, saw it as a brazen attempt to reopen the ‘COIN 
versus CT’ debate in order to influence the resourcing for a much broader 
population-centric COIN campaign that moved Afghanistan back to the 
centerpiece of the overarching strategy.”105  
 
Moreover, these officials believed that the “military was trying to box the president in 
and force him to commit to significant troop increases in Afghanistan."106 
 Despite these suspicions, “very few could argue with the report’s findings which 
warned that Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-
term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome 
where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”107 The assessment also offers a 
harsh critique of the Afghan government, arguing that corruption is as much a threat to 
Afghanistan as the insurgency is.108 “The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of 
power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and 
ISAF’s own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government.”109 The 
result has been a “crisis of confidence among Afghans,” McChrystal writes. “Further, a 
104 Eric Schmitt, “In Afghanistan Assessment, a Catalyst for Obama,” New York Times, September 21,  
 2009. 
105 Mark Memmott, “Gates: Obama Made Solid Decisions,” 2. 
106 Peter Baker, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” New York Times, December 5, 
 2009.  
107 Stanley McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment.” http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
 srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf [ January 13 – August 30, 2009], 1-2. 
108 Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure,” The Washington Post,  September 21,  
 2009. 
109 Stanley McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” 2-4. 
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perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against 
the insurgents.”110         
 General McChrystal is equally critical of the U.S. led NATO military alliance that 
he had led since June 15. According to him, the key weakness of U.S. and Coalition 
forces is that they are not defending the Afghan population aggressively enough.   
“Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner 
that distances us – physically and psychologically – from the people we seek to 
protect … The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves. 
ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in the local communities, nor 
how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and 
criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population.”111    
    
 The general also notes that “coalition intelligence-gathering has focused on how to 
attack insurgents, hindering ISAF’s comprehension of the critical aspects of Afghan 
society.”112 
 At the end of his report, McChrystal outlines a plan to implement a fully 
resourced population-centric counterinsurgency strategy that would reverse the Taliban’s 
momentum and allow the Afghan government to control these contested territories.113 He 
also makes one last plea that his command must be bolstered if failure is to be averted. 
"ISAF requires more forces,"114 he states. “Failure to provide adequate resources also 
risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, high overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss 
of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission failure.”115 
 The public airing of a leaked copy of General McChrystal’ s analysis on 
September 21 by Bob Woodward of the Washington Post did not come at a good time for 
110 Ibid., 2-10.  
111 Ibid., 2-10.  
112 Ibid., 2-10.  
113 Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure,” 2.  
114 Stanley McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” 2-21. 
115 Stanley McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” 2-21. 
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the Obama administration.116 Afghans had just gone to the polls a month earlier on 
August 20th and “the election was seen by many as flawed, manipulated, and 
illegitimate.”117 Thus, the election raised serious questions as to whether or not there was 
a legitimate Afghan government for the United States to support. 
The 2009 Strategy Review: The Afghan Surge     
 The remainder of the fall of 2009 would be used for the second major Afghan 
strategy review of the year. The president and the NSC staff directed the review. The 
purpose of these review sessions was to debate the pros and cons of a fully-resourced 
counterinsurgency campaign versus counterterrorism-centric.118 There was also a third 
strategy called “counterterrorism plus,” by its strongest proponent Vice President Joe 
Biden.119 The issue of troop levels remained undecided throughout this period as well.120 
 The first meeting with the president took place on September 13th as Obama 
posed a series of questions:  
“Does America need to defeat the Taliban in order to defeat al Qaeda as well? 
Can a counterinsurgency strategy work in Afghanistan given the problems with its 
government? If the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan would a nuclear-
armed Pakistan be next?”121  
 
This skepticism was reinforced by Vice President Biden, who expressed opposition to an 
expansive strategy requiring a big troop increase.122 
 Instead, Biden proposed an alternative strategy dubbed “counterterrorism plus.”123 
This approach boiled down to retaining the massive American bases at Bagram and 
116 Peter Bergen, The Longest War, 321. 
117 Ibid., 321.  
118 Peter Baker, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” New York Times, December 5, 
 2009. 
119 Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus,” 79. 
120 John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, & John K. Wood, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back, 245. 
121 Peter Baker, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” New York Times, December 5, 
 2009.  
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Kandahar, which would allow SOF teams to raid anywhere in the country, improving the 
quality of training Afghan forces and expanding reconciliation efforts to peel off some 
Taliban fighters.  The problem with this plan was that “it did not clarify how such a 
policy would substantially differ from what George W. Bush’s policy of maintaining a 
light footprint approach and pursuing a counterterrorism mission.”124   
 According to Bob Woodward’s 2010 book, Obama’s Wars, the vice chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General James Cartwright), went behind the back of his boss 
Admiral Mike Mullen “who despised the counterterrorism option.”125 Against Mullen’s 
objections, Cartwright worked up numbers for Biden that “showed that it would take an 
additional twenty thousand soldiers to execute counterterrorism plus: half of them Special 
Forces to hunt insurgents, and half of them trainers to build up the Afghan army.”126 The 
president never seemed to have seriously considered this approach.127  
Tensions between the military and the Obama administration reached a new high 
on October 1, when General McChrystal made it clear during a public appearance that he 
“believed a policy in Afghanistan that focused largely on counterterrorism, Biden’s 
preferred option, would lead to failure.”128 He also said that “success required a full-
blown counterinsurgency strategy.”129 White House officials were furious upon learning 
about the statement as “National Security Advisor, Jim Jones, shortly called Admiral 
Mullen after learning about the comments and told him that McChrystal’s speech was 
123 Ibid., 5. 
124 Peter Bergen, “The General’s War,” http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/the-generals-victory-   
 obamas-wars-woodward [January 7 – December 6, 2010], 4. 
125 Peter Baker. “Woodward Book Says Afghanistan Divided White House,” New York Times, September 
 21. 2010 
126 Peter Bergen, “The General’s War,” 4. 
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 October 1, 2009. 
129 Bob Woodward. Obama’s Wars, 180. 
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insubordinate and stupid.”130 The president quickly “summoned McChrystal to Denmark- 
where he was receiving the Nobel Peace Prize at the time – and gave the general what 
one can only assume was something of a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.”131 
The episode “underscored the uneasy relationship between the military and a new 
president, who aides said, was determined not be as deferential as he believed his 
predecessor, George W. Bush, was for years in Iraq.”132 The military on the other hand, 
“needed to adjust to a less experienced but a more skeptical commander in chief.”133 The 
military also saw “Obama in the same light as his democratic predecessor in the White 
House, Bill Clinton, a lightweight on foreign policy with no real understanding of war-
fighting.”134 Moreover, commanders such as David Petraeus trusted very few of Obama’s 
civilian political advisors, especially senior political advisor David Axelrod, who they 
believed to be “a complete spin doctor.”135 
 On October 9th, President Obama and his national security team began to review 
the troop levels proposed by General McChrystal that would be needed to reverse the 
Taliban’s momentum.136 The first option was “a further eleven thousand trainers to build 
up the Afghan army; the second option was forty thousand more soldiers through 2013; 
and the last an additional 85,000.”137 McChrystal, Petraeus, and Mullen all understood 
that the first and third options were not going to go over well.138 “The first did not suffice 
to make much of a difference in disrupting the Taliban, while the third was politically out 
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 Afghanistan, (New York: Blue Rider Press, 2012), 143 
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of the question.”139 As before, many White House officials were skeptical and had many 
misgivings about send more American forces to Afghanistan.140 According to Peter 
Baker of the New York Times, one senior official asked in an interview: “Why wasn’t 
there a 25 number. He then answered his own question: It would have been too 
tempting.”141 Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, the point person at the National Security 
Council for Afghanistan under both Bush and Obama, is quoted as saying that “I can’t 
tell you that the prospect here for success is very high.”142 
 The only members of the president’s national security team that seemed in favor 
of a counterinsurgency strategy and a large increase of American forces was Robert 
Gates and Hillary Clinton. According to one member of McChrystal’s inner circle, 
“Hillary had Stan’s back during the strategic review.”143 Like Clinton, Secretary Gates 
was also sympathetic to General McChrystal’s request. Initially, “Gates was skeptical of 
any troop increase, but two things had changed his mind by late summer.”144 The first 
was an article in The Weekly Standard called “We’re Not the Soviets in Afghanistan,” 
written by Fred Kagan (who had made the case for the surge in Iraq).145 In his article, 
Kagan noted that the Soviets had rolled in with brute force, their arsenals contained no 
precision weapons, and their soldiers had no experience in COIN.146 The second was the 
66-page classified report written by McChrystal.147       
 On October 22nd, the National Security Council produced  a ‘consensus memo,’ 
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that concluded that “the United States should focus on diminishing the Taliban 
insurgency, but not destroying it; building up certain critical ministries; and transferring 
authority to Afghan security forces.”148 With still no consensus on the number of troops 
that should be sent to Afghanistan, Obama met with Sectaries Clinton and Gates on 
October 26th to gauge their feelings about a possible troop surge. Both of them expressed 
support for General McChrystal’s request for 40,000 troops or something close to it. 
Despite Clinton’s and Gates’s support for a fully-resourced counterinsurgency strategy, 
Obama remained wary of committing a significant number of troops.149   
 Four days later on October 30th, Obama met with the Joint Chiefs and emphasized 
the need for speed to break the Taliban’s momentum. “Why can’t I get the troops in 
faster he asked? ” 150 If they were going to do this, he concluded, “it only made sense to 
do this quickly, to have impact and keep the war from dragging on forever.”151 Having an 
a better idea of what the president was asking for, Secretary Gates began coming up with 
a plan that would make up the differences in the number of troops to be sent to 
Afghanistan and for how long they would be deployed there.152 The plan, called Option 
2A was presented to Obama on November 11 and gave McChrystal the bulk of his 
request.”153 Upon learning of this option, the president reportedly complained that it 
would take too long to get the troops in Afghanistan. “What I’m looking for is a surge. 
This has to be a surge.”154         
 This statement represented a stark contrast from when Obama was a senator. In 
148 Peter Baker, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” 9. 
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2007, then-Senator Obama staunchly opposed President Bush’s buildup in Iraq and 
questioned the effectiveness of a COIN based strategy in Iraq. Thus, “the president was 
hoping that the same strategy that helped to save Iraq led by the same general (Petraeus) 
could once again snatch strategic victory from the jaws of defeat, this time in 
Afghanistan.”155 However, unlike the Bush plan, Mr. Obama wanted from the start to 
speed up a withdrawal as well.       
 By the beginning of November, the idea of some sort of time frame was starting 
to take on momentum.156 Shortly before Hamid Karzai’s inauguration to a second term, 
Secretary of State Clinton met with him to suggest that he use his speech to outline a 
schedule for taking over security of the country.157 Upon hearing about this suggestion, 
Karzai was “more than enthusiastic.”158 On the evening of November 23rd, the president 
gathered his team to present a revised version of Option 2A, this one titled “Max 
Leverage,” pushing 30,000 troops into Afghanistan by mid-2010 and beginning to pull 
them out by July 2010. “As a quid pro quo for securing a substantial troop increase, 
Obama told military officials that they had to get troops in Afghanistan quickly and out 
before the 2013 drawdown date they had originally proposed.”159 The July 2011 
withdrawal date was also designed by Obama officials “to send a signal to the American 
public that the commitment to Afghanistan was not an open-ended one.”160  
  Upon learning about this revised plan, many Pentagon officials, including 
Petraeus and McChrystal, had misgivings about setting a time frame for withdrawal, 
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“fearing that it would be used by Taliban leaders to boost their fighters’ morale.”161 Thus, 
Secretary Gates countered with a “withdrawal” date of July, 2011 to bridge over the 
differences between the Pentagon and the White House.162  
Most of the president’s advisors and military staff concurred with the plan. The 
only one to have deep reservations about it was Joe Biden, who once again expressed 
skepticism about any plan that required more troops. On November 29, Obama 
summoned his national security team to the White House to announce his decision. 
Having finally decided on a strategy, the president announced that he would send 30,000 
troops as quickly as possible, and then begin the withdrawal in July 2011. “In deference 
to Gates’s concerns, the pace and endpoint of the withdrawal would be determined by 
conditions at the time.”163 Having secured the support of his advisors, Obama then called 
General McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry to make them aware of his 
decision.          
 Two days later on December 1, 2009, Obama finally announced his decision 
during a speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. In his 
33-minute address, the president set out a strategy that would send thirty thousand 
additional troops to Afghanistan to reverse Taliban gains in large parts of the country, 
increase the pressure on Afghan authorities to build its own military capacity and a more 
effective government, and step up attacks on al Qaeda in Pakistan.164 He also delivered a 
pointed message to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, saying, “the days of providing a 
blank check are over and that the United States could not afford and should not have to 
161 Peter Baker, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” 10. 
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shoulder an open-ended commitment.”165 Thus, Obama, vowed to start bringing 
Americans troops home during the fall of 2011.   
165 Ewen Macskill, “Barack Obama’s War: The Final Push in Afghanistan,” The Guardian, December 1, 
 2009.   
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CHAPTER IV: SECURING AFGHANISTAN’S POPULATION AND BORDERS 
“You can surge troops, but you can't surge trust.” – MG Larry D. Nicholson 
 One of the main goals of the counterinsurgency strategy implemented by Generals 
Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus was to win over the “hearts and minds” of the 
Afghan people by securing the population. According to FM 3-24, counterinsurgency is a 
contest between insurgents and the government for control and the support of the 
population. 1 One of the “manual’s core assumptions is that the main challenge facing 
counterinsurgents is not killing their opponents, but rather finding them in the first 
place.”2 Thus, counterinsurgent forces must win over the support of the people and 
“protect any informants who come forward with information that is useful in locating the 
enemy.”3 
 In order to protect the population, counterinsurgents must be able to control key 
terrain, “both natural and man-made, in and around major urban areas, as well as the 
border regions between neighboring countries.” 4 Counterinsurgents must also be able to 
achieve increased levels of security and isolate enemy forces.5 Unfortunately, there is no 
simple metric or easy way for determining the number of troops needed to win a 
counterinsurgency campaign. 
1 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Washington: Department of 
 Defense, 2006),  1-1. 
2 Jeffrey A. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and  
Practice,” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2011.625768 [accessed January 
20 - November 29, 2011], 558.  
3 Ibid., 558. 
4 Hugh D. Blair “Challenges With Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan”  http://www.hsdl.org/ 
 ?view&did=7013 63 [accessed  January 19 – February 28, 2011], 8. 
5 Ibid., 8. 
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 Upon review, “Field Manual 3-24 recommends that force requirements should be 
measured in terms of “troop density”, or the ratio between counterinsurgents and local 
inhabitants in the area of operations (AO).”1 According to Paragraph 1-67 of FM 3-24,  
 “No predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures 
 success in [counterinsurgency] . . . . A better force requirement gauge is troop 
 density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police 
 forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density 
 recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 
 1,000 residents in an [area of operations]. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 
 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective 
 [counterinsurgency] operations; however, as with any fixed ratio, such 
 calculations remain very dependent on the situation.”2 
 
Based off this ratio, a counterinsurgent force of 725,000 troops would be needed to 
secure Afghanistan’s population of 29 million people.3 This is a number five times higher 
than the number of troops on the ground during the peak of the surge in the summer of 
2011.4  
 At first look, it would appear that the U.S. COIN strategy implemented by 
Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus does not meet the minimum troop 
density level requirements recommended by FM 3-24. However, as mentioned above, 
“any fixed troop ratio remains very dependent on the situation.”5  Factors such as the 
security situation on the ground, available manpower & resources, and availability of 
native security forces can help offset the number of troops needed to secure the 
population.6 Using FM 3-24 as a guideline, the beginning part of this chapter will 
compare troop density levels before, during, and after the surge to determine whether the 
1 Jeffrey A. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency,” 7. 
2 Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,” http://strategic 
 studies institute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/09winter/goode.pdf [accessed January 20 – 
 Winter 2009-2010], 46. 
3 Hugh D. Blair “Challenges With Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan,”8. 
4 Jeffrey A. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency,” 560.  
5 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1-68. 
6 Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,” 49.  
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U.S.’s counterinsurgency and accompanying surge strategy satisfy the minimum troop 
density level requirements advocated by FM 3-24.  
 This chapter will also compare troop density levels before, during, and after the 
surge to those of other recent counterinsurgency campaigns to see where Afghanistan 
places among the operations that succeeded and those that did not. Since current U.S. 
doctrine on force requirements is based off recent American and European COIN and 
nation-building operations,7 this study utilized the 22 case studies used by James 
Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, and et. in their 2008 study, Europe’s Role in Nation-Building: 
From the Balkans to the Congo. The first volume compares inputs and outcomes for eight 
U.S.-led nation-building missions: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq.  
 The second compares inputs and outcomes for those original eight cases plus 
eight more UN-led nation-building missions: the Belgian Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, 
Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. The final 
volume incorporates the data from those cases with findings from the European and 
Australian cases of Congo, Bosnia, the Balkans, and the Solomon Islands. Thus, the 
incorporation of data from these previous studies yields a total of 22 case studies from 
which to draw, with some overlap. For instance, there are two Congo cases, the UN effort 
in the 1960s and the UN – and European-led effort in the current decade. 
 While the focus of Dobbins’s study is nation-building not troop density, its 
compilation of troop densities from recent U.S. and European counterinsurgency and 
7 Glenn E. Kozelka, “Boots on the Ground: A Historical and Contemporary Analysis of Force Levels for  
Counterinsurgency Operations,” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source 
=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc 
% 3FAD%3Dada505239&ei=AS_WVL qG477gwSL3IK4AQ&usg=AFQjCNHtfmqZ8icc0U6N 
W NeVGAwqlhIs9w&bvm=bv.85464276,d.eXY [accessed January 30-April 7, 2009], 8. 
50 
 
                                                          
contingency operations gives a way of comparing troop numbers in Afghanistan before, 
during and after the surge to those of other successful and unsuccessful 
COIN/contingency operations. Comparing these cases also allows us to see if they meet 
the force level requirements recommended by FM 3-24, and where troop density levels 
before, during, and after the surge in Afghanistan rank amongst them. As noted earlier, 
there is no simple metric for determining how many troops are needed to secure a 
population, as FM 3-24 makes it very clear that such calculations remain very dependent 
on the situation.8 Moreover, “there is no consensus among previous studies whether 
indigenous forces should be included in the total number of troops deployed in support of 
specific operations.”9  
 One major component of FM 3-24 Paragraph 1-67 is that counterinsurgent 
security forces include U.S. military, foreign military, and host nation military and police 
forces.10 This is in contrast with James Dobbins’s study as well as John McGrath’s 2006 
study, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations. According to 
Dobbins and his team, international troops and police are essential to establishing 
security after a major war.11 “Often, in the immediate aftermath of civil or inter-state 
conflict, states will undergo a period of anarchy in which groups and factions seek to arm 
themselves for protection.”12 Thus, as pointed out by Seth G. Jones (2008), large 
numbers of troops and police are needed for defeating and deterring these groups. “These 
8 Ibid., 1-68. 
9 John J. McGrath, “Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,” www..dtic.mil%2Fc  
gibin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA456584&ei=8ibWVIqjDc7IsAT4lYGYBA&usg=AFQjCN
EcXEDoHWQRJ8WPnuFB4FnwQNAiGw [accessed January 30-December 2006], 94. 
10 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1-13. 
11 James Dobbins, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,” http://www.rand.org/con 
 tent/dam /rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/MR1753.pref.pdf [accessed January 20 – 
 February 2004], 7. 
12 Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” as seen  in Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of  
 Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 118. 
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forces are also needed for general law-enforcement functions such as crowd control, 
patrolling borders, securing roads, and policing the streets.”13 
Even though it is “possible to distinguish between local and intervening security 
forces,”14 Field Manual 3-24 highlights the importance of training Host Nation (HN) 
security forces and including them in counterinsurgency operations. Despite being better 
trained and equipped, “intervening forces such as the U.S usually do not possess the 
language skills and cultural familiarity that local forces can provide.”15 Local residents 
are also usually more willing to work with native forces because they are not as 
suspicious as foreign soldiers. Thus, local security forces are critical in winning the 
“hearts and minds” of the people as well as securing the population.16  
 For the purposes of this study, force levels will be measured by manpower only, 
not by quality or role. As pointed out by Steven Goode (2009), “clearly different forces in 
a given conflict can vary widely in effectiveness due to variations in their training, 
motivation, leadership, equipment, level of corruption, and other factors.”17 What is 
much more difficult is comparing forces across conflicts in a consistent manner.18 Thus, 
in accordance with doctrine and previous studies, this analysis will use total military 
strength for all cases. 
 Finally, this chapter will also take a look at U.S. and ISAF efforts to secure 
Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, which poses a major challenge to counterinsurgency 
in that country. “The Pakistani government has traditionally enjoyed only limited control 
13 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict 
Stability Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)  in Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard 
of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 118. 
14 Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,” 49. 
15Ibid.,  49.  
16 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1-13. 
17 Ibid., 49.  
18 Ibid., 49. 
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over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that border 
Afghanistan.”19American and ISAF officials have noted that cross-border attacks ‘have 
yielded big operational and tactical benefits—by causing the insurgent networks to feel 
disconnected, and prompting local residents in Pakistan to want al Qaeda and other 
outsiders to leave their communities.”20        
From 2007-2011, U.S. forces conducted numerous counterinsurgency operations 
in an attempt to win over the local tribes’ support and built small outposts to stem the 
flow of foreign fighters coming in from Pakistan’s FATA.21 In the fall of 2011, “U.S. 
troops were withdrawn from the region, after it was determined that their presence there 
only antagonized the locals and led them to carry out attacks on U.S. patrols and to attack 
U.S. combat outposts (COP).”22 Hence, this area “has resulted in some of the most deadly 
tactical defeats suffered by U.S. forces anywhere in the country with little or no strategic 
value.”23 
Did the U.S. Possess the Necessary Troop Density Level to Secure the Population 
 In order to secure the population, the U.S.’s COIN strategy relied on a basic 
tenant of counterinsurgency operations borrowed and adapted from Vietnam and more 
recently Iraq, “clear, hold, and build.” Done successfully, “clear-hold-build” allows the 
HN government to increase the territory under its control.24 “According to the most 
common simile, government control spreads like oil or ink-spots across absorbent 
19 Shuja Nawaz, “Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal  
Areas of Pakistan,” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf [accessed 
January 19-January 2009], 11. 
20 Kristen E. Boon, Aziz Huq, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Conflict in 
 Afghanistan,  (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), 10. 
21 Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified, 60.  
22 Ibid., 60.  
23 Hugh D. Blair “Challenges With Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan”  http://www.hsdl.org/ 
 ?view&did=7013 63 [accessed  January 19 – February 28, 2011], 11. 
24 Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm.” 170. 
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paper.”25          
 In the spring of 2011, ISAF Headquarters identified 121 districts out of 400 
Afghan districts whose control would provide a marked advantage over the enemy.26 Out 
of the 121 districts, 80 were designated as “key terrain” while the other 41 were assessed 
as “areas of interest.”27 Control of these districts would allow the U.S. to achieve its goal 
of being able to secure and protect the Afghan people. Thus, most of the 30,000 surge 
troops initially sent to Afghanistan would be deployed to populated areas around 
Kandahar City as well as in Helmand province. This would be the main effort of the 
U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy as the goal would be to protect the population from 
Taliban insurgents and clearing them from key population areas. ANSF forces would 
then be used to hold the cleared areas and prevent the Taliban from returning.  
 Next, a smaller number of troops would be sent to the eastern region of 
Afghanistan. With insufficient troops for a COIN strategy in the area, a counterterrorism 
strategy would be implemented instead. Thus, Coalition forces would attack fighters from 
the Haqqani Network instead of clearing population areas. “The goal of this second phase 
was to “wear down Haqqani Network fighters, leaders, and infrastructure, rendering them 
less capable of operations.”28 This, in turn, “would halt their momentum and prevent 
them from spreading into neighboring provinces and, most importantly, the capital city of 
Kabul.”29  
25 David Ucko, “Clear-Hold-Build-Fail? Rethinking Local-Level Counterinsurgency,” http://waronthe 
 rocks. com/ 2013 /11/clear-hold-build-fail-rethinking-local-level-counterinsurgency/ [accessed 
 January 21 – November 7, 2013], 1. 
26 Hugh D. Blair, “Challenges With Counterinsurgency,” 8. 
27 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Afghan War: Metrics, Narratives, and Winning the War,” 50. 
28 CJ Radin, “Analysis: U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan shifts as forces draw down,” http://www.long 
 warjournal.org/archives/2011/08/the_military_strateg_1.php [accessed January 17 – August 3, 
 2011], 2. 
29 Ibid., 2.  
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Figure 3: The 2009 Troop Surge Plan 
 
Source:  Radin, CJ, “Analysis: U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan,” (2011): 1, image 1. 
 Moreover, this strategy would also “provide valuable time to expand the Afghan 
Army, disburse reconstruction assistance, and create local governments in places where 
there had been very little government influence.” 30 Finally, “with persistent outside 
efforts, the capacity of the Afghan government would steadily grow, the levels of U.S. 
and international assistance would decline, and the insurgency would eventually be 
defeated.”31 
What the Numbers Say 
 Upon review, troop levels before the surge failed to meet the minimum troop 
density levels that were needed to secure Afghanistan’s population. As seen in Figure 4, 
30 Frances Z. Brown, “Taking Stock of the Surge.” http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/  2012/09/26/ 
 taking_stock_of_the_surge_from_the_bottom_up [accessed January 20 – September 26, 2012],4.   
31 Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” http://www.foreignaffa 
 irscom/print/136845 [accessed October 17 – September/October 2013], 1. 
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the light footprint approach used by the United States and ISAF in Afghanistan, translates 
into one of the lowest troop and police levels in any COIN/stabilization operation since 
the end of World War II.32 Between 2002 and 2006, troop density levels ranged from 
0.61 per thousand inhabitants in 2002 to 4.5 per thousand in 2006.  
Figure 4: Number of Troops per Thousand Inhabitants 
 
Source: Dobbins, James, “America’s Role in Nation-Building,” (2003) & “Europe’s Role in Nation-
Building: From the Balkans to the Congo,” (2008), p. 4, image 1. 
*Cases added by author of this study (data compiled from Brookings Institute Afghan & Iraq Indexes) 
 
 These force levels rank with some of the international community’s most notable 
failures: the UN mission of Belgian Congo (1.3 per thousand); the American and UN 
intervention in Somalia (5.7); the U.S. rescue of Haiti (2.9); the French operation in Cote 
32 Ibid., 119. 
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d’Ivorie (0.2); and the U.S. war in Iraq in 2005 (5.3). By comparison, “89.3 U.S. troops 
per thousand inhabitants were needed to establish security in the American sector of 
Germany after World War II, 35.3 per thousand were needed in Eastern Slavonia, 19.3 
per thousand in Kosovo, 17.5 per thousand in Bosnia, and 9.8 per thousand in East 
Timor.”33 As mentioned by Dobbins, “none of these conflicts were resolved easily, even 
at those levels of troop involvement.”34 
Figure 5: Number of U.S./ISAF & HN Security Forces per Thousand Inhabitants 
 
Source: The Brooking Institute’s “Afghanistan Index,”  p.4, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/f 
oreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20140227.pdf 
 
 In an attempt to counter the Taliban’s momentum, the United States deployed an 
additional 1,500 troops to Afghanistan in 2007. Between 2007 and 2008, the number of 
U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan rose from 24,800 in 2007 to 32,500 by the end of 
33 James Dobbins, “America’s Role in Nation-Building,” 9.  
34 Ibid., 9. 
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2008. ISAF troop levels also increased during this time, as NATO deployed an additional 
10,400 troops between 2006 and 2008. Despite this substantial increase, troop density 
levels continued to remain well below the minimum force requirements recommended by 
FM 3-24. Between 2006 and 2007, troop density levels rose from 4.5 per thousand to 6.2 
and by end of 2008, force levels in Afghanistan had reached 7.5 per thousand inhabitants.  
Figure 6: Troop Density Levels in Iraq & Afghanistan (2002-2014) 
 
Source: The Brooking Institute’s “Afghanistan Index,” updated February 2014 & “Iraq Index,” updated 
July 2013 
 
 Force levels during this time are very comparable to some of America’s most 
recent contingency and nation-building failures including: Somalia (5.7) and Iraq 2005 
(5.3). Moreover, when compared to Iraq, troop density levels in Afghanistan took a much 
longer time to reach levels achieved by the United States and its allies in Iraq. As seen in 
Figure 6, there were only 3.3 troops per thousand inhabitants in Afghanistan in 2005, 
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while there were 12.3 troops per thousand in Iraq. During the height of the Iraq Surge in 
2007, troop density levels reached a new high of 18.85 troops per thousand inhabitants. 
This is 3.5 more troops per thousand residents than during the height of the Afghan surge 
in 2011 (15.5). This may not seem significant, but it bolsters the argument that the United 
States was willing to do whatever it took to win in Iraq while doing what it had to do in 
Afghanistan. Moreover, the COIN strategy that was used to help turn around the Iraq War 
was supposed to serve as a blueprint for the U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy in 
Afghanistan.  
Figure 7: U.S./ISAF Troop & ANSF Levels (2001-2014)  
 
Source: The Brooking Institute’s “Afghanistan Index,”  p.4, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/f 
oreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20140227.pdf 
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 In a last ditch effort to turn the tide and reverse the Taliban’s momentum, the U.S. 
sent a surge of 30,000 troops along with 6,000 European soldiers as part of a new 
counterinsurgency strategy implemented by General Stanley McChrystal in 2010. With 
the surge, the total number of American troops serving in Afghanistan rose to 100,000 
while raising the number of NATO troops to over 42,000. Compared to 2009, this is a 
1.35% increase in the number of U.S. and ISAF forces serving in Afghanistan. Between 
2009 and 2010, force levels rose from 10.4 inhabitants per thousand to 14.1.  
 This is an increase of over 3.7 troops per thousand. This may not seem significant, 
but troop density levels in Afghanistan did not reach 3.7 troops per thousand until 2006 
(4.5), almost five years after the war had started. Troop density levels continued to rise in 
2011 (15.5) as U.S. and Coalition forces reached their peak. At the same time, ANSF 
forces were beginning to conduct a small number of operations on their own and had 
started to take over security in the central, northern, and western parts of the country. 
Even though a majority of the surge troops sent by the U.S. were withdrawn in 
September 2012, force levels reached an all-time of 16.3 per thousand inhabitants as 
ANSF forces reached a level of 342,378 by July 2012. 
 When compared to the 22 other cases listed above, force levels in Afghanistan 
between 2010 and 2012 rank with some of the highest levels reached by U.S. and 
international forces in Kosovo (19.3); Iraq 2007 (18.85); Bosnia (17.3); and East Timor 
(9.8). These campaigns are considered to be some of the more successful COIN and 
nation-building operations carried out by the United States and international community 
in recent years.35 Despite reaching similar force levels, the counterinsurgency and 
accompanying surge strategy implemented by Generals McChrystal and Petraeus failed 
35 Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 119. 
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to meet the troop density levels needed to conduct a successful COIN operation. 
Moreover, the U.S. and NATO have been unable to generate the kind of success 
experienced by these other campaigns as violence continues to plague eastern 
Afghanistan and has spread to areas previously unaffected by the insurgency. Thus, as 
pointed out by Stephen Good (2009), “having enough forces to reverse increasing 
insurgent violence does not always equate to victory, or even the attainment of low levels 
of violence.”36  
 Even though it may appear that troop density levels are not useful in determining 
how many troops are needed to secure the population or carry out a successful COIN 
campaign, this study has shown that numbers do matter and that past campaigns that have 
come close to or meet the force requirements advocated by FM 3-24 have been 
historically more successful than those that have not. This study has also shown that 
military efforts alone however, cannot ensure victory in a coin campaign. Thus, “having 
adequate forces can at best enable the counterinsurgent side to provide a certain level of 
security, and security itself is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for victory.”37   
Efforts to Secure Afghanistan’s Borders 
 In order to protect the population, “the counterinsurgent force must also be able to 
control key terrain, both natural and man-made, in and around major urban areas, as well 
as the border regions between neighboring countries.”38 Thus, one of the main goals of 
the U.S.’s COIN strategy was to help the Afghan Government secure its borders and deny 
cross-border mobility to insurgents and other anti-government/criminal elements. To 
accomplish this objective, “U.S. efforts to secure Afghanistan’s border focused on two 
36 Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements,” 56. 
37 Ibid., 59. 
38 Hugh D. Blair “Challenges With Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan,”  5. 
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areas: (1) building the capacity of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and (2) regional 
engagement.”39 According to Generals McChrystal and Petraeus, securing Afghanistan’s 
border would directly support security in the country “by denying insurgents access to 
and from sanctuaries in Pakistan.”40 Securing the borders would also promote security by 
“limiting or preventing the flow of illegal narcotics across the border, thereby denying 
criminals and insurgents alike an important source of revenue.”41   
 Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1,500-mile-
long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. “Since 2001, the United 
States has pursued several initiatives to reduce tensions between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and to encourage both governments to concentrate their attention on countering 
the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists operating inside their territories.”42 Unfortunately, 
incidents of violence have increased on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border “as 
historical conflicts, different priorities, and personal animosities have combined to 
weaken the collective ability of the three countries to repress Islamist extremists 
operating along the border.”43 
 In the last several years, U.S. officials and national intelligence reports have 
“repeatedly attributed the growing strength of al Qaeda and the resurgence of the Taliban 
to safe havens in this border region.”44 According to the Pentagon, “the existence of 
militant sanctuaries inside Pakistan’s FATA represents the greatest challenge to long-
39 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces,” http://csi  
 is.org/publication/winning-afghanistan [accessed February 20-May 2, 2009], 21. 
40 Ali A. Jalali, “Winning in Afghanistan, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/ 
 09spring/jalali.pdf [accessed February 21 – March 2009], 14. 
41 Department of Defense, “Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 19. 
42 Richard Weitz, “Afghan-Pakistan Border Rules: The U.S. Role,” http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/  
 eurasia_border_review/ebr3/weitz.pdf [accessed February 20- November 27, 2011], 1.  
43 Jayshree Bajoria, “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border,” http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afgh 
 an-pakistani-border/p14905 [accessed February 20 – March 20, 2009], 1. 
44 Dilip Hiro, Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadists in South Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 207. 
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term security within Afghanistan.”45 In 2008, General David McKiernan, the top 
commander in Afghanistan, “asserted that Pakistan’s northwestern tribal regions provide 
the main pool for recruiting insurgents who fight in Afghanistan.”46 Most intelligence 
analysts appear to agree that, so long as Taliban forces enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, the 
U.S. will be unable to quell the insurgency plaguing most of Afghanistan.47  
Heart of Darkness: The Afghan/Pakistan Border     
 Shortly after the fall of the Taliban in December 2001, the group along with some 
members of al Qaeda (AQ) began to establish sanctuaries in northwest Pakistan, 
specifically in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).48 Consisting of seven 
provinces: “Bajaur, Mohmand, Kyber, Kurram, Orakzai, North and South Waziristan, 
FATA has served as a buffer zone operating under its own paramilitary forces and police 
and ruled directly by the President of Pakistan via the Governor of North West Frontier 
Province.”49 Shortly after 9/11, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the 
adjoining North West Frontier Province served as an escape hatch for al Qaeda and 
Taliban fighters trying to escape U.S. and Afghan forces.50  According to Ahmed Rashid, 
with the arrival of al Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups, FATA became a 
multilayered terrorist cake.51  
 “At its base were Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, soon to become Taliban in their 
 own right, who provided the hideouts and logistical support. Above them were the 
45 Ibid., 297. 
46 K Alan Kronstadt, “Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy,” htt 
 ps: //www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34763.pdf [accessed February 20 – November 21, 2008], 3. 
47 Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier, (New York: Penguin Group, 
 2011), xxv. 
48 Richard Weitz, “Afghan-Pakistan Border Rules: The U.S. Role,” http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/  
 eurasia_border_review/ebr3/weitz.pdf [accessed February 20- November 27, 2011], 1. 
49 Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place, 46.  
50 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, 
 Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (New York: Penguin Books Limited, 2008), 268. 
51 Ibid., 265. 
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 Afghan Taliban, who settled there after 9/11 followed by militants from Central 
 Asia, Chechnya, Africa, China, and Kashmir, and topped by Arabs who forged a 
 protective ring around bin Laden. FATA became the world’s ‘terrorism central.”52 
 
It was from here that the bomb plots in London, Madrid, Bali, Islamabad, and later 
Germany and Denmark were planned.53 
 Al Qaeda’s first sanctuary was the South Waziristan agency. “With its high 
mountains, steep slopes, deep ravines littered with broken rock and shale, and its thick 
forests, it was an ideal hideout.”54 In June 2002, U.S. military officials believed there 
were up to 3,500 foreign militants hiding out in South Waziristan.55 At the time, 
“Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was deflecting U.S. pressure to send in troops on 
account with Pakistan’s standoff with India as al Qaeda and Taliban fighters brazenly 
launched rockets at U.S. firebases at Shikin and Lawara, just inside Afghanistan.”56 
Coalition forces also complained that paramilitary soldiers from the Frontier Corps were 
helping al Qaeda fighters cross the border or were providing covering fire to distract U.S. 
forces.57 
 American officers on the ground soon became frustrated and began pressuring 
U.S. commander, Lt.-Gen. Dan McNeill, to allow them to chase al Qaeda fighters into 
South Waziristan.”58 Even though he did not have permission from the Pentagon to do so, 
McNeil threatened to cross the border into Pakistan if the cross-border raids by the 
Taliban and other militant groups continued. “U.S. forces acknowledge the 
52 Ibid., 265. 
53 Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, “The Drone War,” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/ 
 articles/2009/drone_ war_13672 [accessed February 12 – June 3, 2009], 6. 
54 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 268. 
55 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan—And How it 
 Threatens America, (New York: Free Press, 2010), 78. 
56 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos,” 269.  
57 Ibid., 269. 
58 K Alan Kronstadt, “Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border,” 3. 
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internationally recognized boundaries of Afghanistan, but may pursue attackers who 
attempted to escape into Pakistan to evade capture or retaliation, read a U.S. Army 
statement.”59 There was also mounting U.S. pressure on Musharraf to act or face 
unilateral attacks inside FATA.60  
 U.S. and NATO forces “noted a sharp deterioration in border security after the 
Pakistani government began negotiating a series of peace deals with local tribal leaders 
and with various extremist groups.”61 Between 2004 and 2008, the Pakistani government 
and military cut numerous peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban, the most famous of 
which was the May 2008 Swat Agreement.62 The peace agreements, “which were struck 
throughout the tribal areas and in Swat and other settled districts in the northwest, 
required the Taliban to accept the writ of the state and eject "foreigners," or al Qaeda and 
allied groups, from their areas.”63 Despite these agreements, the Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) refused to abide by them, and instead established mini-Islamic emirates 
while continuing to expand their control into neighboring areas.64 By 2008, U.S. combat 
deaths in Afghanistan began to exceed those in Iraq, “despite the fact that five times as 
many U.S. troops were in Iraq than Afghanistan at the time.”65    
 In July 2007, a National Intelligence Estimate issued by the entire U.S. 
intelligence community stated “that al Qaeda was based in FATA and that the United 
States would not hesitate to bomb or even invade any part of FATA if bin Laden was 
59 Carlotta Gall, “Pakistanis Tied to 2007 Border Attacks on U.S.,” New York Times, September 26, 2011. 
60 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, 
 Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (New York: Penguin Books Limited, 2008), 268.270 
61 Richard Weitz, “Afghan-Pakistan Border Rules: The U.S. Role, 5. 
62 Bill Roggio, “Pakistan Government Inks Peace Deal with Swat Taliban, 2.  
63 Bill Roggio, “Pakistani Taliban Announce Ceasefire with Government,” http://www.longwarjournal.org/  
 archives/2014/03/pakistani_taliban_an.php [accessed March 12-March 1, 2014], 1. 
64 Ibid., 1. 
65 Ibid., 5. 
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found to be hiding there.”66 In 2008, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 
Michael Mullen, singled out the terrorist camps in Northwest Pakistan as one of the most 
serious threats confronting the next U.S. presidential administration: “Al Qaeda is there. 
Its leadership is there. We know that. And it continues to plan against the West, including 
against our homeland.”67 The Pakistani Army did conduct several minor raids against 
militants in Northwest Pakistan between 2002 and 2005, but most of these were for show 
and did not achieve any strategic objectives.68 
Figure 8: Map of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
 
Source: BBC News.Com, “Taliban Growing in Strength,” p.1,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/news/20 
09/05/090513_pakistan_map.shtml 
 
In the spring of 2009, the Pakistani military finally launched a major operation to 
clear militants and foreign fighters operating in FATA. In what became the Second Battle 
66 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 278. 
67 K Alan Kronstadt, “Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region,” 4. 
68 Ali Imtiaz, “Military Victory in South Waziristan or the Beginning of a Long War?” Terrorism Monitor 
 Volume: 7 Issue: 38 (2009): 5. 
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of Swat, the Pakistan Army launched the strategic airborne attack, codenamed “Black 
Thunderstorm” on April 26, 2009. The objective of this operation was the retaking of 
Buner, Lower Dir, Swat, and Shangla districts under the control of the radical militant 
leader Mauluna Fazullah.69 Following the success of “Operation Black Thunderstorm”, 
the Pakistani military conducted another campaign called “Operation Rah-e-Nijat” (Path 
to Salvation) that began on June 19th, 2009. “Supported by F-16 fighter jets and 
helicopter gunships, 30,000 Pakistani soldiers engaged over 10,000 militants and foreign 
fighters.”70 Many analysts quickly “described this much-awaited operation as the ‘mother 
of all battles.”71  
During the battle, senior TTP leaders were forced to abandon their posts and 
escape to neighboring Afghanistan as thousands of their fighters were either killed or 
captured by Pakistani forces. On December 12th, “the military announced the success of 
the operation as all of South Waziristan was now under the full control of the Pakistani 
government, denying al Qaeda and its militant allies from their former stronghold.”72 
Despite these operations, U.S. officials continued to complain “that members of the 
Pakistani military and ISI were still providing aid and training to the Taliban, including 
alerting them to imminent U.S. air strikes on Pakistani territory.”73Since the Afghan 
Taliban, Haqqani Network, and HIG do not carry out attacks against the Pakistani state, 
Islamabad has refused to target these groups as they see them as potential allies against 
India. As Steve Coll explains (2010), 
69 Ann Scott Tyson, “Insurgents putting up tough fight in Waziristan, report says,” The Washington Post, 
 October 24, 2009.  
70 Frederick W. Kagan, Reza Jan, & Charlie Szrom, “The War in Waziristan: Operation Rah-e-Nijat,” http:  
//www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/war-waziristan-operation-rah-e-nijat-phase-1-analysis [accessed 
February 21-November 18, 2009], 1. 
71 Imtiaz Ali, “Military Victory in South Waziristan or the Beginning of a Long War?, 6.  
72 Ibid., 6. 
73 K Alan Kronstadt, “Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region,” 5. 
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 “Pakistan’s generals have retained a bedrock belief that, however unruly and  
distasteful Islamist militias may be, they could yet be useful proxies to ward off a 
perceived existential threat from India. Many more Pakistanis believe that since 
the U.S. and NATO are planning to withdraw from the region in the next few 
years, the Taliban could well return to power in Kabul, making it important for 
Pakistan not to antagonize them.74 
 
Pakistan’s support for the Afghan insurgency is also “reinforced by its aspiration for 
influence among the Pashtuns that are divided by the disputed ‘Durand Line’ which 
separates Afghanistan and Pakistan.”75               
Pakistani Complicity with the Taliban       
 During the last seven years, “multiple reports have surfaced that elements of 
Pakistani intelligence and the military are in close contact with and supporting members 
of the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups.”76 According to Ahmed Rashid 
(2010),  
“Taliban leaders and their families live in Pakistan and are in close touch with the 
military and ISI. Some Taliban allies, such as the network led by Jalaluddin 
Haqqani, are even closer to the ISI.”77 
 
Three of the most wanted terrorists by the United States are also widely believed to reside 
in Pakistan, including al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, and Haqqani 
Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani.78 “Some intelligence officers believe that Mullah 
Omar may be receiving protection from elements of the Pakistani government in either 
Quetta or Karachi.”79 U.S. officials have also “repeatedly accused the ISI of actively 
74 Steve Coll, “Don’t Look Back,” http://newamerica.net/node/28404 [accessed February 25- March 1, 
 2010], 1. 
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supporting the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other insurgent groups with money, 
supplies, and planning guidance.”80                                        
 According to Matt Waldman (2010), the Taliban-ISI relationship is founded on 
mutual benefit. “The Taliban need external sanctuary, as well as military and logistical 
support to sustain their insurgency, the ISI believes that it needs a significant allied force 
in Afghanistan to maintain regional strength and ‘strategic depth’ in their rivalry with 
India.”81 Pakistan has been intimately associated with the Taliban since its creation in the 
mid-1990s.82  
By 2001, the ISI and Pakistani military “were providing the Taliban with 
hundreds of advisers and experts to run its tanks, aircraft, and artillery, and thousands of 
Pakistani Pashtuns to man its infantry”83 At one point, up to thirty ISI trucks a day were 
crossing into Afghanistan.84 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, “Pakistan reluctantly 
chose to side with the U.S. as American and allied forces intervened in Afghanistan with 
a UN mandate and toppled the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”85  
This created a dilemma for Pakistan, “as it now had to hunt down the Taliban and 
other Islamic militant organizations it had helped to create in the first place.”86 Pakistan 
officially became a coalition partner of the United States in the Global War on Terror, “it 
simultaneously continued supporting and directing the Taliban as a deputy government in 
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Afghanistan.”87         
 Shortly after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the ISI began granting refuge to 
the Taliban and other Islamic militants it regarded as friendly, while extraditing al Qaeda 
fighters to the United States.88 According to Adrian Hanni and Lukas Hegi, “the 
Pakistani military and ISI played a central and active role”89 in aiding and training the 
Taliban, “promising them money, weapons, and other kinds of support.”90 The ISI also 
allowed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of the HIG and Jalaluddin Haqqani of the Haqqani 
Networks to set up bases in Northwestern Pakistan, from where they could launch attacks 
against U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces from.91      
 Over the last decade, analysts have “disputed whether ISI support to the 
insurgency is officially sanctioned, and whether it is carried out by serving or former 
officers.”92 According to Matt Waldman, “some analysts speak of the collaboration of 
elements within the ISI with the Taliban.”93 Antonio Giustozzi argues “there is evidence 
of the involvement of the insurgency of advisors with long-standing experience of 
Afghanistan, such as current or former ISI operatives.”94 Seth Jones has argued, “there is 
some indication that individuals within the Pakistan government—for example, within 
the Frontier Corps and the ISI—were involved in assisting insurgent groups.”95 He has 
87 Adrian Hanni & Lukas Hegi “The Pakistani Godfather,” 7. 
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also reported that by mid-2008, “the United States collected fairly solid evidence of 
senior-level complicity [in ISI support to the insurgents].”96    
 In July 2010, WikiLeaks, released dozens of U.S. diplomatic documents that 
detailed Pakistan’s links with Islamist militants including the Afghan Taliban and al 
Qaeda. Some of the most important documents “detail a 2006 meeting with senior 
Taliban leaders in which Pakistani officials pushed for an attack on Maruf, a district of 
Kandahar that lies beside the Pakistan border.”97 An offensive began later that year.98 
The files also link active and retired ISI officers to some of the Afghan insurgency’s most 
notorious leaders including General Hamid Gul, who ran the ISI from 1987 to 1989.99 
 In one classified "threat report", Gul is described ordering magnetic mines to be 
planted in snow on roads used by military vehicles.100 "Gul's final comment to the three 
individuals was 'to make the snow warm in Kabul' basically telling them to set Kabul 
aflame,’ the report said.”101 Another report describes a meeting between Gul and a group 
of militants in Wana, the capital of South Waziristan, in January 2009. There, he met 
with three senior Afghan insurgent commanders and three “older” Arab men, presumably 
representatives of al Qaeda, who the report suggests were important because “they had a 
large security contingent with them.”102 Some of the other documents released by 
WikiLeaks contain accounts of American anger at Pakistan’s unwillingness to confront 
insurgents who launched attacks near Pakistani border posts, moved openly by the 
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truckload across the frontier and retreated to Pakistani territory for safety.103                                                                                                               
 A NATO study published in 2012 “based on the interrogations of 4,000 captured 
Taliban, al-Qaeda and other fighters in Afghanistan concluded that ISI support was 
critical to the survival and revival of the Taliban after 2001 just as it was critical to its 
conquest of Afghanistan in the 1990s.”104 It provides sanctuary, training camps, expertise 
and help with fund raising. The NATO report concluded “the ISI is thoroughly aware of 
Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior Taliban personnel.”105    
 The circumstances of Osama bin Laden’s (OBL) death “brought more focus on 
purported Pakistani and ISI links with Islamist militants.”106 On May 2, 2011, bin Laden 
was located and killed in a compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. This 
compound was just a half-mile from the Kakul Military Academy, Pakistan's equivalent 
of West Point, and close to various army regiments. The news of Osama bin Laden’s 
whereabouts led to immediate questioning of Pakistan’s role and potential complicity in 
his refuge.107 President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, told 
reporters it was “inconceivable that Osama bin Laden did not have a support system in 
Pakistan.”108         
 Following the May 2011 raid, the Pakistani government began to crack down on 
people it believed to be working with the CIA. In May 2011, the ISI was accused of 
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ordering the torture and murder of investigative journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad who had 
just finished writing a book detailing Pakistan’s links with al Qaeda and the Afghan 
Taliban and how fundamentalists had infiltrated Pakistan’s military establishments. 
Pakistani authorities also arrested Dr. Shakil Afridi, “who aided the CIA’s manhunt for 
Osama bin Laden by going door-to-door in Abbottabad offering hepatitis jabs to children 
in an attempt to collect DNA samples from OBL’s compound.”109 On May 23rd, Dr. 
Afridi was convicted of treason by a court in northwestern Pakistan and sentenced to 33 
years in prison.110  
 After the May 2nd raid, “ISI leadership was confronted more frequently by U.S. 
officials over allegations of collusion between the Pakistani government and Afghan 
insurgents, especially with the Haqqani Network.”111 The terrorist network led by 
Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, is “commonly identified as the most 
dangerous of Afghan insurgent groups battling U.S.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan.”112 
The Haqqani network, “which professes obedience to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, is 
believed to have been involved in some of the most audacious attacks of the Afghan 
war.”113  
 During oral testimony given to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
September 22, 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen repeatedly reiterated his concerns about the 
ISI’s role in sponsoring Haqqani Network attacks: "The fact remains that the Quetta 
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Shura [Taliban] and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. 
Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking 
Afghan troops and civilians as well as U.S. soldiers.”114 Publicly, the Obama 
administration did not fully back up Admiral Mullen’s charges against the ISI and 
Pakistani government. President Obama himself later stated, “I think the intelligence is 
not as clear as we might like in terms of what exactly the [ISI-Haqqani] relationship 
is,”115 but he still insisted that the Pakistanis “have got to take care of this problem in any 
case.”116  
U.S. Efforts to Secure the Border from the Flow of Insurgents and Foreign Fighters 
 Since 2001, “the United States has provided the Afghan and Pakistani 
governments and militaries with considerable money, equipment, training, and other 
security assistance.”117 The U.S. has also provided economic aid to the border region.118 
Furthermore, the United States “helped to establish a Joint Intelligence Operations center 
in Kabul to provide a forum where analysts from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and ISAF could 
share and evaluate data about terrorist activities along the Afghan-Pakistan border.”119                        
 Unfortunately, none of these attempts have proven very effective at curbing the 
flow of fighters and weapons crossing the Afghan-Pakistani border. Even though the 
United States and NATO has so far been unsuccessful in securing Afghanistan’s border 
with Pakistan with the efforts discussed above, programs such as the creation of the 
Afghanistan Border Police, the use of armed drones in Pakistan’s Federally Administered 
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Tribal Areas, and Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams have yield better results.   
Building the Capacity of the Afghan Border Police    
 Afghanistan shares borders with six other countries and has over 3,400 miles of 
international border – most of it vast desert or high mountains.120 “The most treacherous 
of these borders is the 1,500 mile border with Pakistan, which serves as a safe haven for 
various insurgents, foreign fighters, bandits, and smugglers.”121 In order to help stem the 
flow of insurgents, equipment, and weapons coming in from Pakistan, the United States 
and international community created the Afghan Border Police in 2005.122 The mission 
of this new force was to “provide law enforcement capabilities at borders and entry 
points, including the country’s airports, in order to deter criminal activity and the 
movement of insurgents into Afghanistan.”123       
 Originally, the Afghan Border Police was overseen by the State Department’s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs with DnyCorp. Other 
organizations have also helped to train the APB including; the European Union Police 
Mission (EUPOL), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and 
Border Protection agencies.124 By the end of 2008, the ABP maintained an operational 
strength of approximately 12,000 out of an authorized strength of nearly 18,000. 125 Like 
the ANP, the Afghan Border Police undergo an eight-week training program conducted 
by private U.S. security contractors.       
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 In January 2009, the U.S. military launched a major overhaul in the training of the 
Afghan Border Police in response to the Focused Border Development program that was 
developed by the Afghan government and international community to combat corruption 
and incompetence plaguing most of the ABP. In the past, “the U.S. primarily relied on 
small teams of embedded advisers to train Afghan security forces, but those teams were 
in short supply, especially for the border police and Afghan National Police.”126 In 
response to this demand for more advisors, commanders from the 4th BCT of the 101st 
Airborne Division began assigning each of its battalions to work with a battalion of 
border police during joint operations in eastern Afghanistan. Besides training, new 
recruits were also issued new weapons and gear.127  
 Before 2009, Border Patrol commanders “complained of a lack of heavy weapons 
and few development projects in their areas, which they said made it difficult to win over 
the local population.”128 By the end of 2010, U.S. and ISAF forces had trained and 
equipped over 4,200 border police members at a cost of $70 million.129 The U.S. also 
built 18 operational border facilities along the Afghan-Pakistani border with the hopes of 
building 139 more.130 Despite dramatic improvements in their operational capabilities, 
“the Afghan Border Police continue to be plagued by corruption, incompetence, and a 
lack of funding and weapons.”131       
 According to officials from Academi (formerly Blackwater International) and 
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Dyncorp, “roughly one in twelve of the Afghan troops who have attended the ABP basic 
training course were thrown out after failing drug tests.”132 Officials also heard 
complaints from ABP commanders that their troops “are still being issued cheaply made 
Pakistani or Egyptian assault rifles, rather than the Hungarian models promised to 
them.”133 Even though the ABP is fully funded for equipment and supplies, “corruption 
within the Afghan Ministry of Interior (AMOI) and at the regional logistic hubs present 
problems for units in the field stationed along the Afghan borders.134 In many parts of the 
country, the Afghan Border Police are also complicit in the drug smuggling trade.135  
Use of CIA Paramilitary Teams along the Afghan/Pakistan Border  
 The CIA has also assigned a small number of American civilians and paramilitary 
troops to operate alongside the Pakistani military, but primarily as advisors.136 The teams 
“provide the Pakistanis with various types of intelligence, especially analyses of 
intercepted communications and imagery data from U.S. planes and spy satellites.”137 In 
return, the Pakistanis share their human intelligence about militant activities in the tribal 
areas and other terrorist plots.138 “Since 2001, U.S. and Pakistani intelligence and law 
enforcement services have conducted more than one hundred joint raids against suspected 
Taliban, al Qaeda, or other Islamist extremists.”139      
 In 2010, Bob Woodward disclosed the existence of a well-armed 3,000-member 
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Afghan paramilitary force collectively known as Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams in his 
book Obama’s Wars. These teams are reportedly trained by the CIA at Firebase Lilley, in 
Paktika province, Afghanistan.140 “In addition to being used for surveillance, raids, and 
combat operations in Afghanistan, the teams are crucial to the United States’ secret war 
in Pakistan, according to current and former U.S. officials.”141 A former senior CIA 
official involved in the formation of the Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams said the first 
unit was created in Kabul shortly after the U.S.-backed invasion in 2001.142 The team in 
the capital “remains the largest and most sophisticated, and it is routinely used to carry 
out operations elsewhere in the country.”143      
 Over the past 10 years however, new units have been created in other locations, 
including Kandahar.144 Their missions “vary from sensitive intelligence-gathering 
operations to carefully orchestrated takedowns of Taliban targets.”145 Some of the 
Wikileaks reports leaked in 2010 provide descriptions of the activities of the “Other 
Government Agency” (OGA) and “Afghan OGA” forces.146 In addition to accounts of 
snatch-and-grab operations targeting insurgent leaders, “the logs contain casualty reports 
from battles with the Taliban, summaries of electronic intercepts of enemy 
communications, and hints of heavy firepower at the CIA’s disposal.”147  
 For several years now, the CIA has been running operations from its eastern 
Afghan bases, which are generally shared with U.S. SOF teams and other military units. 
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These bases “are also used by the agency to build and manage networks of ethnic Pashtun 
informants who cross into Pakistan’s tribal belt.”148 The CIA has also used these bases 
for their drone programs. According to Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller, “the use of these 
bases has allowed the CIA to identify the whereabouts of al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. 
This has led to an exponential increase in drone attacks against AQ and Taliban 
targets.”149 At the same time, these bases and teams have helped to reduce the CIA’s 
dependence on the ISI.150        
 Drone Wars          
 In recent years, missile strikes by armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have 
constituted the principle U.S. military activity inside Pakistani territory and along the 
Afghan-Pakistan border. Launched in 2004, “the CIA’s covert drone campaign to target 
and kill al Qaeda and Taliban commanders based in Pakistan’s lawless northwest has 
resulted in the death of dozens of lower-ranking militants and at least ten upper-level 
leaders within AQ and the Taliban.”151 Moreover, these strikes have forced militants to 
abandon satellite phones and large gatherings in favor of communicating by carrier and 
moving in small groups.152         
 While unpopular among the Pakistani public, the drone strikes have become a 
weapon of choice for the United States’ campaign against insurgents and Islamic 
militants in FATA. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush authorized the use of 
drones equipped with laser-guided Hellfire missiles to kill the leaders of AQ in Pakistan. 
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The United States’ fleet of drones includes Predators and the larger Reapers. According 
to Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal, the U.S. has carried out 354 strikes since the 
drone campaign began in 2004.153  
Between 2004 and the end of 2008, the Bush Administration authorized 46 strikes 
in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Provinces. A majority of these strikes (35) were carried 
out in 2008 after U.S. officials reached a quiet understanding with President Pervez 
Musharraf to allow U.S. forces to conduct drone strikes and hot pursuit operations in 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.154 Moreover, “there was mounting 
evidence that al Qaeda and affiliated groups were using FATA to train Westerners for 
attacks on American and European targets.”155 For instance, “the masterminds of the July 
7, 2005, transit system attacks in London, which killed 52 people, had trained in the tribal 
regions.”156 
 Since assuming office, Obama has greatly accelerated the program, “likely as a 
result of better intelligence on the ground in Pakistan.”157 In 2009, the U.S. launched 
more than 53 drone strikes against militant targets in Pakistani territory.158 This was more 
than the previous four years combined.159 The number of drone strikes continued to surge 
in 2010 (117) and 2011 (64) as the Obama administration was seeking to complement the 
increase of U.S. combat troops inside Afghanistan with intensified operations in the 
Taliban sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan.         
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Figure 9: Number of U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan by District 2004-2014 
 
Source: Roggio, Bill, “The Covert U.S. Air Campaign in Pakistan,” p.2 http://www.longwarjournal.org/pa 
kistan-strikes.php   
 
 Over the past six years, a majority of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan have targeted 
Islamist militants operating in North Waziristan,160 a FATA in northwestern Pakistan that 
borders Afghanistan. According to Jeffrey Dressler, “North Waziristan hosts a blend of 
insurgents and terrorists operating against Pakistan and Afghanistan, with some also 
targeting the American homeland.”161 Enemy groups based there include: “the Haqqani 
Network; powerful tribal enablers; foreign extremists; and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), 
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who have been at war with the Pakistani state for much of the past decade.”162 Out of the 
354 drone strikes that have occurred in Pakistan since 2004, 253 of them have struck AQ 
and Taliban targets in North Waziristan.163        
Figure 10: Number of U.S. Airstrikes in Key Districts of Northwest Pakistan  
 
Source: Roggio, Bill, “The Covert U.S. Air Campaign in Pakistan,” (2013)  p.2, http://www.longwarjourna 
jl.org/p kistan-strikes.php   
      
 The United States has also carried out a large number of drone strikes (83) in the 
neighboring province of South Waziristan. Shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan by 
U.S. and NATO forces in October 2001, “thousands of Afghan Taliban along with their 
al Qaeda allies fled to South Waziristan looking for refuge and bases to continue their 
fight against the foreign forces occupying their country.”164 The local tribes, sympathetic 
to the cause, provided shelter and assistance to the fighters, while local militants who 
162 Ibid., 1.  
163 Bill Roggio, “The Covert U.S. Air Campaign in Pakistan,” 3. 
164 Mansur Khan Mahsud, “The Battle for Pakistan: South Waziristan,” http://newamerica.net/  
publications/ policy/the_battle_for_pakistan_south_waziristan [accessed February 14 – April 19, 
2010], 5.  
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were affiliated with the Afghan Taliban government before September 11--such as 
Abdullah Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud, Nek Muhammad, Haji Sharif, and Haji Omar--
began to organize local Taliban groups across South Waziristan.165  
 Since 2004, the U.S. has killed a number of prominent al Qaeda and Taliban 
leaders, including: Abu Laith al Libi, senior military commander in Afghanistan and the 
leader of al Qaeda’s paramilitary Shadow Army (2008); Sa’ad bin Laden, one of Osama 
bin Laden’s sons who served as a senior AQ leader in Iran and was involved in several 
plots (2009); Baitullah Mehsud, the overall leader of the Movement of the Taliban in 
Pakistan (2009); Ilyas Kashmiri, the leader of al Qaeda’s Lashkar al Zil and the 
operational commander of the Harakat ul Jihad-i-Islami (2011); and Mullah Sangeen 
Zadran, the deputy of the Haqqani Network operational commander Sirajuddin Haqqani 
(2013).166 According to The Long War Journal, “American drones have killed more than 
1,900 Islamist insurgents in Pakistan’s FATA areas since 2006.”167 As a result of these 
strategically significant deaths, “then-CIA director Leon Panetta called drone strikes “one 
of the most important weapons in the fight against terrorists.”168 
 The Pakistani government “regularly issues protests over the strikes—and the 
perception that they violate Pakistani sovereignty fuels considerable anti-American 
sentiment among the Pakistani public.”169 Despite these protests, the Pakistani 
Government has never ordered the Pakistani Air Force to shoot down the drones. 
165 Ibid. 5. 
166 Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer. “Senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in U.S. airstrikes in 
 Pakistan, 2004-2013.” http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hvts.php [accessed 
 February 14 - December 26, 2013],  6. 
167 Ibid. 2. 
168 Gregor Peter Schmitz, “Are Drones Worth Their Drawbacks?” Der Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/ 
 international/world/the-debate-on-push-button-war-are-drones-worth-their-drawbacks-a-
 682645.html [accessed February 14 – March 12, 2010], 1. 
169 Richard Weitz, “Afghan-Pakistan Border Rules: The U.S. Role,” http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/  
 eurasia_border_review/ebr3/weitz.pdf [accessed February 20- November 27, 2011], 21. 
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According to Sara Birkenthal (2012), “global outcry over the drone campaign has also 
intensified in response to collateral civilian deaths brought by errant air strikes in the 
country.”170 An analysis published by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann in Foreign 
Affairs shows that “less than two percent of those killed by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan 
have been described in reliable press accounts as leaders of al Qaeda or allied groups.”171 
U.S. government officials have disputed such reports, “claiming that only 50 non-
militants have been killed by drone strikes over the past decade in six countries in which 
the United States is known to have used Predator and Reaper drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.”172      
 Members of the Pakistani Taliban “also cite the continuing UAV strikes to justify 
their terrorist campaign against Pakistanis living outside the tribal zone.”173 Although 
unarmed Pakistani civilians are usually the targets of their attacks, the TTP claims that 
these bombings are in retaliation for the Pakistani governments’ allowing the United 
States to operate the drones on their territory. On March 30th, 2009, “a terrorist assault 
team estimated in size at 14 men launched a coordinated attack on the Manawan Police 
Trainers School in Lahore that resulted in 34 deaths.”174  
 According to Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the Pakistani Taliban, the 
Taliban’s March 2009 attack on the police academy was ‘in retaliation for the continued 
drone strikes by the U.S. in collaboration with Pakistan on our people.”175 Mehsud, 
himself, would later on be killed in a drone strike on August 5, 2009. Another report 
170 Sara Birkenthal, “U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan: A Strategic Analysis,” 10. 
171 Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, “There Were More Drone Strikes,” 3. 
172 Greg Jaffe and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Drone Targets Two Leaders of Somalia Group Allied With Al 
 Qaeda, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, June 29, 2011seen  in Sarah Birkenthal, “U.S. Drone  
 Strikes in Pakistan: A Strategic Analysis,” 15.   
173 Richard Weitz,“Afghan-Pakistan Border Rules,” 8. 
174 Bill Roggio, “Terrorist Storm Lahore Police Academy, Kill More than Thirty, 1. 
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written by Qandeel Siddique (2010), finds that the “growing number of U.S. drone strikes 
in Pakistan’s border areas, and expanding U.S. presence and influence inside Pakistan has 
further aggravated the jihadists.”176 
 Despite criticism surrounding their use, “UAVs amount to safer, cheaper, and 
more effective warfare in the United States’ counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan, as 
consistently argued by the Department of Defense.”177 Moreover, sending U.S. combat 
troops into Pakistani territory could spark outrage in throughout the country. On one such 
occasion, “a U.S. SOF team attacked a suspected terrorist base in Pakistan’s South 
Waziristan region, killing over a dozen people.”178 These attacks sparked outrage and 
massive protests throughout the country. In response to this raid, the Pakistani military 
announced on September 16, 2008, “that it would shoot at U.S. forces attempting to cross 
the Afghan-Pakistan border.”179 Since then, “several minor incidents have occurred when  
members of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps have fired at what they believed to be American 
helicopters flying from Afghanistan to deploy Special Forces on their territory.”180  
 Strategically, “killing terrorist operatives through drone strikes has proven 
effective in dismantling terrorist havens along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.”181 Such 
attacks “keep extremist groups on edge and disrupt their plans, because when individuals 
in these groups die or are wounded, new members must be recruited and less experienced 
176 Qandeel Siddique, “Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization 
 and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s North-West,” http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publicati 
 ons/Reports2010-12-Tehrik-e-Taliban_web.odf  [accesed February 16-December 2010], 23.  
177 Brianna Lee, “Five Things You Need to Know About Drones,” http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-
 know/five-things/drones/12659/ [accessed February 16 – September 13, 2012], 1 in Sarah  
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February 24- Spring 2012] 9.  
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leaders are forced to take over day-to-day operations.”182 Terrorist or insurgent groups 
fearing a strike or an attack “must also devote increased attention to their own security 
because any time they communicate with other cells, they may be exposing themselves to 
a targeted attack.”183  
 According to memorandums between Osama bin Laden and his subordinates, 
made public by the U.S. military’s Combating Terrorism Center, crippling U.S. drone 
attacks had forced bin Laden to consider withdrawing his fighters from what had 
previously been safe havens in Pakistan. “The reserves will not, for the most part, be 
effective in such conflicts. Basically, we could lose the reserves to the enemy’s air 
strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives!” Moreover, he said that commanders 
with experience “needed to get out of the area.”184     
 Despite resting on morally questionable footing, the U.S. drone campaign in 
Pakistan “has been arguably one of the most effective tactics against Islamist militants 
operating in the remote regions of western Pakistan.”185 However, until the Pakistanis do 
something about the safe havens in FATA, insurgent and terrorist groups such as the 
Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda will continue to recruit, train, equip, 
and prepare to launch attacks against U.S., ISAF, and Afghan forces from within 
Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER V: MEASURING SECURITY PROGRESS DURING THE SURGE 
We’ve got our teeth in the enemy’s jugular now, and we’re not going to let go.  
-General David Petraeus 
 
 According to FM 3-24, “counterinsurgency is an extremely complex form of 
warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population’s support.”1 In almost every 
case, counterinsurgents “face a populace containing an active minority supporting the 
government and equally small militant faction opposing it.”2 The government must 
“demonstrate that it can fight the insurgents effectively while also protecting the 
population.”3 Insurgents on the other hand, “only have to demonstrate that the 
government is unable to protect the population by inflicting enough chaos and destruction 
to turn public support against the existing authorities.”4  
 Upon review, the United States’ counterinsurgency and accompanying surge 
strategy made substantial progress in the southern parts of Afghanistan.5 Prior to the 
surge in 2010, the Taliban and its allies made startling gains, “showing an ability to 
control territory in Helmand and Kandahar they had previously lost.”6 The surge reversed 
those gains as U.S. and ISAF forces conducted more than 7,100 counterterrorism 
missions between May 30th and December 2nd, 2010. During these operations, more than   
1 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1-28. 
2 Elliot Cohen, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of 
 Counterinsurgency, 49. 
3 John A. Lynn, “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mi 
 lreview/lynn.pdf [accessed March 17-July/August 2005], 23. 
4 Ibid.,  22. 
5 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Surge is Over,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/25 
 /the_afghan_surge_is_over [accessed April 24-September 25, 2012], 4 
6 Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, “Analysis The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been broken,” 1. 
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than 600 insurgent leaders were captured or killed.1 In addition more than 2000 enemy 
fighters were killed and over 4,100 captured.2  
To gauge the overall impact of the U.S.’s counterinsurgency and accompanying 
surge strategy, this study consulted several sources: monthly data compiled by NATO’s 
International Security Assistance Force, data gathered by the DoD for its semiannual 
annual report to Congress (Report on Progress: Toward Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan), and annual reports produced by the United Nations. These sources are not 
all consistent with one another in the specifics, “as they each have their own criteria to 
hold territory, which is difficult to quantify, but is nonetheless important.”3 For instance, 
“the Taliban were much stronger overall prior to 2001, when the group controlled 
Afghanistan and did not have to function as an insurgency.”4 Therefore, “the various 
statistics used to measure the insurgency’s efficacy offer only a part of the overall 
picture.”5 
IED Attacks: The $30 Bombs that Cost the U.S. Billions 
 One security indicator that U.S. and ISAF forces used to measure progress during 
the surge in Afghanistan was the number of IED attacks that occurred between January 
2010 and December 2012. Since 2006, “IEDs have become the Taliban’s favored weapon 
of choice and the biggest killer of Coalition soldiers and Afghan civilians.”6 According to 
documents released by WikiLeaks, “in 2004, there were 308 makeshift bombs in 2004: in 
1 Bill Roggio, “Special Operations Forces Deal Blows to Taliban Ranks,” http://www.longwarjournal.org/ 
 archives/2010/12special_operations_f.php [accessed March 17 – December 9, 2010], 1. 
2 Ibid., 1.  
3 Bill Roggio, “Special Operations Forces Deal Blows to Taliban Ranks,” http://www.longwarjournal.org/ 
 archives/2010/12special_operations_f.php [accessed March 17 – December 9, 2010], 2.  
4 Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, “Analysis The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been broken,” 2. 
5 Ibid., 2. 
6 Rob Evans, “Afghanistan war logs: How the IED became Taliban's weapon of choice,” http://www.the  
guardian.com/world/2010/jul/25/ieds-improvised-explosive-device-deaths [accessed March 17-
July 25, 2010], 1. 
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2009 there were 7,155.7 Taliban fighters in total planted more than 16,000 IEDs in those 
five years.”8  
Figure 11: Number of IED Events (2004-2012) 
 
  
Source: Brookings Institute, “Afghan Index,” as January 15, 2013, p. 11, http://www.brookings.edu/`media/ 
Programs /foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20130131.pdf 
       
During an interview with USA Today in July 2009, General McChrystal argued 
“the best way to defeat IEDs will be to defeat the Taliban’s hold on the people.”9 In the 
fall of 2009, McChrystal ordered his commanders to increase the number of dismounted 
patrols being conducted by U.S. and ISAF forces. “The Taliban responded by increasing 
the number of improvised explosive devices targeting dismounted patrols from 71 in 
September 2009 to 228 by January 2010.”10     
 Unfortunately, these numbers foreshadowed a deadly trend that was only about to 
get worse. According to the Civil Military Fusion Center, the number of IED events in 
7 Ibid., 1. 
8 Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, “Analysis The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been broken,” 3. 
9 Gareth Porter, “How the U.S. Quietly Lost the IED War in Afghanistan,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2012.10 
 how-the-u-s-quietly-lost-the-ied-war-in-afghanistan/ [accessed March 17 – October 9, 2012], 2. 
10 Ibid., 3. 
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Afghanistan increased to over 15,225 in 2010.11 “This is a 62 percent increase over 2009 
and more than three times as many as the year before.”12 The number of American troops 
killed by roadside bombs in 2010 soared by 60 percent, while the number of those 
wounded almost tripled.13 The number of IED events continued to rise in 2011, as more 
than 16,554 IEDs detonated or were cleared that year. The number of IED events in 2011 
was a new record and represented a nine percent increase from 2010. U.S. fatalities did 
fall that year from 257 in 2010 to 196 in 2011, and overall fatalities fell from 499 to 
418.14   
Figure 12: Executed IED Attacks Nationwide Monthly Attacks 
 
Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) 
Database as of January 12, 2013, p.5. http://augengeradeaus.net/wp content/uploads/2013/02/ ISAF_ 
Monthly_ Trends_ Dec 2012. 
11 Civil Military Fusion Center, “Improvised Explosive Devices: A Global Review January & February 
 2012,” https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Documents/Security/CFC_IED-Trends-and-Issues_ 
 March2012.pdf [accessed March 17 – March 2012], 1. 
12 Ibid., 1. 
13 Craig Whitlock, “Number of U.S. Casualties from Roadside Bombs in Afghanistan Skyrocketed from 
 2009 to 2010,” http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2011/january/jan262011.html#61. 
 [accessed March 18 – January 25], 1. 
14 Ibid., 1. 
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Beginning in 2012, the number of IED attacks began to drop in Afghanistan with 
February 2012 representing one of the best months since the beginning of the surge in 
2010.15 Overall, “there were 15,222 incidents in 2012, an 8 percent decline from their 
record high in 2011.”16 These numbers (15,222) are very similar to the number of IED 
events that occurred in 2010 (15,225).17 Moreover, fewer U.S. troops (104) were killed 
by IEDs in 2012 than in 2011 (183), a 57% decline.18 Bombs wounded fewer troops too, 
from 3,542 in 2011 to 1,744 in 2012, a 50% drop.19 Afghan troops however, suffered a 
“124% increase in the number of IED attacks against them in 2012.”20 
U.S. IED Casualties 
 
 According to the Pentagon’s Defense Casualty Analysis System and iCasualties, 
the U.S. military suffered a total of 14,627 casualties between 2009 and 2011. Of that 
total 8,680 or 59 percent were from IED explosions.21 Since 2006, “the United States has 
spent $18 billion dollars on high-tech solutions aimed at detecting and protecting soldiers 
from IEDs including robots, armored vehicles, high-tech surveillance gear, and blimps 
with spy cameras.”22 Despite these efforts, the number of IED casualties rose 
dramatically between 2008 and 2012. As shown in Figure 13, only 96 U.S. service 
members were killed by IEDs between dramatically between 2008 and 2012.  
 In 2008, the number of casualties caused by IEDs jumped to 84, this represents 
15 Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, “Analysis The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been broken,” 3. 
16 DoD, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ 
 Section _1230_Report_July_2013.pdf [accessed March 18 – July 2013], 19. 
17 Ibid., 19. 
18 Tom Vanden Brook, “Coalition Death from IED Attacks Soar in Afghanistan.” http://u satoday30.usatod  
 . ay.com/news/military/2009-03-08-IED_N.htm [accessed December 23 – March 9, 2009]. 1. 
19 Ibid., 1. 
20 Ibid., 1.  
21 Gareth Porter, “U.S. Losing IED war in Afghanistan,” 3. 
22 John M. Doyle “The Spreading Threat of Roadside Bombs and other Improvised Explosive Devices,” 
 http://www.idga.org/communications-engineering-and-it/articles/the-spreading-threat-of-roadside-
 bombs-and-other-i/ [accessed March 18 – January 02, 2013], 1. 
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54.2% of all U.S. fatalities for that year.23 By 2009, the number of IED fatalities almost 
doubled to 142, a 59% increase from the previous year. Unfortunately, the number of 
IED casualties continued to rise in 2010, “reaching a record high of 257 fatalities. Of the 
499 U.S. fatalities that year, over 51.5 percent were caused by IEDs.”24  
Figure 13: U.S. IED Fatalities/Total Fatalities in Afghanistan (2001-2013) 
 
Source: Brookings Institute, “The Afghan Index,” p. 11, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/forei  
gn% 20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20140227.pdf 
 
 Despite an increase in the number of IED events in 2011, (16,554), U.S. fatalities 
did fall that year from 257 in 2010 to 196 in 2011, and overall fatalities fell from 499 to 
418.25 With the United States and NATO handing over security responsibility to ANSF 
23 John M. Doyle “The Spreading Threat of Roadside Bombs and other Improvised Explosive Devices,” 2. 
24 Ibid., 2. 
25 Brookings Institute, “The Afghan Index,” http://www.brookings.edu/media/Programs/foreign%/pol 
 icy/afghanistan%20index/index20120227.pdf [accessed March 18 – February 27, 2012], 11. 
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forces and taking more of an advisory role in 2012, the number of IED fatalities 
continued to decline in 2012.26 According to statistics released by the Pentagon, “only 
104 U.S. troops were killed by IEDs in 2012, compared with 196 in 2011, a 57% decline. 
IED casualties accounted for 33.5 percent of all U.S. troops killed that year.”27  
 Even though the number of U.S. casualties caused by IEDs dropped by more than 
8 percent in 2012, a decrease in fatalities may not always tell the full story.28 According 
to Bill Roggio of The Long War Journal, “attacks were down overall nationwide in 2012 
as Afghan forces were pushed to the fore.”29 While the number of U.S. casualties in 
Afghanistan dropped by more than 60% between 2012 and 2013, the number of Afghan 
troops killed in combat shot up almost 80%.30 “This is likely in response to ANSF forces 
taking an increased role in combat operations as well as the ongoing decrease in the 
number of international forces in the country.”31 In 2013, 95% of all conventional 
operations were carried out by Afghan forces as well as 98% of all special operations 
missions.32 Thus, “casualties are not the best way to judge the strength or weakness of an 
insurgency.”33  
Afghan Civilian IED Casualties 
  
 Since 2009, IEDs in Afghanistan have killed or injured 12,504 civilians.34 Compared  
26 Ibid., 11.  
27 David Wood, IED Blasts Spike In Afghanistan War As The Wounded Flow Home, http:// www.huffingto  
npost.com/2012/07/26/ied-afghanistan-war-veterans_n_1705397.html[accessed March 18-July 26, 
2012], 1.  
28 Rowan Scarborough, U.S. troops winning war against IEDs of Taliban, http://www.washingtontimes.  
com/news/2012/may/24/us-troops-winning-war-against-ieds-of-taliban/?page=all [accessed March 
18-May 24, 2012], 1. 
29 Ibid., 1.  
30 The Guardian.Com “Afghan Troop Deaths up almost 80% in 2013 Fighting Season says Pentagon,” 1.  
31 Ibid., 1.  
32 DoD, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ 
 Section _1230_Report_November_2013.pdf [accessed March 18 – November 2013], 74. 
33 Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, “Analysis The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been broken,”  
 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/ [accessed March 17 – December 9, 2010], 4. 
34 UNAMA, “2013 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” http://unama.unmissions. 
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to 2009, “the number of civilian casualties increased by more than 40 percent in 2010.”35 
According to UNAMA, IED attacks accounted for the majority of civilians killed in 
2010. “This dramatic increase in the use of IEDs in 2010, even when targeting a 
legitimate military object disproportionately harmed civilians.”36 More than 511 civilians 
were killed in the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar in 2010.37 
Figure 14: Civilian Death by Tactic (2009-2011) 
 
Source: “2011 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.11, http://unama.unmissions 
.org/ Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012.pdf 
 
Upon review, “there were more than 1,281 IED incidents in the southern region of 
Afghanistan in 2010.”38 The Helmand districts of Lashkar Gah and Nad Ali (including 
Marjah) “saw the most civilian casualties in the province, with 40 per cent and 16 per 
 Org/Portals /UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf 
 [accessed March 18 – February 2014], 16. 
35 Ibid., 16. 
36  UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” http://unama.unmissions. 
 org.Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012 
 [accessed March 18 – March 2011], 6. 
37 Ibid., 6.  
38 Ibid., 6. 
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cent respectively of civilian casualties caused by IEDs.”39 All of these areas where the 
focus of intense counterinsurgency efforts by U.S. and ISAF forces in 2010.  
 IEDs continued to be the Taliban’s weapon of choice in 2011 as UNAMA 
recorded more than 967 civilian deaths and 1,586 injuries from IEDs that year.40  A 
majority of the civilians killed by IEDs were killed by victim –activated pressure plate 
IEDs (PPIEDs).41 PPIEDs in Afghanistan are set to explode when they are walked on or 
driven over with a trigger weight between 10 kg and 100kg.42 “The majority of PPIEDs 
in Afghanistan have approximately 20 kg of explosives, more than twice the explosive 
content of a standard anti-tank mine yet, they have the trigger of an anti-personnel 
mine.”43 This means that “every PPIED acts as a massive anti-personnel landmine with 
the capability of destroying a tank; civilians who step on or drive over these IEDS have 
no defense against them and little chance of survival.”44 
 The number of Afghan civilians killed by IEDs continued to rise sharply in 2012, 
“with a three percent increase compared to 2011.”45 Between January 1st and December 
31st, 2012, “UNAMA documented 782 IED incidents (more than two IEDs per day 
causing civilian casualties in 2012) which resulted in 2,531 civilian casualties (868 
civilian deaths and 1,663 injuries).”46 UNAMA also observed “that in most cases of 
39 Ibid., 6. 
40 UNAMA, “2011 Annual Report on Protection Civilians in Armed Conflict,” http://unama.unmissions.org 
 // Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf 
 [accessed March 18-February 2012], 17. 
41 Ibid., 17.  
42 The Long War Journal, “Anatomy of an IED,” http:/www.longwarjournal.org/nultimedia/IED-
 Anatomy/index.html [accessed March 18- August 2006], 5. 
43 Clay Wilson, “Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures,” 
 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22330.pdf [accessed March 18-August 28, 2007], 5. 
44 Ibid., 1. 
45 UNAMA, “2012 Annual Report on Protection Civilians in Armed Conflict,” http://unama.unmissions.org 
 // Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf 
 [accessed March 18-February 2013], 17. 
46 Ibid., 17. 
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civilian casualties caused by IEDs, the device appeared not to have been directed at 
specific military objectives or was used in a way that its effects were indiscriminate and 
in violation of international humanitarian law.”47 For example, “UNAMA confirmed 298 
incidents causing 913 civilian casualties (393 deaths and 520 injuries) from PPIEDs 
which had been planted on roads and footpaths frequently used by civilians.”48 This is a 
huge increase compared to 2011 when UNAMA documented 74 killed and 67 injured by 
this tactic.49 
Figure 15: Civilian Deaths and Injuries: IEDs by Region (2009-2013) 
 
Source: UNAMA, “2012 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.17 http://unama. 
unmissions.org/ Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf 
 
 The majority of IEDs used by the Taliban and other insurgent groups were victim-
activated IEDs (VAIEDs). “The prevalence of VAIEDs is highest in the southern 
47 Ibid., 17.  
48 Ibid., 17.  
49 Ibid., 17. 
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provinces of Afghanistan, where they constituted the vast majority of IEDs used.”50 The 
Taliban released several statements in 2012 denying the use of IEDs to target civilians 
indiscriminately.51   
Afghan Civilian Casualties and the U.S./ISAF Failure to Protect the Population 
 Another security indicator U.S. and ISAF forces used to track positive trends 
made during the surge was the number of civilians killed or injured. The first principle of 
COIN doctrine “is the need to secure the indigenous population in areas deemed centers 
of gravity, politically, economically, and militarily.”52 According to David Kilcullen, “in 
areas where there is a high level of Afghan-on-Afghan violence the population is very 
unlikely to feel safe enough to put their weapons down and join in peaceful negotiations 
or support for the government.”53 Also, “a spike in Afghan-on-Afghan violence in a 
particular area probably correlates to a drop in public confidence.”54 Supporters of the 
surge argued that “behind the protective shield of increasing numbers of ISAF and 
Afghan security forces, good government would emerge, the rule of law would take root 
and prosperity would grow.”55  
 During his June 2009, testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services 
Committee, General Stanley McChrystal discussed how civilian casualties affect popular 
perception and behavior.  
 “I would emphasize that how we conduct operations is vital to success…This is a 
 struggle for the support of the Afghan people. Our willingness to operate in ways 
50 Ibid. 18 
51 Ibid., 18. 
52 Karl W. Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan-The Other Side of 
 COIN,”http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139645/karl-w-eikenbery\the-limits-of-
 counterinsurgency-doctrine-in-afghanistan [accessed March 18-September/October 2013], 1. 
53 David Kilcullen, “Measuring Progress in Afghanistan,” http://literature-index.wikispaces.com/file/view/ 
 Kilcullen-COIN+Metrics.pdf [accessed March 18-February 8, 2010],  21. 
54 Ibid., 21. 
55 Karl W. Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan, 2. 
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 that minimize casualties or damage, even when doing so makes our task more 
 difficult, is essential to our credibility.”56 
 
Then-Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, expressed the same opinion before Congress. 
“But I will tell you that I believe that the civilian casualties are doing us enormous harm 
in Afghanistan, and we have got to do better in terms of avoiding casualties. And I say 
knowing full well that the Taliban mingle among the people, use them as barriers. But 
when we go ahead and attack, we play right into their hands.”57                                        
 When Afghans were asked what the main problems in their area were, most 
respondents stated that ISAF was not able to protect them “24/7”, both physically and 
psychologically.58 Even though U.S. and ISAF forces conduct daily patrols and other 
operations to clear insurgents from their hideouts, these groups return during the night 
after Coalition forces have returned to their bases. “Insurgents take advantage of this by 
extending their influence through intimidation and attacks on civilians and the 
infrastructure they use.”59 This fact turns the local population against ISAF and the 
Afghan government “as they are not able to live up to the promises of security.”60 
Moreover, ‘it is the consensus view among NATO intelligence that the inadvertent killing 
of civilians is one of the two or three things, along with corruption and favoritism 
perhaps, that most help the Taliban in recruiting.”61 
Afghan Civilian Casualties in 2010      
 According to United Nation’s “Afghanistan: Annual Report 2012, Protection of 
56 Noah Shachtman, “New Top General Could Mean Changes for Afghan Airstrikes,” http://www.wired.co 
 m /dangerroom/2009/06/new-top-general-could-mean-changes-for-afghan-airstrikes/ [accessed 
 March 18-June 05, 2009],2. 
57 Luke N. Condra, “The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq,”  https://www.princeton.edu 
 /`jns/papers/CFIS _CIVCAS_OCT2010.pdf [accessed March 18-October 14, 2010], 8. 
58 Robert Beljan, “Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from an ISAF Perspective,” 16. 
59 Ibid., 16.  
60 Ibid., 17. 
61 Luke N. Condra, “The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq,”  9. 
98 
 
                                                          
Civilians in Armed Conflict”, the numbers of civilian casualties (both dead and injured) 
has risen dramatically since 2009.62 Before the surge in 2010, “UNAMA estimated that 
more than 2,412 civilians were killed in 2009.”63 However, the number of civilians killed 
in Afghanistan increased by more than 15% in 2010.64 In total, more than 2,777 Afghan 
civilians were killed that year. “The overall rise in civilian deaths can be attributed to the 
increased use of IEDs and targeted assassinations by insurgents and intensified military 
operations particularly in southern Afghanistan.”65  
 Although the majority of fighting in 2010 occurred in the southern and  
southeastern regions, the insecurity of the conflict continued to spread to the northern, 
eastern, and western regions. All regions apart from the eastern region experienced major 
increases in the number of civilians killed compared to 2009.66 “The northern region saw 
an intensification of fighting throughout the year with the number of civilians killed 
increased by 76 percent compared to 2009.”67 Both the southern and southeastern regions 
saw a rise in the number of civilian deaths compared to 2009, “with a 21 percent and 40 
percent increase respectively.”68         
 Upon review of Figure 16, more than 2,080 civilians were killed by Anti-
Government Elements in 2010. This represents 75% of all Afghan civilians killed that 
year.69 In total, the Taliban and other insurgent groups were responsible for 5,446 civilian 
casualties in 2010. IEDs, suicide attacks, assassinations and executions, intimidation, 
62 UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” http://unama.unmissions. 
 org.Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012 
 [accessed March 18 – March 2011], 5. 
63 Ibid., 5. 
64 Ibid., 5. 
65 Ibid., 5. 
66 Ibid., 6. 
67 Ibid., 6. 
68 Ibid., 8. 
69 Ibid., 8.  
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harassment, and abductions were the main tactics used by the Taliban to undermine 
support for ISAF and the Afghan government.70 
Figure 16: Recorded total Civilian deaths in 2010 by parties to the conflict 
 
Source: UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p. xi. http://unama. 
unmissions.orgPortals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012  
As seen in Figure 17, IED attacks account for the majority of civilians killed in 
2010 with 904 killed and 1662 injured. Civilian casualties from IEDs increased by 40 
percent compared to 2009.71 “2010 was also characterized by an intensified, systematic, 
and widespread campaign of intimidation by insurgents.”72 According to the UN’s 2010 
“Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” UNAMA recorded 
381assassinations and executions in 2010.73 This is more than double the incidents 
70 Ibid., 8.  
71 Ibid., 8. 
72 Ibid., 8. 
73 Ibid., 8  
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recorded in 2009.74            
Figure 17: Record AGEs-attributed civilian deaths in 2010 by incident type 
            Source: UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p. 2  
http://unama.missions.org.Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_F
 inal_Feb%202012 pdf 
 
Surprisingly, the number of civilians killed by suicide attacks decreased by 15 
percent compared to 2009.75 “This may have reflected guidance in the Taliban’s Code of 
Conduct or Laiha to concentrate the use of these strategic weapons on very important 
targets” and possibly the guidance to “avoid casualties among the common people.”76 At 
least 71 suicide attacks were carried out in 2010, killing 237 civilians and injuring 737.77 
The majority of these attacks occurred in Helmand and Kandahar provinces.   
 Even though the Taliban and other insurgent groups were responsible for a 
74 Ibid., 11.  
75 Ibid., 11.  
76 ICRC, “Conflict in Afghanistan,” http://www.icrc.org/eng/resource[accessed March 18-March 2011], 81. 
77 UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection,” 11.  
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majority of the Afghan civilians injured or killed in 2010, some of these casualties can be 
attributed to Pro-Government Forces (PGF), which include U.S., ISAF, and ANSF 
forces. Between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2010, more than 840 civilians were 
injured or killed by Pro-Government Forces with 440 civilian deaths and 400 injuries.78 
“This represents a decrease of 21 percent from the 1,057 civilian casualties linked to 
PGFs in 2009.”79 UNAMA also recorded a significant decline in civilian deaths from air 
strikes (171), escalation of force incidents (45) and search and seizure operations (80) 
during 2010.80 
 According to a number of statements released by U.S. and ISAF forces, “more 
aerial attacks, more operations by SOF forces, and more night raids were carried out in 
2010 than in any previous year.”81 In spite of this increase, “UNAMA observed a 
significant decline in the number of civilians killed and injured by U.S., ISAF, and ANSF 
forces as General Petraeus, who took over command of ISAF in July 2010, reinforced 
and revised General McChrystal’s COIN guidelines.”82 Although the number of civilian 
casualties decreased by 43% in 2010, air strikes remained the deadliest tactic used by 
U.S. and ISAF forces that year. 83 Compared to 2009, “these attacks continued to cause 
the most civilian harm with 171 deaths and 133 injuries.”84     
 In the second half of 2010, the number of air strikes increased substantially.85 
According to USAFCENT Public Affairs Directorate, “as of December 31, 2010, a total 
78 UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection,” 23. 
79 Ibid.,  23. 
80 Ibid., 23. 
81 Bill Roggio, “Special Operations Forces Deal Blows to Taliban Ranks,” 1. 
82 UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” http://unama.unmissions. 
 org.Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012 
 [accessed March 18 – March 2011], 25. 
83 Ibid., 25. 
84 Ibid., 23. 
85 Ibid., 23.  
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of 33,679 Close Air Support sorties were recorded with a total of 5,101 incidents in 
which weapons were released.”86 Although the number of air strikes increased 
dramatically, the number of civilian casualties from these attacks decreased in 2010.87 
“February and October proved to be the deadliest months for civilians killed by ISAF 
airstrikes in 2010.”88  
 The number of civilian casualties caused by “night raids” also decreased in 2010. 
“UNAMA documented 60 incidents of night raids that caused civilian casualties.”89 Both 
General McChrystal and General Petraeus increased the number of night raids carried out 
by U.S. SOF forces in 2010. These raids are “carried out without warning on private 
residences and are deeply resented by Afghans, who see troops entering their homes a 
night as a blatant violation of their country’s conservative social norms.”90 Moreover, 
President Karzai began calling for an end to the U.S. night raids in 2010.91 “U.S. military 
officials however, deemed the tactic extremely effective in gathering intelligence, 
arresting suspected insurgents, reducing civilian casualties, and stopping more attacks by 
insurgent forces.”92 U.S. and NATO commanders also stated that no shots are fired in 80 
percent of night raids.93 
Afghan Civilian Casualties in 2011      
 Despite a renewed emphasis by Coalition and Afghan forces to protect the 
86 Marc V. Schanz, “Boom Time in Afghanistan,” http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Docume 
 nts/2011/June %202011/0611afghanistan.pdf [accessed March 18-June 2011] 28. 
87 Ibid., 28.  
88 UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection,” 23.  
89 Ibid., 24.  
90 Anthony H. Cordesman,  “Afghanistan at the End of 2011,”  http://csis.org/files/publication/120103 _ 
 Afghan_War_at_End.pdf [accessed March 18-January 3, 2012], 9. 
91 Alex Rodriguez & Hashmat Baktash, “Afghanistan, U.S. Sign Night Raid Authorization Pact,” The Los 
 Angeles Times, April 8, 2012. 
92 Ibid., 1.  
93 Open Society Foundations, “The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Surge on Afghan 
 Civilians,” http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Night-Raids-Report-FINAL-
 092011.pdf [accessed March 18-September 19, 2011], 21. 
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population and winning over their support, “Afghanistan again incurred a greater human 
cost in 2011 than in previous years.”94 UNAMA documented 3,021 civilian deaths in 
2011, “an increase of eight percent over 2010 (2,790 civilian deaths) and a 25 percent 
increase from 2009.”95 Since 2007, the number of Afghans killed has almost doubled 
from 1,523 (2007) to 3,021 (2011).96 Insurgents caused 2,322-related deaths of Afghan 
civilians in 2011, up 14 percent from 2010.97 More than 410 civilians were killed from 
operations by U.S., ISAF, and ANSF forces, down four percent from 2010.98 
Figure 18: Civilian Deaths by Year (2007-2011) 
 
Source: “2011 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.1, http://unama.unmissions. 
org/Portal s/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012.pdf             
 At the same time, “the geographic distribution of civilian casualties shifted  
94 UNAMA. “2011 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” http://unama.unmissions   
 org/ Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012 .
 pdf [accessed March 18 – February 2012], 1. 
95 Ibid., 1. 
96 Ibid., 1.  
97 Ibid., 1.  
98 Ibid., 2. 
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significantly, particularly in the second half of 2011.”99 As the intensity of the conflict 
declined in southern Afghanistan, it began to intensify in areas previously unaffected by 
the insurgency, including the eastern and northern parts of Afghanistan.100 During the 
second half of 2011, “only 289 civilians were killed as a result of engagements between 
insurgent and Coalition forces in southern Afghanistan.”101 This is a decline of 33 percent 
compared to the same period in 2010.102 “Deaths from this tactic decreased in all regions 
except, the eastern region, where 72 civilians died in ground combat, up 29 percent from 
2010.”103  
 As mentioned earlier, insurgents were responsible for 77 percent of all conflict-
related civilian deaths in 2011.104 “The use of IEDs by insurgent groups was the single 
largest killer of Afghan men, women, and children in 2011, taking the lives of 967 
civilians or nearly one in three (32 percent) of all civilians killed in the conflict.”105 
During 2011, insurgents increased their use of anti-personnel landmines and IEDs even 
though they banned them in 1998 denouncing such weapons as “un-Islamic and anti-
human.”106  
 Unlike 2010, the number of civilians killed by suicide attacks rose dramatically in 
2011.107 In total, “431 Afghan civilians were killed in suicide attacks, an increase of 80 
percent over 2010.”108 According to UNAMA, suicide attacks accounted for 14 percent 
of all civilian deaths in 2010. The number of suicide attacks carried out by insurgents 
99 Ibid., 2 
100 Ibid., 2.  
101 Ibid., 3. 
102 Ibid., 3.  
103 Ibid., 3. 
104 UNAMA, “2011 Annual Report on Protection,” 1 
105 Ibid., 3. 
106 Ibid., 3. 
107 Ibid., 1.  
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increased as well.109 In 2011, there were more than 431 suicide attacks across 
Afghanistan, compared to 238 in 2010.110 Targeted killings of civilians by insurgents 
increased as well. UNAMA documented 495 targeted killings across the country, up three 
percent from 2010.111         
 Despite an increase in the number of civilians killed by the Taliban and other 
affiliated groups, there was a 4 percent decrease in the number of civilians killed by 
Coalition and ANSF forces.112 In 2011, more than 410 Afghan men, women, and children 
were killed as a result of operations conducted by Pro-Government Forces.113 The 
number of civilians injured also decreased by more than 16% in 2011 compared to 2010. 
Similar to 2009 and 2010, airstrikes by U.S. and ISAF warplanes accounted for the 
majority of civilian deaths by U.S, NATO, and ANSF forces.114  
 According to UNAMA, more than 187 civilians were killed in airstrikes by 
Coalition forces in 2011.115 This is a nine percent increase compared to 2010.116  
Interestingly enough, “less aerial operations were carried out by ISAF/Operation 
Enduring Freedom using fixed or rotary-wing aircraft (from 1,816 in 2010 to 1,675 in 
2011).”117 Unlike previous years, “the eastern region of Afghanistan saw the majority of 
civilian deaths from aerial attacks in 2011.”118 Kunar province, in particular, experienced 
a third of all civilian deaths by Coalition aircraft that year.     
  The United States and ISAF also took additional steps in 2011 to help minimize 
109 Ibid., 4.  
110 Ibid., 4.  
111 Ibid., 4. 
112 Ibid., 24.  
113 Ibid., 24.  
114 Ibid., 24.  
115 Ibid., 24.  
116 Ibid., 24. 
117 Marc V. Schanz, “Boom Time in Afghanistan,” 128. 
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the impact of night operations on civilians. In December of that year, General John Allen, 
the new commander of ISAF,  
“issued a directive that encouraged ANSF to take the lead on operations, required 
that the provincial governor or his designated representative be notified prior to 
the commencement of an operation, provide written notification of any 
individuals detained within 24 hours where possible and that entry is initiated by 
‘soft-knock’ with an Afghan led call-out in local language.”119  
 
Despite these new ROEs, “UNAMA continued to receive reports that the standard of 
partnered operations was not often followed in night search operations.”120 
 Another concerning finding reported in the UN’s “2011 Annual Report on 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, was the number of civilians killed by 
operations and actions of the Afghan National Security Forces.121 Between July and 
December 2011, 41 civilians were killed as a result of operations carried out by the 
ANSF.122 This represented “a 192 percent increase in the number of civilian deaths 
attributed to these forces compared to the last six months of 2010.”123 UNAMA recorded 
minimal increases or decreases in civilian casualties caused directly by ANSF forces in 
transitioned areas.124  
Afghan Civilian Casualties in 2012 
 Despite the positive security gains made in southern Afghanistan in 2011, Afghan 
civilians continued to be killed and wounded at an alarming rate in 2012. UNAMA 
documented 7,559 civilian casualties (2,754 civilian deaths and 4,805 injuries from 
119 Azmat Khan,” Night Raids , Disrupting or Fueling the Insurgency,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline /afghanistan-pakistan/kill-capture/night-raids-disrupting-or-fueli/ [accessed March 18-
June 17, 2011], 1.  
120 Ibid., 1. 
121 UNAMA. “2011 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” http://unama.unmissions   
org/ Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012 
.pdf [accessed March 18 – February 2012], 28.  
122 Ibid., 28. 
123 Ibid., 28. 
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armed conflict in 2012.125 “These numbers reflect a 12 percent reduction in civilian 
deaths and a minimal increase in civilians injured compared to 2011.”126 Despite this 
decrease, the Taliban and other insurgent groups continued to target civilians throughout 
the country. 
Figure 19: Civilian Deaths by Year: 2007-2012 
 
Source: UNAMA, “2012 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.1, http://unamam 
issions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3D 
 
 According to the UN’s report, 81 percent of all civilian casualties in 2012 can be 
attributed to the Taliban and other insurgent groups.127 “The heavy use of IEDs by 
insurgents remained the biggest threat to civilians in 2012, causing 2,531 civilian 
casualties with 868 civilians killed and 1,663 injured, in 782 separate incidents.”128 This 
represented a three percent increase from 2011. Moreover, IED incidents accounted for 
125 Ibid.,  1 
126 UNAMA. “2012 Annual Report on Protection Civilians in Armed Conflict,” http://unama.unmissions.  
org//Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf 
[accessed March 18-February 2013], 1.  
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38 percent of all civilian casualties in 2012.129         
 UNAMA also recorded a 108 percent increase in the number of Afghan civilians 
injured or killed as a result of targeted killings.130 Between January 1, and December 31, 
2012, more than 1,077 Afghan civilians were injured or killed.131 “Many of these 
casualties resulted from the intentional targeting of civilians perceived to be supporting 
the Afghan Government, including government officials, off-duty police officers, tribal 
elders, and persons supporting the peace process.”132 Of these 1,077 civilian casualties, 
“targeted killings and injuries of government civilian employees increased by a 
staggering 700 percent.”133              
 Civilian deaths and injuries caused by Coalition and ANSF forces continued to 
decline in 2012, just like they had in the previous two years.134 Between January 1 and 
December 31, 2012, “UNAMA recorded 587 civilian casualties (316 deaths and 271 
injuries) attributed to PGFs.”135 This represented a “39 percent decrease in civilian deaths 
and 53 percent reduction in civilians injured, and an overall 46 percent decrease in total 
civilian casualties from 2011.”136 Eight percent of all civilian casualties in 2012 were 
attributed to U.S., NATO, and ANSF forces, compared to 14 percent in 2011.137 
 Despite a decline in the number of civilians killed in aerial operations, airstrikes 
continued to be main cause of civilian deaths by ISAF and Afghan forces. 138 According 
to UNAMA, “more than 204 civilians were killed or injured as a result of U.S. and ISAF 
129 Ibid., 3. 
130 Ibid., 3.  
131 Ibid., 4.  
132 Ibid., 4 
133 Ibid., 4. 
134 Ibid., 4.  
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airstrikes (126 deaths and 78 injuries).”139 This is a 42 percent decrease from 2011. 
“Airstrikes caused 40 percent of all civilian deaths attributed to Coalition and ANSF 
forces and three percent of all civilian casualties from all parties.”140 Of the 126 civilian 
deaths caused by aerial attacks, 40 percent were children.141 
Figure 20: AGE Civilian Deaths by Core Tactics (2010-2012) 
 
Source: UNAMA, “2012 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.29, http://unama 
missions. org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3D 
 
 The number of civilians killed as result of night raids conducted by U.S, ISAF, 
and Afghan SOF teams also decreased in 2012. According to UNAMA, “only 54 
civilians were killed while 21 were injured during these operations, a decrease of 33 
percent compared with 2011.”142 This is consistent with the downward trend documented 
in the same periods in 2010 and 2011. UNAMA was also able to document 35 search 
139 Ibid., 2. 
140 Ibid., 2. 
141 Ibid., 2.  
142 Ibid.,35. 
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operations by PGF forces which resulted in civilian casualties, a 78 percent drop in the 
number of incidents of search operations resulting in civilian casualties compared to 
2011.143 Despite this decrease, “it remains unclear whether the decline in civilian 
casualties can be attributed to the better practices and training of Afghan security forces 
or a reduction in the number of search operations being carried out.”144 In July 2012, 
Afghan security forces began taking the lead in the majority of military operations, 
although U.S. and ISAF forces may have been present during these operations.145 The 
majority occurred during ground operations against insurgents, “usually following an 
attack against an ANSF checkpoint or convoy.”146  
Figure 21: Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Aerial Attacks (2010-2012) 
 
Source: UNAMA, “2012 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.32, http: 
//unamumissions. org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3D 
143 Ibid., 35.  
144 Ibid., 35.  
145 Ibid., 37.  
146 Ibid., 37.  
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Enemy Initiated Attacks 
 Since 2009, “ISAF reporting – and a great deal of U.S. reporting as well – focused 
on one set of criteria: enemy initiated attacks (EIAs).”147 The U.S. and ISAF define EIAs 
as “enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, as well as executed 
attacks.”148 At first, EIAs were “believed to be a useful surrogate metric for determining 
which side possesses the tactical initiative as well as a key indicator of which side 
controls initiation of firefights and has better situational awareness and access to 
intelligence on enemy movements.”149 However, the reporting of this metric was ceased 
on March 5, 2013 after it became clear there was no progress made by Coalition forces 
between 2011 and 2012.150         
 ISAF and DoD reporting do indicate that the number of enemy initiated attacks 
did drop between 2011 and 2012 “but these reports also indicate EIAs did not drop 
meaningfully in 2012 and remain far higher than in 2009.”151 This reporting also shows 
that the number of EIAs in Kandahar and Helmand provinces (the main focus of the 
surge) continued to remain high in 2012.152 A breakout of the trend in enemy initiated 
attacks by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is shown in Figure 22. It not 
only “shows no significant progress when 2010 is compared to 2011 and 2012, but it also 
shows that insurgents kept up the pace of their attacks by shifting away from ISAF 
targets and focusing on ANSF and civilian targets.”153 
147 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The War in Afghanistan at the End of 2012: The Uncertain Course of the War 
 and Transition,” https://csis.org/publication/war-afghanistan-end-2012-uncertain-course-war-and-
 transition [accessed March 21 – January 22, 2013], 17. 
148 ISAF, “ISAF Month Data Trends through December 2012,” 1. 
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150 Robert Burns, “Taliban Attacks Drop Reported By ISAF Was Incorrect,” 1.  
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Figure 22: Average Daily EIAs by Type in Afghanistan, Dec 2005-Dec 2012 
  
Source: Afghanistan, Key Oversight Issues, Government account Office, February 2013, GAO-13-218SP, 
p.17. 
Another report that indicates the number of EIAs did not drop meaningfully 
between 2010-2012 and remains far higher than levels in 2009 is ISAF’s “Monthly Data 
Trends” report. This data comes from the Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined 
Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) and defines EIAs as “enemy-initiated 
direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, as well as executed attacks.”154 ISAF includes 
a bar chart of EIAs in its monthly reporting on the violence in Afghanistan.155 “Although 
the underlying data used to make the graphs is classified, it is possible, based on ISAF’s 
reporting, to estimate the number of EIAs each month.”156    
 According to Figure 23, “the number of EIAs exceeded or approximated 1,000 in 
154 ISAF, “ISAF Month Data Trends through December 2012,” http://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content  
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just four months, and in no month did that figure reach 1,500 in 2008.”157 Violence 
continued to rise in 2009 as the number of EIAs “exceeded 1,000 in eight months out of 
the year, 1,500 in five months, and topped 2,500 in one month (August 2009).”158  By 
2010, when the surge was first implemented, the number of EIAs exceeded 1,000 in 
every month. “In ten of twelve months, the number of EIAs exceeded 1,500. (Recall that 
in 2008 the number of EIAs did not reach 1,500 in any single month).”159 Moreover, the 
“number of EIAs was greater than 2,500 in six months out of the year.”160 The number of 
enemy initiated attacks also topped 4,000 for the first time in both August and September 
of that year. While the level of violence “continued to remain high in 2011, the number of 
EIAs began to decline in May of that year.”161  
Figure 23: Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIA) Nationwide Monthly Attacks 
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After five consecutive years where enemy initiated-attacks and overall violence 
increased sharply each year (e.g., up 94 percent in 2010 over 2009), “such attacks began 
to decrease in May 2011 compared to the previous year and continued to decline for the 
rest of 2011.”162 In comparison, the number of EIAs only exceeded 3,000 in three months 
in 2011 (June, July, & August) compared to six months in 2010.163 The lowest number of 
EIAs reported in 2011 was in February (under 1,500).164 This month represented “the 
first time the number of EIAs had not topped 1,500 since February 2010.”165 
Even though the number of enemy initiated attacks did drop in 2011 and 2012, 
“these numbers are far closer to 2010 in terms of the total level of violence than 2008 or 
2009.”166 When compared to monthly totals from 2009, the total number of EIAs in 2011 
and 2012 has been far greater each month.167 While the total number of EIAs exceeded 
2,500 in only one month in 2009, “it topped this same mark on five occasions in 2011, 
and five months in 2012.”168 
Despite progress made by U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the number of 
EIAs did not decline as significantly in 2012 as they had in 2011.169 In January 2013, the 
U.S. and ISAF discovered that a number of EIAs reported from independent ANSF 
operations had not been included in its database.170 These EIAs occurred throughout 
2012, although most occurred towards the end of the year. The ANSF had accurately 
162 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Failing Transition: The New 1230 Report on Progress Toward Stability and 
Progress in Afghanistan,” http://csis.org/files/publication/130805_failingtransition_afghanistan 
.pdf  [accessed March 21-August 5, 2013], 8.  
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reported this data, but ISAF mistakenly did not enter the data into its main EIA 
database.171 According to Anthony H. Cordesman (2013), “an internal audit resulted in a 
retroactive correction of 2012 EIA totals, from being down 7 percent compared to 2011 
to no change.”172 The error revealed by the discovery in January has since then been 
corrected (Figure 24), and all EIA-related data in this report uses this corrected data.      
Figure 24: Number of Enemy Initiated Attacks Has Recovered Since the “Surge”: 
No Progress in reducing EIAs in the First Six Months of 2013 versus First Six 
Months of 2012 
   
Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. A-1. 
 
In contrast, Figures 25 through 27 show that “even if one does confine EIA 
reporting to combat areas and tie it to specific regions,”173 the figures do not show any 
“significant” progress made by U.S. and ISAF forces in Helmand and Kandahar 
provinces in 2011 and 2012. This is particularly important because plans to carry out a 
171 Ibid., 8.  
172 Ibid., 8.  
173 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Afghan War in 2013,” http://csis.org/files/publication/1303 
 27_afghan_war_in_2013_vol_III.pdf [accessed March 22-May 2013]. 12.  
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similar campaign in the east were canceled due to U.S. and NATO troop cuts. Thus, there 
was no broad effort to take back control of key areas in eastern Afghanistan.174 Figure 25 
shows “what appear to be positive trends in enemy initiated attacks in the Helmand area – 
which was the key focus of the surge: however, these trends do little more than show that 
the insurgents stopped making attacks they know would result in major losses during the 
peak of the surge in 2010.”175 As seen in Figure 25, this “positive” trend largely vanishes 
in 2011.176 
Figure 25: EIA Monthly Year-Over-Year Changes in RC SW (Jan 09-Dec 12) 
 
Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) 
Database as of January 12, 2013, p.4. http://augengeradeaus.net/wp content/uploads/2013/02/ ISAF_ 
Monthly_ Trends_ Dec 2012. Pdf 
 
 Another area that was a key focus of U.S. and ISAF counterinsurgency efforts 
was Kandahar province. Kandahar falls under the command of RC South (RC-S) which 
includes the provinces of Uruzgan, Zabul, and Daykundi as well. Even though progress 
was made in reversing the Taliban’s momentum in Kandahar, this area saw far fewer 
174Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, “Analysis: The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been broken,” 2. 
175 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Afghan War in 2013,” 12.  
176 Ibid., 13.  
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positive trends in EIAs during the 2010-2011 campaign than RC SW. Upon review, the 
number of EIAs surged in Kandahar and the rest of RC South during the summer of 
2010. While some progress was made in 2011, violence in Kandahar continued to remain 
well above levels before the surge in 2010. Moreover, the number of enemy initiated 
attacks increased once again during the spring and summer of 2012 and has declined very 
little since then.  
Figure 26: EIA Monthly Year-Over-Year Changes in RC S (Jan 09-Dec 12) 
 
Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) 
Database as of January 12, 2013, p.4. http://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ ISAF 
_Monthly_Trends_Dec2012.pdf 
  
 A final area that was the focus of intensive U.S. and ISAF military operations is 
RC East. RC East includes the provinces of Bamyan, Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, 
Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktiya, Panjshayr, Parwan and 
Wardak.  It covers 46,000 square miles and shares a portion of its border with Pakistan. 
Moreover, this area serves as the home turf of the Haqqani Network. As seen in Figure 
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27, RC E accounted for 38% of all EIAs reported in Afghanistan in 2012. This is a 
decrease of 8% compared to 2011, but unlike RC South and RC Southwest, RC East has 
seen very few positive trends, even less than RC South.177 EIAs increased for 29 
consecutive months between January 2009 and May 2011, before the there was any 
decline. Even then, this decline was insignificant as the number of attacks has increased 
since May 2011 and remains at levels well above EIA levels before the surge in 2010. 
Figure 27: EIA Monthly Year-Over-Year Changes in RC E (Jan 09-Dec 12) 
 
Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) 
Database as of January 12, 2013, p.4. http://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ISAF 
_Monthly_Trends_Dec2012.pdf 
 
 Unfortunately, there is no way of telling if the U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy 
would have been successful in quelling the insurgency plaguing eastern Afghanistan as 
the United States began withdrawing troops before they could be dispatched to this 
region. On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced that all of the 33,000 additional 
177 Ibid., 13.  
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troops sent to Afghanistan would be withdrawn by September 2012. Defense Secretary 
Gates and General Petraeus had initially pushed for a drawdown of 3,000-5,000 so that 
U.S. forces could dispatch a small number of troops to the eastern provinces of Paktika, 
Paktia, and Khost to conduct counterterrorism operations against Haqqani Network 
fighters, leaders, and infrastructure.178 This, in turn, “would have halted the Haqqani 
Network’s momentum and prevent them from spreading into adjacent provinces and, 
most importantly, to the national capital of Kabul.”179 Despite these recommendations, 
Obama ultimately decided to adopt a more aggressive withdrawal plan citing that the 
current military campaign was “meeting our goals” in Afghanistan and the drawdown 
would begin “from a position of strength.”180 
           
178 CJ Radin, “Analysis: U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan shifts as forces draw down,” http://www.long 
 warjournal.org/archives/2011/08/the_military_strateg_1.php [accessed January 17 – August 3, 
 2011], 2. 
179 Ibid., 2. 
180 Dave Boyer, “Obama Time to Withdraw Troops from Afghanistan: We stand not for Empire,” The 
 Washington Times, June 24th, 2011. 
120 
 
                                                          
CHAPTER VI: EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A MORE CAPABLE & ACCOUNTABLE 
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT 
“A government that is losing to a counterinsurgency isn’t being outfought, it is being out-governed.” 
-David Kilcullen 
 One of the biggest challenges to U.S. success in Afghanistan over the last decade 
has been wide-spread corruption and a lack of governance by the Afghan Government.  
According to FM 3-24, “good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve 
legitimacy for the Host Nation (HN) government.”1 FM 3-24 defines governance “as the 
Host Nation government’s ability to gather and distribute resources while providing 
direction and control for the society.”2 These include the regulation of public activity, 
taxation, maintenance of security, control and essential services, and normalizing the 
means of succession of power.3 Governments “that attain these goals usually garner the 
support of enough of the population to create stability.”4    
 Since 2002, Afghanistan has consistently ranked as one of the world’s most 
corrupt nations, along with Syria, Somalia, and North Korea.5 In 2009, Afghanistan 
ranked 179 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index, making it-by that standard-the second most corrupt country in the world. An ABC 
1U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Washington: Department
 of Defense, 2006), 5-44. 
2 Ibid., 5-44. 
3 Ibid., 5-44. 
4 Elliot Cohen, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of 
 Counterinsurgency,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/cohen.pdf [accessed March  
 16-March 2006], 49. 
5 Brian Patrick Eha, “The 10 Most Corrupt and Least Corrupt Countries in the World,” http://www.  
 entrepreneur.com/article/230189 [accessed April 1-December 3, 2013], 1.  
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poll in the winter of 2009-210 found that 95 percent of Afghans calls corruption a 
problem, and 76 percent called it a “big problem.”1 This is 31 percent points higher than 
in 2007.2 Integrity Watch Afghanistan released a survey in June 2010 that found 
“Afghans considered corruption to be the third largest problem in the country, following 
security and unemployment.”3  
 The Afghan people “are likewise not enthralled by an overly centralized and 
controlling government in Kabul. They prefer local governance and local security with 
some enablers and resources from the central government.” 4 The Afghans also want 
fundamental services such as education and roads. According to LTC Chris Cavoli, “the 
Taliban seek ways to prevent the Afghan government from taking actions that would 
legitimate itself by providing reconstruction and security, making possible economic 
activity other than narcotics cultivation and trafficking.”5 Thus, Afghans “who have 
minimal positive ties with their national government, have minimal incentive to support 
it.”6 Even though many Afghans are dissatisfied with aid ineffectiveness, corruption, and 
government failure to protect the population, support for the Taliban remains low. 
 According to David Kilcullen, “Afghans hate the Taliban; even today only four 
percent want them back.”7 Moreover, 63 percent of Afghans surveyed in 2008 wanted 
Coalition troops to stay, while 82 percent wanted the current government to continue 
1 Anthony H. Cordesman, “How America Corrupted Afghanistan: Time to Look in the Mirror,” http://csis 
Org/publication/100907_Ameerican_Corruption_Afghanistan.pdf [accessed April 1-Sep 9, 2010], 
3.  
2 Ibid.,3.  
3IWA, “Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption, A National Survey 2010,” http://www.iwaweb 
 .org/corruptionSurvey2010/NationalCorruption2010.html [accessed April 1-January 23, 2011], 1. 
4 Robert Cassidy, War, Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011, 
 (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2012), 113. 
5 Chris Cavoli, manuscript entitled “Guns and Tea,” June 20, 2010, p.18 
6 Tom Pike and Eddie J. Brown, “Populations as Complex Adaptive Systems: A Case Study of Corruption  
 In Afghanistan, 4.  
7 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 2009), 67. 
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ruling Afghanistan. Forty-nine percent of these respondents also rated the central 
government’s performance as good or excellent.8 Thus, Afghan support remained one of 
the United States’ and ISAF’s most important assets heading into 2010.9  
 Under the guidance of Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus, the 
Obama administration identified the need to “separate insurgent influence from the 
populace and support Afghan government sub-national structures to establish rule of law 
and deliver basic services”10 as one of the three principal efforts of the United States' 
counterinsurgency strategy. To gauge progress made in this aspect of the war, the 
Defense Department developed a series of metrics for estimating the level of Afghan 
government influence and control, and the impact of aid programs: (1) Corruption, the 
misuse of entrusted power for private gain; (2) Rule of Law, the lack of effective 
government; (3) Improving Afghan subnational governance, building governance from 
the bottom up; and (4) Revenue collection, the rate and success of taxation is a measure 
for government support.11  
 Even though some of the “metrics used to gauge progress are inconsistent and 
fewer and fewer have been provided as U.S. and NATO forces continue their withdrawal 
from Afghanistan,”12 these measures do provide insight into U.S. and ISAF efforts to 
improve Afghan governance and corruption between 2010 and 2012. Moreover, these 
measurements also give a way of determining whether or not the United States 
counterinsurgency strategy was successful in promoting a more capably and accountable 
8 Ibid., 67. 
9 Ibid., 68.  
10 Department of Defense, “November 2010 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 
 Afghanistan,” http://www.defense.gov/pubs/november_1230_report_Final.pdf [accessed April 1-
 November 2010], 11. 
11 Ibid., 11.  
12 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Afghanistan: The Failed Metrics of Ten Years of War,” http://csis.org/files/  
 publication/120209_Afghanistan_Failed_Metrics.pdf [accessed April 1-February 9, 2012], 67.  
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Afghan government.                         
Corruption: More Dangerous than the Taliban? 
 One of the biggest threats to Afghanistan over the last decade has been corruption. 
According to Tom Pike and Eddie Brown, (2011), “Corruption permeates every facet of 
Afghan governance from high levels of grand corruption at the national government to 
petty corruption at the lower levels of government.”13 Corruption has become in effect, a 
“domestic issue on its own terms as well as a factor contributing to terrorism and 
insurgency.”14 Since 2001, “one of the unquestioned premises of American and NATO 
policy has been that ordinary Afghans do not view public corruption quite the same way 
that Americans and other Westerners do.”15 Diplomats, military officers, and senior 
officials flying in from Washington “often say privately that while public graft is 
pernicious, there is no point in trying to abolish it-and that trying to do so could destroy 
the very government the West has helped to build.”16 
 The spread of corruption in Afghanistan has also been facilitated by the sudden 
inflow of foreign aid over the past decade. “This had led to a nationwide crisis that has 
undercut both the capability and legitimacy of the Afghan government to implement any 
effective policy as well as the well-meaning actions of foreign supporters, including the 
U.S. and UN.”17 Although the pre-2001 Taliban proved corrupt in practice when they 
came to power, many Afghans have turned to the Taliban shadow government, because 
the current government has been unsuccessful at establishing a consistent and enforceable 
13 Tom Pike and Eddie J. Brown, “Populations as Complex Adaptive Systems: A Case Study of Corruption  
 In Afghanistan, 3.  
14 David Isby, Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires, (New York: Pegasus Books, 2010), 154. 
15 Dexter Filkins, “Inside Corrupt-istan, a Loss of Faith in Leaders,” New York Times, September 4, 2010. 
16 Ibid., 2. 
17 Sarah Chayes, “The Money Pit,” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story2014/02/afghanistan-the-mo 
 ney-pit-103880.html. [accessed April 3-March/April 2014], 5. 
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rule of law.18          
 According to a report released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) in 2010, “Afghan citizens had to pay approximately US$ 2.5 billion in bribes 
which is equivalent to 23 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).”19 This 
is similar to the revenue accrued by the opium trade in 2009 (which UNODC estimates at 
US$ 2.8 billion).20 “Drugs and bribes are the two largest income generators in 
Afghanistan; together they correspond to about half the country’s licit GDP.”21 
 The report also showed that graft was a part of everyday in Afghanistan. During 
the survey period, one Afghan out of two had to pay at least one kickback to a public 
official.22 “In more than half the cases (56%), the request for illicit payment was an 
explicit demand by the service provider.”23 In three quarters of the cases, baksheesh 
(bribes) were paid in cash.24 The average bribe is US$ 160, in a country where GDP per 
capita is a mere US$ 425 per year.25       
 Moreover, the survey also finds that those entrusted with upholding the law are 
seen as most guilty of violating it.26 “Around 25 percent of Afghans had to pay at least 
one bribe to police and officials during the survey period.”27 Between 10-20 percent had 
to pay bribes either to judges, prosecutors, or members of the government.28 The 
international community does not escape criticism: 54 percent of Afghans believe that 
18 David Isby, Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires, 54.  
19 UNODC, “Corruption in Afghanistan,” http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and analysis/Afghanistan 
 -corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf [accessed April 3-Janaury 2010], 4. 
20 Ibid., 4.  
21 Ibid., 4. 
22 Ibid., 4.  
23 BBCNews.Com, “UN Afghanistan Survey Points to huge Scale of Bribery,” http://news.bbc.co.uk  
 /2/hi/8466915.stm [accessed April 3-January 19, 2010], 1.  
24 Ibid., 1.  
25 Ibid., 2.  
26 UNODC, “Corruption in Afghanistan,” 30. 
27 Ibid., 30. 
28 Ibid., 30.  
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international organizations and NGOs "are corrupt and are in the country just to get 
rich".29 
  Between 2010 and 2012, the U.S. and Afghan governments established a number 
of programs to combat graft in Afghanistan.30 General H.R. McMaster, a key deputy of 
General Petraeus’s, “formed several DoD task forces to focus on corruption (Shafafiyat, 
Task Force Spotlight, and Task Force 2010) from a U.S. military/counterinsurgency 
perspective.”31 These task forces, in part, reviewed U.S. contracting strategies to enhance 
Afghan capacity and reduce the potential for corruption.32 The Shafafiyat task force 
announced in February 2012 that it had “caused the restitution of $11.1 million, $25.4 
million in fines, and $3.4 million in seizures from allegedly fraudulent contractors, and 
had debarred or suspended more than 125 American, Afghan and international workers 
for alleged fraud.”33 
 Senior U.S. officials also helped the Afghan government create a number of 
oversight bodies to curb corruption. Since 2008, several additional investigative bodies 
have been established under the Ministry of Interior.34 “The most prominent is the Major 
Crimes Task Force, tasked with investigating public corruption, organized crime, and 
kidnapping.”35 A related body is the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), “run by several 
dozen Afghan police officers, vetted and trained by the DEA.”36 This body was 
responsible for the August 2010 arrest of Mohammad Zia Salehi, a Karzai aide, on 
29 UNODC, “Corruption widespread in Afghanistan, UNODC survey says,” 1. 
30 John Ryan. “Task Force Rooting Out Corruption in Afghanistan.” Army Times February 20, 2012. 
31 Ibid., 1.  
32 Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” http://www.refwor .
 ld.org/docid/50d1f21b2.html [accessed April 3-November 30, 2012], 46. 
33 John Ryan. “Task Force Rooting Out Corruption in Afghanistan.” 1.  
34 Ibid., 46. 
35 Ibid.. 46.  
36 Joshua Partlow, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, 
 November 24, 2009. 
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charges of soliciting a bribe from the New Ansari Money Exchange in exchange for 
ending a money-laundering investigation of the firm.37 The Afghan government also 
“finalized a National Corruption Strategy (Azimi Report) on December 21, 2010 and 
committed to enacting 37 laws to curb corruption.”38 Despite the progress made by the 
United States and Afghan government in fighting corruption, Afghanistan continues to 
rank as one of the world’s most corrupt nations.39  
Figure 28: Afghanistan’s Rank in Transparency International’s Annual (CPI) 
 
(T): Indicates years of Afghanistan’s score tied with one or more other country. 
 
According to Transparency International’s Annual Corruption Perception Index, 
Afghanistan has consistently ranked as one of the top five corrupt countries in the world 
since 2008. In 2008, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 176th out of 180 
countries, only fourth from the worst case. Since then its ratings have continued to slip. 
37 Ibid., 1. 
38 Ibid., 1.  
39 Paul D. Shinkman, “Corruption Plagues Afghanistan Ahead of U.S. Withdrawal,” http://www.rawa.org/ 
 temp/ runews/2013/12/27/corruption-plagues-afghanistan-ahead-of-u-s-withdrawal.html [accessed 
 April 4-December 27, 2013], 2. 
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Between 2010 and 2012, Afghanistan ranked 176th out of 180 in 2010, 180 out of 182 in 
2011, and 174 out of 176 in 2012.40 In 2013, Afghanistan tied North Korea and Syria as 
the most corrupt country in the world.41 
 Integrity Watch Afghanistan reports that Afghans, whom they surveyed in 2010, 
“thought that the following four sectors were affected most from corruption: justice, 
security, municipal government, and customs.”42 Some commentators and organizations 
have argued “that many of the forms of corruption noted above are somehow part of the 
fabric of Afghan culture and society and that they are acceptable to many Afghans.”43 In 
December 2010, General Petraeus drew a lot of criticism for saying that corruption had 
always been a part of Afghan history and culture.44      
 Such comments “added to an ongoing debate concerning what levels and types of 
corruption might be acceptable to Afghans and which they considered unacceptable.”45 
Integrity Watch Afghanistan provides some insight into this issue through its 2010 
Afghanistan Survey. Figure 29 shows the type of corrupt behavior which Afghans said 
they find acceptable and unacceptable. As the data itself shows, it does not appear that 
any kind of corruption is acceptable to the Afghan people. Unfortunately, such polls have 
done little to change the view of Westerners as many U.S. and international officials 
believe corruption to be an internal problem.                   
Figure 29: Afghan’s Tolerance of Various types of Corruption 
40 Ibid., 2.  
41 Ibid., 2.  
42 Eray Basar, “An Overview of Corruption in Afghanistan,” https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Docume 
 nts/Governance/Afghanistan_Corruption_Introduction.pdf [accessed April 4-November 2011], 6. 
43 Ibid., 6.  
44 Tom A. Peter, “Petraeus Comments on Corruption Went too far, says Afghans,” http://www.csmonitor. 
 com/ World/Asia-South-Central/2010/1207/Petraeus-comments-on-corruption-went-too-far-say-
 Afghans [accessed April 4-December 7, 2010], 1. 
45 Eray Basar, “An Overview of Corruption in Afghanistan,” https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Docume 
 nts/Governance/Afghanistan_Corruption_Introduction.pdf [accessed April 4-November 2011], 5. 
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Source: Afghanistan Integrity Watch, “2010 Afghanistan Survey,” p.4 https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo.afg 
/Documents/Governance/Afghanistan_Corruption_Introduction.pdf  
  
According to a report released by the Asia Foundation on December 11, 2013,  
“Afghans see corruption as a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of 
government. Roughly half see corruption as a problem in their neighborhood. 
More see it in their daily life, and almost 60 percent experience it at the hands of 
local authorities. Roughly two thirds say it is a major problem at the provincial 
level, and more than three quarters, 77 percent, say corruption is a major problem 
in Afghanistan as a whole.”46 
 
Numbers have not been this high since 2006, according to the report, prior to the 
Coalition troop surge in 2010.47        
 The amount of bribery paid by Afghans has also increased significantly from 
2007 to 2012.48 In 2007, “$466 million were paid in bribes, this amount doubled in 2010 
46 Ibid., 68.  
47 Ibid., 78. 
48 UNODC, “Corruption in Afghanistan,” http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and analysis/Afghanistan 
 -corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf [accessed April 3-Janaury 2010], 4. 
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and almost tripled in 2012.”49 The 2012 data shows an overall increase of 16% in bribery 
compared to 2010.50 As seen in Figure 30, “an estimated 62.6 billion Afs 
(62,582,667,120 Afs=1,254,543,390 USD) were paid in bribes in 2012. Compared to 
2010, this number shows an increase of 16% (8,599,184,118 Afs in 2010).”51 While in 
2010, the average number of bribes per year was 3.4; in 2012 this number rose to 4.0.52 
Furthermore in 2012, less adults (55,510) paid bribes compared to 2010.53 “This was a 
3.4% decrease in the number of Afghan adults who paid bribes in 2012 compared to 
2010.”54 
Figure 30: Estimated Amount of Money Paid in Bribes per Year 
 
Source: Afghanistan Integrity Watch, “2012 Key Findings,” p.1 http://www.iwaweb.org/ncs/_2012/key_fin 
 dings.html 
 
The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing in Inaction    
 Over the past few years, the international community has “increasingly 
49 Integrity Watch Afghanistan, “2012 Key Findings,” http://www.iwaweb.org/ncs/_2012/key_findings. 
 html [accessed April 4-January 2013], 1. 
50 Ibid., 1.  
51 Ibid., 1.  
52 Ibid., 1. 
53 Ibid., 1. 
54 Ibid., 1.  
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recognized that the lack of focus on the rule of law, including security sector reform, 
have undoubtedly contributed to the boom of organized drug-related criminality and 
corruption in Afghanistan.”55 As a consequence, “the development of Afghanistan’s 
judicial institutions was considered by many U.S. and ISAF officials to be essential in 
winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government’s 
credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions.”56  
 According to Seth G. Jones, there have been several challenges to improving 
Afghanistan’s justice system.57 “First, the central government’s inability to decrease the 
power of the warlords and exert control over the country impacted justice reform.”58 
Shortly after the overthrow of the Taliban in December 2001, warlords began taking 
control of the local in areas under their control. This led to intimidation of centrally 
appointed judges.59         
 Secondly, the “central government’s inability and unwillingness to address 
widespread and deep-rooted corruption decreased the effectiveness of the justice 
system.”60 Over the last few years the Attorney General’s Office and Afghan Supreme 
Court have also been accused of “significant corruption.”61 Another challenge not 
mentioned by Jones is “that a majority of Afghans have little or no access to judicial 
55 Sari Kouvo, “State-building and the rule of law: Lessons from Afghanistan?,” http://www.google.com/  
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fkms
1.isn.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F98288%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocu
ment%2F07bc297d-ad2c- 4497981d88681189%2Fen%2Ffp_06.pd981d88681189%2Fen %2Ffp_ 
06.pdf&ei=T4PXVMfnDoivggS0uoDoAQ&usg=AFQjCNHXZQwUYfZzjXvLhBi1-jU3liu-
pw&bvm=bv.85464276,d.cWc  [accessed April 5-March 2009], 7.  
56 Nick Grono, “Rule of Law and the Justice System in Afghanistan,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/public 
 ation -type/speeches/2011/rule-of-law-and-the-justice-system-in-afghanistan.aspx [accessed April 
 4-April 28, 2011], 1. 
57 Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monogr 
 aphs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf [accessed April 4-January 2008], 85. 
58 Ibid., 85.  
59 Ibid., 85. 
60 Ibid., 85.  
61 Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, Governance Matters V, pp. 113-115. 
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institutions.”62 Many of the courts used by the Afghan government were inoperable and 
those that did function were severely understaffed.63 As a result, a “growing number of 
Afghans have been forced to accept the rough justice of the Taliban and criminal 
powerbrokers in areas of the country that lie beyond government control.”64   
 In 2008, press reports began to surface, “indicating that many Afghans who are 
not sympathetic to the Taliban seem to believe that the Islamic Emirate is more capable 
than the Afghan government in maintaining law and order, both in terms of policing 
(catching culprits) and in delivering justice.”65 In an attempt to “outgovern” the Afghan 
government, the Taliban made the re-establishing of their judicial system as their top 
non-military priority in 2005.66 The first signs of Taliban provincial governors and judges 
date back to 2003, when the Taliban started controlling significant areas of Afghan 
territory.67 The Taliban’s effort initially faced little opposition as the Afghan government 
and U.S./ISAF forces paid little attention.68 Many observers believed “that the new 
governance system was merely a façade and that its purpose had more to do with public 
relations and propaganda than anything else.”69 From about 2006, district governors and 
“chiefs of security” also started being reported. By 2010, 33 provincial governors and 
about 180 district governors were said to be in existence.  
62 International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghansitan’s Broken Judiciary,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/  
asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx [accessed 
April 4-November 2010], 1. 
63 Ibid., 1.  
64 Nick Grono, “Rule of Law and the Justice System in Afghanistan,” 1. 
65 Pamela Constable, “As Crime Increases in Kabul, So Does Nostalgia for the Taliban,” The Washington 
 Post, September 25, 2008. 
66 Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzi, Governance Matters V, pp. 113-115 
67 Antonio Giustozzi, “Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun, the Taliban’s Shadow Government,” http:// 
 cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/prism71-80_giustozzi.pdf [accessed April 4-March 2012], 1.  
68 Angela Priestley, “Taliban Survives Through the Rule of Law,” http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news 
 / taliban-survives-through-rule-of-law- [accessed April 4-September 7, 2009], 
69 Antonio Giustozzi, Claudio Franco, & Adam Baczko, “Shadow Justice: How the Taliban run their 
 Judiciary?” http://www.iwaweb.org/_docs/reports/research/shadow_justice-how_the_ taliban_ 
 run_their_judiciary.pdf [accessed April 4-December 2012], 13. 
132 
 
                                                          
 ISAF also estimated that there were 15 Taliban courts operating in southern 
Afghanistan during this time, mainly involved with resolving local disputes.70 Before 
2011, the Taliban mostly maintained fixed courts in known locations, where 
complainants could approach judges or clerks and file a case.71 “Many villagers 
appreciated the quick justice provided by the Taliban, where trials would rarely last more 
than two weeks.”72 David Kilcullen described the work of the Taliban courts as 
“translating local dispute resolution and mediation into the local rule of law, and thus into 
political power.”73         
 Due to the threat of “night raids” the Taliban began relying more on mobile courts 
in the spring of 2011.74 The Taliban were “rapidly forced to abandon the fixed courts 
system in most if not all provinces and switched to a mobile courts system, where the 
judges would hold a trial at a different place each time within a particular district.”75 
These operations also made it more difficult for villagers to access the courts, although 
the Taliban have adapted “by tasking commanders to enquire in the villages if anybody 
needed the judges and by giving elders mobile numbers to call.”76 By 2011, the Taliban 
judiciary seemed to have adapted pretty well to the new challenge.77 
 In February 2010, the U.S. State Department issued the Afghanistan and Pakistan 
Regional Stabilization Strategy, which included “enhancing Afghan rule of law” as one 
of its nine key initiatives for Afghanistan. The 2010 Stabilization Strategy identified five 
major ROL program objectives including: (1) capacity building for the formal justice 
70 Ibid., 72.  
71 Ibid., 72.  
72 Ibid., 72. 
73 Angela Priestley, “Taliban Survives Through the Rule of Law,” 1.  
74 Antonio Giustozzi, Claudio Franco, & Adam Baczko, “Shadow Justice,” 14.  
75 Ibid., 14. 
76 Ibid., 14.  
77 Ibid., 14. 
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sector; (2) strengthening traditional justice; (3) enhanced access to formal justice; (4) 
corrections sector support; and (5) enhanced and focused outreach.78 Justice sector 
reform was also featured in the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan.79 
 Other strategies and guidance created by the U.S. to help improve Afghanistan’s 
judicial institutions include the U.S. Strategy for Rule of Law in Afghanistan and a U.S. 
Strategy for Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan. According to the State Department, “the 
Rule of Law Strategy is composed of four pillars, or goals: 
Pillar 1: Tackle the pervasive culture of impunity and improve and expand access 
to the state justice sector, by increasing capacity and reducing corruption in the 
justice sector’s institutions; 
 
 Pillar 2: Support corrections reform; 
 
 Pillar 3: Provide security and space for traditional justice systems to re-emerge 
 organically in areas cleared of the Taliban and engage closely at the grassroots 
 level to ensure dispute resolution needs in the local communities are being met; 
 and 
 
 Pillar 4: Build the leadership capacity of the Afghan government’s justice sector, 
 and civil society generally.”80 
 
Despite these efforts by the international community and Afghan government, “data from 
the World Bank suggest that Afghanistan’s rule of law continues to be one of the least 
effective—if not the least effective—in the world.”81  
 The data used by the World Bank measure the extent to which populations have 
confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society.82 They also include perceptions of the 
incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the 
78 Liana Sun Wyler & Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance,” 
 http: //www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41484.pdf [accessed April 4-November 9, 2010], 19. 
79 Ibid., 19.  
80 U.S. Departments of State and Defense, U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan 
 for Support to Afghanistan,” August 10, 2009. 
81 Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 85. 
82 Ibid., 85.  
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enforceability of contracts.83 Figure 31 illustrates Afghanistan’s rule of law in 
comparison to other countries in the region. The data show that Afghanistan’s justice 
system started from a low base.84 When the United States and its Afghan allies overthrew 
the Taliban in 2001, “Afghanistan had the lowest-ranking justice system in the world,”85 
and it has improved very little over the course of reconstruction efforts and the surge. In 
comparison to other countries in the region—such as Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—“Afghanistan’s justice system was one of the least 
effective and ranked at the bottom.”86  
Figure 31: Afghanistan Rule of Law Indictors from World Bank 
  
Source: World Bank, Aggregate Governance Indicators Data, 2002-2012, (Washington: World Bank, 
2013) 
 
Civilian Surge and Renewed Military Focus on District Governance  
 For more than a decade, improving governance in Afghanistan “has been 
83Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 85. 
84 Ibid., 85.  
85 Ibid., 85.  
86 Ibid., 85.  
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recognized as the most difficult and critical challenge involving Afghanistan 
reconstruction.”87 Between 2002 and 2010, the international community focused a 
majority of its assistance and efforts on increasing the capacity and effectiveness of the 
Afghan national government. “This did little to improve the everyday lives of the Afghan 
people who had very little contact with the government in Kabul.”88 As a result, the 
COIN strategy adopted by the Obama administration aimed to connect local governance 
structures to national ones “from the bottom up.”89   
 From 2010 to 2012, the number of representatives from the U.S. Agency for 
International Aid (USAID), and the Departments of State, Justice, and Agriculture 
roughly tripled from 300 to 1,000, overseeing additional thousands of contract civilian 
implementing partners. 90 At the provincial level, “American-led Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which previously hosted one of two U.S. State 
Department or USAID officers now became hubs of many more civilian personnel.”91  
 Even though progress was made in certain municipalities, communities, and 
districts, the United States and international community fell far behind in its efforts to 
improve local government in critical Afghan districts.92 “Of the 1,100 U.S. civilian 
officials stationed in Afghanistan in 2011, over two-thirds were located in Kabul.”93 This 
did little to help a majority of Afghans, who lived in rural villages far from the capital. 
87 Steven H. Sternlieb, “Status of Developing afghan Governance and Lessons for Future Endeavours,”  
 International Journal of Security and Development, Vol 2, No 1, (2013), 1. 
88 Frances Z. Brown, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, Again,” http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012  
 /10/09/bureaucracy-does-its-thing-again/ [accessed April 8-October 9, 2012], 1.  
89 Frances Z. Brown, “The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance,” 3. 
90 Kristin Henderson, “This is War: How USAID workers are trained for work and danger in Afghanistan,” 
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/25/AR2010062503838.html 
[accessed April 8-July 4,2010], 2 see in 90 Frances Z. Brown, “The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local 
Governance,” 3.  
91 Frances Z. Brown, “The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance,” 
92 Ibid., 3. 
93 Josh Boak, “In Afghanistan, U.S. ‘Civilian Surge’ Falls Short in Building Local Government,” The 
 Washington Post, March 8, 2011. 
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Moreover, “these experts reinforced the sense of big government coming from Kabul that 
ultimately alienates populations and leaders in the provinces.”94  
 According to Frances Brown, “efforts to improve Afghanistan’s subnational 
institutions have failed because the United States’ counterinsurgency strategy rested on 
three key assumptions that proved unrealistic.”95 First, American plans “overestimated 
the speed with which specific types of governance intervention would yield wider 
progress.”96 In military terminology, “the COIN strategy assumed that the campaign’s 
quick success in “amassing security efforts” would be mirrored (or closely approached) 
by the speed with which it amassed governance effects.”97 The most high-profile 
example of this driving assumption was “Operation Moshtarak”, which began on 
February 15, 2010.98 
 Billed as a model of the new, fully integrated counterinsurgency strategy, 
“Operation Moshtarak” (Dari for Together or Joint) involved 15,000 American, British, 
Canadian, Estonian, Danish, and Afghan troops aimed to remove the Taliban from its last 
stronghold in central Helmand Province.99 To distinguish it from previous offensives, 
General McChrystal announced that NATO and Afghan officials had assembled a large 
team of Afghan civil servants backed by 1,900 police officers, who would move into the 
liberated town. “We’ve got a government in a box, ready to roll in,” he declared.100  
Faced with such overwhelming armed might, the Taliban disappeared after a few days of 
fighting. On February 18, 2010, Afghan troops raised the national flag over the damaged 
94 Ibid., 2. 
95 Frances Z. Brown, “Taking Stock of the Surge: From the Bottom Up,” 1. 
96 Ibid., 1. 
97 Ibid., 2. 
98 John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, & John K. Wood. From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S. at War 
 in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 252. 
99 Ibid., 252.  
100 Dilip Hiro, “Apocalyptic Realm,” 275. 
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bazaar.          
 Unfortunately, the trained Afghan officials promised by McChrystal--who would 
jump in behind the troops and begin to govern and provide services--never 
materialized.101 “No Afghan wanted to serve in Marjah, because it was so insecure.”102 
By May, the situation had worsened to the point where the Americans were in control by 
day but found themselves challenged by the gun-wielding Taliban at night.103 Instead of 
being the blueprint for the future in Afghanistan, Marjah had become in the words of 
McChrystal, “a bleeding ulcer.”104 Even apart from the high-profile Marjah campaign, 
“several other local COIN efforts over-estimated the speed with which local district 
governors would become locally viewed as ‘legitimate.”105     
 A second miscalculation was “the expectation that the surge’s ‘bottom up’ 
progress-the result of dedicated work by locally-based U.S. and Afghan personnel-would 
be matched by ‘top-down’ Afghan-led systemic reforms to make this local progress 
durable.”106 The U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy “deployed hundreds of civilians and 
uniformed personnel at the district level to encourage district governors to become more 
accountable to a broader spectrum of the population.”107 These attempts were viewed 
with little enthusiasm by the Afghan national government as “it threatened their heavily 
centralized patronage system to ensure that district-level administrators maintained 
101 Rosa Brooks, “Obama vs. the Generals,” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/11/obama-vs- 
 the-generals-99379_Page2.html [accessed April 8-November 2013], 2.  
102 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, (New York: 
 Penguin Group, 2012), 103. 
103 Dilip Hiro, “Apocalyptic Realm,” 275. 
104 Dion Nissenbaum, “McChrystal calls Marjah a ‘bleeding ulcer’ in Afghanistan Campaign,”  
 New York Times, May 24, 2010.  
105 Frances Z. Brown, “The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance,” http://reliefweb.int/sites /reliefweb. 
 int/files/resources/SR316.pdf [accessed April 8-September 2012], 6 
106 Frances Z. Brown, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, Again,” http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012  
 /10/09/bureaucracy-does-its-thing-again/ [accessed April 8-October 9, 2012, 1. 
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allegiance to the capital.”108        
 According to Stephen Biddle, Hamid Karzai depends on the networks’ leadership 
to deliver political support. 
“In exchange, he empowers them with critical appointments, protects them from 
prosecution, and allows them to prey on the public. The result is a government of 
informal political deal making rather than rule-based administration by publicly 
accountable institutions.109  
 
Thus, “efforts to increase local accountability as well as local governance are 
hindered by a lack of political will (or abundance of political obstruction) on top.”110 
 Finally, the COIN strategy devised by McChrystal and Petraeus rested upon the 
assumption “that the lack of governance was a universal driver of the insurgency, for 
which service delivery was the appropriate cure.”111 Though this rang true in some parts 
of southern Afghanistan,” in other areas, particularly some remote parts of eastern 
Afghanistan, observers suggested that the presence of U.S., ISAF, and ANSF forces 
became a fueling factor.”112 According to James Fussell, counterinsurgency has proved 
more difficult to apply in the sparsely-populated mountains of Kunar and Nuristan 
provinces.113 Kunar Province in particular, has been a “no-go zone” since it rose up 
against the Communists in 1978.114 
 Although most observers see the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar as 
being the heart of the Taliban insurgency, “the northeastern border province has been 
described in mythic proportions as one of the most dangerous terrains for U.S. troops 
108 Tom Pike and Eddie J. Brown “Populations as Complex, 5. 
109 Ibid., 2.  
110 Ibid., 2.  
111 Frances Z. Brown, “The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance,” http://reliefweb.int/sites /reliefweb. 
 int/files/resources/SR316.pdf [accessed April 8-September 2012], 2. 
112 James Fussell, “Kunar and Nuristan: Rethinking U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations,” http://www.under
 standingwar.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan_Report_1_2.pdf [accessed April 8-July 2009], 3. 
113 Ibid., 3. 
114 Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America’s Longest War, 61. 
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anywhere in Afghanistan.”115 U.S. soldiers, who fight a bold enemy in Kunar’s rugged 
mountains have dubbed it Afghanistan’s ‘Heart of Darkness.’116 From 2007-2011, U.S. 
forces conducted numerous counterinsurgency operations in an attempt to win over the 
local tribes’ support and built small outposts to stem the flow of foreign fighters coming 
in from Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.117 Unfortunately, U.S. troops 
were withdrawn from the region in 2011, “after it was determined that their presence 
there only antagonized the locals and led them to carry out ambushes on U.S. patrols and 
to attack U.S. combat outposts. “118   
Generating Domestic Revenue Remains a Challenge 
 According to David Kilcullen, “the rate and success of taxation is a measure for  
government support.”119 In 2008, the Open Budget Index gave Afghanistan a score of 8 
out of 100 for the openness of budget information by the Afghan government.120 While 
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance continues to expand its tax code, “the central 
government does not depend on the Afghan people for revenue because of its inability to 
collect taxes.”121 Since the population provides little to the national government, the 
“government has little reason to provide services to the population and yet it must find 
ways to fund the national budget.”122        
 As pointed out by Colin Cookman & Caroline Wadhams (2010), “many factors 
115 Ibid., 61.  
116 Ibid., 61.  
117 Ibid., 61. 
118 James Fussell, “Kunar and Nuristan,” 38. 
119 David Kilcllen, “Measuring Progress in Afghanistan,” 9, seen in Tom Pike and Eddie J. Brown,  
 “Populations as Complex Adaptive Systems: A Case Study of Corruption In Afghanistan, 5. 
120 Open Budget Index, “Afghanistan 2008,” http://openbudgetindex.org, [accessed April 7- March 2009], 
 4 , seen in Tom Pike and Eddie J. Brown, “Populations as Complex Adaptive Systems: A Case  
 Study of Corruption In Afghanistan, 5. 
121 Ministry of Finance Afghanistan, “Taxpayer Compliance, seen in Tom Pike and Eddie J. Brown,  
 “Populations as Complex Adaptive Systems: A Case Study of Corruption In Afghanistan, 5. 
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have contributed to the international community and Afghan government’s limited 
appetite to cultivate domestic revenue sources.”123 Some of these factors include the 
government’s limited control over local actors, weak popular legitimacy, active insurgent 
violence, continued access to foreign funding, and the international community’s quick-
impact security-and humanitarian-focused priorities.124 Afghanistan is hugely dependent 
on aid. A World Bank analysis in May 2012 suggested that only Gaza, the West Bank, 
and Liberia have been so reliant.125 As much as 80 percent of Afghanistan’s budget 
comes from foreign aid.126   
Figure 32: Afghanistan’s Foreign Aid 2003-2011 
 
Source: The Economist.Com, “The Hand that Feeds,” p.1 http://www.economist.com/node/21558635 
123 Colin Cookman & Caroline Wadhams, “Governance in Afghanistan,” Looking Ahead to What We  
 Leave Behind,” [accessed  April 7-May 2010], 25. 
124 Ibid., 25. 
125 The Economist.Com, “The Hand that Feeds,” http://www.economist.com/node/21558635 [accessed  
 April 4-July 14, 2012], 1. 
126 Joel Brinkley, “Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of U.S. Aid to Afghanistan,” http://www.worldaffairs 
 .journal.org/article/money-pit-monstrous-failure-us-aid-afghanistan [accessed April 7-February 
 2013], 1. 
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In a recent quarterly report, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) said that, “when security for aid workers is figured in, the total 
amount of non-military funds Washington has appropriated since 2002 is approximately 
$100 billion-more than the U.S. has ever spent to rebuild a country.”127 Unfortunately, 
“aid volume, rarely matched by efficiency.”128  Since 2002, “some $55 billion of aid has 
flowed into the country and billions of it has flowed out again to pay the salaries of 
foreign staff and profits to foreign contractors.”129 Thus, “only 10-25% of funds given are 
spent on the ground in Afghanistan.”130 Aid has also fed corruption in the government. 
According to Paul Shinkman, corruption costs the Afghan government roughly $4 billion 
each year.131  
 Another factor that has contributed to the Afghan government’s inability to 
cultivate domestic revenue is the withholding of funds by officials responsible for 
customs revenue collection.132 Over the last decade, “the government has clashed with 
local efforts to renationalize their lucrative sources of income.”133 One example of this is 
“the central government’s showdown in 2004, with Herat’s former governor, the warlord 
Ismail Khan, for the tax revenue from major border crossing points between Afghanistan 
and Iran.”134 The Afghan government marginalized the famous warlord from Herat and 
secured profits from the Herat border.135 It increased the government’s tax revenue six-
fold from that border crossing, from $2 million U.S. dollars a month in 2001 to $12 
127 Ibid., 1. 
128 The Economist.Com, “The Hand that Feeds,” 1. 
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130 Ibid., 1.  
131 Ibid., 4. 
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million U.S. dollars a months in 2005.136        
 Upon review, Afghanistan’s score on the Open Budget Index has greatly 
improved over the last six years. The Open Budget Survey “assesses whether the central 
government in each country surveyed makes eight key budget documents available to the 
public, as well as whether the data contained in these documents is comprehensive, 
timely, and useful.”137 The survey uses internationally accepted criteria to assess each 
country’s budget transparency developed by multilateral organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and the International Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions 
(INTSOAI). The scores on 95 of the 125 Open Budget Survey questions are used to 
calculate objective scores and rankings of each surveyed country’s relative 
transparency.138 
 Since 2008, Afghanistan’s score has risen 51 points.139 In 2010, Afghanistan’s 
OBI score rose 13 points to 21 in 2010. However, the biggest increase came in 2012, 
when Afghanistan’s OBI score rose another 38 points to 59.140 According to Open 
Budget Index, 
“Afghanistan’s score indicates that the government provides the public with only 
some information on the national government’s budget and financial activity 
during the course of the budget year. This makes it challenging for citizens to 
hold the government accountable for its management of the public’s money.”141  
 
Nonetheless, Afghanistan’s OBI scores were the second greatest improvement in budget 
transparency over all countries in the world in 2012. The score of 59 also “surpasses the 
136 Ibid., 5. 
137 Open Budget Index, “Afghanistan 2012” http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-
 AfghanistanCS-English.pdf [accessed April 7- January 23, 2013], 1. 
138 Ibid., 1. 
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target of 40 agreed upon by Afghanistan and the international community in the Tokyo 
Mutual Accountability Framework.”142 Compared to other countries in South Asia, 
Afghanistan received one of the highest scores from Open Budget Index in 2012. Only 
India (68), received a higher score.            
Figure 33: OBI Scores for South Asia 
 
Source: Open Budget Index, “Afghanistan 2012,” p.2, http://mof.govaf/en/news/16855 
142 Ibid., 1. 
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CHAPTER VII: EFFORTS TO TRAIN & EQUIP A COMPETENT AFGHAN 
NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE 
We will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force, 
which ensures that al Qaeda can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies. 
         – President Barack Obama 
 As the United States and NATO continue the withdrawal of most of their troops 
from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, “the U.S. military and its Coalition partners are 
increasingly shifting security responsibilities to Afghan security forces.”1 According to 
Bill Rogio (201), “the success of this security transition depends greatly on the strength 
and competence of the Afghan military and police.”2 Thus the “training of the newly-
mustered Afghan forces became the linchpin of the United States’ counterinsurgency 
strategy, which hinged upon the work of trainers with Afghan security forces.”3  
 Unlike previous military doctrines, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps’ 2006 
doctrine for counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) “underlines the need for assistance from the 
military, along with other government agencies and Coalition partners, to organize the 
host nation security forces required to establish and maintain security and stability within 
their borders.”4 This assistance may include developing, equipping, training, and 
employing indigenous security forces to help carry out the counterinsurgency campaign. 
1 Bill Roggio, “Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan: The Data,” http://www.defenddemocracy.org/  
 media-hit/green-on-blue-attacks-in-afghanistan-the-data/ [accessed April 10-August 23, 2012], 1. 
2 Ibid., 1.  
3 Ibid., 2. 
4 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Washington: Department of 
 Defense, 2006), 5-68 seen in Robert Cassidy, “Indigenous Forces and Sanctuary Denial: Enduring  
Counterinsurgency Imperatives,” http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/44-cassidy. 
pdf  [accessed April 10-February 9, 2008], 6. 
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 As of January 17, 2014, the United States has spent $59 billion funding security 
forces in Afghanistan.1 Most of these funds ($57.5 billion) “were appropriated through 
the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and provided to the Combined Security 
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).”2 Its purpose is to build, equip, train, and 
sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Air Force, 
and the Afghan National Police. Within these units, “specialized personnel round out the 
country’s security capabilities, including border police, public protection forces, local 
police, narcotics officers, and communications and logistical staff.”3  
 Despite the progress made in training Afghanistan’s security forces, “the 
effectiveness, professionalism, and state of readiness of this security apparatus are 
uneven.”4 Within police units specifically, drug abuse, desertion, and violence remain 
constant challenges.5 The army also faces issues related to ethnic factionalism and poor 
civilian oversight.6 Here is a breakdown of each security component, and its current state 
of effectiveness:         
 Afghan National Army: The ANA is widely seen as the most capable branch of 
the country’s security forces.7 The United States was the lead nation for building the 
ANA, although the French, British, Turkish, and instructors from other coalition 
countries were also involved. “The ANA structure includes 6 corps located in different 
1 Jacob Siegel, “The Afghan Money pit: How Millions of Dollars Were Wasted,” http://www.thedailybeast 
 .com/the-hero-project/articles/2013/10/30/the-afghan-money-pit-how-millions-of-dollars-were-
 wasted.html [accessed April 10-October 30, 2013], 3. 
2 Ibid., 3.  
3 Greg Bruno, “Afghanistan’s National Security Forces,” http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistans-
 national-security-forces/p19122 [accessed April 10-August 19, 2010], 2. 
4 Ibid., 2.  
5 Ibid., 2. 
6 Monish Gulati, “Afghan National Security Forces-Hiccups Continue,” http://www.irgamag.com/compon 
 ent/k2/item/680-afghan-national-security-forces-hiccups-continue [accessed April 15-December 
 29, 2012], 2. 
7 Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monogr 
 aphs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf [accessed April 4-January 2008], 72. 
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parts of the country, 1 division (consisting of 2 brigades) based in Kabul, and 24 
additional brigades (including 2 Mobile Strike Force brigades commanded from Kabul, 
and deployed as needed throughout the country).”8 The ANA is approximately 96% 
complete with fielding forces with 11 specialty battalions remaining to be fielded.9 As of 
December 30, 2013, the size of the Afghan Army is roughly 185,386 soldiers including 
nearly 11,000 Special Forces.10  
 Afghan National Police: Made up of 152,600 personnel, “the ANP looks solid on 
paper.”11 Currently, “the Afghan Uniformed Police are responsible for public safety and 
general enforcement and public safety with the Border Police patrolling the borders and 
conducting counter-smuggling operations.”12 There are also a number of more 
specialized police units conducting operations like CT missions, criminal investigations, 
and counter narcotics patrols.13       
 According to General McChrystal, the Taliban “put a severe amount of pressure 
on the police, particularly in areas where security is immature.”14 Moreover, the 
Pentagon has acknowledged that the development of Afghanistan's police force "has been 
hindered by a lack of reform, corruption, insufficient U.S. military trainers and advisors, 
and a lack of unity of effort within the international community."15 Since 2011, there 
have been some signs of progress as the number of units considered capable of 
8 Institute for the Study of War, “Afghanistan National Army (ANA),” http://www.understandingwar.org 
 /afghanistan-national-army-ana [accessed April 10-June 2010], 1. 
9 ISAF, “Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) October 2013,” 1 
10 Jacob Siegel, “The Afghan Money pit: How Millions of Dollars Were Wasted,” http://www.thedailybeast 
 .com/the-hero-project/articles/2013/10/30/the-afghan-money-pit-how-millions-of-dollars-were-
 wasted.html [accessed April 10-October 30, 2013], 3. 
11 Institute for the Study of War, “Afghan National Police (ANP),” http://www.understandingwar.org 
 /afghanistan-national-police-apa [accessed April 10-June 2010], 1. 
12 Ibid., 1. 
13 Ibid.,  1.  
14 “Interview with General Stanley McChrystal,” NPR, http://www..npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
 storyId=121248927 [accessed April 10-December 9, 2009], 2.  
15 Ibid., 2. 
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independently planning and conducting operations has risen, albeit more slowly than the 
Afghan Army.16                                              
 Afghan Air Force: As of December 2013, there are approximately 6,529 
Afghans serving in the AAF, including aircrew and maintenance and support personnel.17 
“The AAF currently has a fleet of 100 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, including 2 C-130s 
and 12 Mi-17 helicopters that were delivered in September 2013.”18 The re-establishment 
of the AAF began later than that of the Army and Police and is expected to transition to 
autonomous operations by 2017.19 
 According to Seth G. Jones, the competence of Afghanistan’s security forces is 
difficult to judge for two reasons.20 First, “many of the most useful metrics are qualitative 
rather than quantitative and difficult to measure accurately.”21 Examples include the 
performance of security forces in conducting cordon-and-search operations, border 
security, patrols, riot control, intelligence collection, and combat operations.22 Second, 
“little data has been systematically collected for several decades in Afghanistan.”23 For 
example, “there are no reliable statistics on homicide rates, which may provide some 
indication of the competence of police forces.”24      
 Despite these difficulties, there are a few quantitative indicators that can be used 
to measure ANSF progress:  
1. Recruitment versus desertion rates: It is said that when an organization’s 
16 Greg Bruno, “Afghanistan’s National Security Forces,” http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistans-
 national-security-forces/p19122 [accessed April 10-August 19, 2010], 2. 
17 ISAF, “Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) October 2013,” 2. 
18 Ibid., 2. 
19 Ibid., 2.  
20 Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 67. 
21 Anthony H. Cordesman. “Afghan National Security Forces,” 124. 
22 Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 67. 
23 Ibid., 68. 
24 Ibid., 68.  
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recruitment rates are higher than its desertion rates, morale is high.25 
However, “when desertion rates rise along with other indicators such as short-
term AWOL and increased sickness rates, organizational morale is likely to be 
dropping. “26 Thus, the ANSF has tried to increase their recruitment and 
retention efforts. 
2. ANSF Literacy Training: “Literacy is a critical force enabler and force 
multiplier for the ANSF.”27 Literacy enables Afghan National Security Force 
service members to learn required skills at vocational schools, enhances 
instruction on human rights and the rule of law, and promotes the long-term 
sustainability of the force as well as post-service economic opportunity.28 
 3.    Assessment Levels of Afghan National Security Forces: These ratings reflect  
        an ANSF unit’s overall operational effectiveness; however, the overall rating  
  is derived from a more detailed assessment of each unit. The current rating  
  system uses six color-coded rating definitions-(1) fully capable, (2) capable,  
  (3) partially capable, (4) developing, (5) established, and (6) not assessed to  
  evaluate ANSF units at the brigade and regional levels each month. In   
  addition, this ratings system “focuses on assessing specific components of the  
  units, such as infantry and communications, against one overall and five  
  targeted categories.”29 
25 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 68 
26 Ibid., 68.  
27 Michael J. Faughnan, “Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program,” http://smallwarsjournal.com/ 
 blog/journal/docs-temp/634-faughnan.pdf [accessed April 14- January 4, 2011], 2. 
28 William B. Caldwell & Nathan K. Finney, “Security, Capacity, and Literacy,” http://usacac.army.mil/CA 
 C2/Military Review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20110228_art006.pdf [accessed April 14-
 January & February 2011], 23. 
29 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” http://reliefweb.int/ 
 sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf [accessed April 15-January 30, 2014], 85. 
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 4.   Green-on-Blue attacks: According to Roggio and Lindquist (2012),      
       “operations involving combined action - where Coalition units partner with  
       local police, military, and civilian forces, tend to indicate improved   
       performance by all partners in the action.”30 A main goal of the U.S.’s COIN    
       strategy was the build-up and training of Afghanistan’s security forces. This  
       has placed U.S. and NATO troops at increasing risk as the drawdown   
continues and Taliban efforts to infiltrate Afghan forces are being ramped 
up.31  
ANSF Recruiting and Retention 
 An effective Afghan National Security Force is the “main plank of the ongoing 
security transition in Afghanistan and critically influences the country’s political and 
economic transitions.”32 Since 2009, the size of the ANSF has nearly doubled.33 As of 
January 2014, ANSF’s assigned force strength was 334,852, according to data provided 
by CSTC-A.34 This is short of the goal to have an end-strength of 352,000 ANSF 
personnel by October 2012.35        
 The goal had been published in the Defense Department’s April 2012 Report on 
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.36 When the end strength was not 
met, the DoD revised the goal to 352,000 ANSF personnel by 2014 (187,000 ANA by 
30 Bill Roggio, “Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan: The Data,” http://www.defenddemocracy.org/  
 media-hit/green-on-blue-attacks-in-afghanistan-the-data/ [accessed April 10-August 23, 2012], 1. 
31 Ibid., 1.  
32 Monish Gulati, “Afghan National Security Forces-Hiccups Continue,” http://www.irgamag.com/compon 
 ent/k2/item/680-afghan-national-security-forces-hiccups-continue [accessed April 15-December 
 29, 2012], 1. 
33 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, November 2013,” http://www.defense . 
 .gov /pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf [accessed April 15-November 2013], 3 
34 Ibid., 85. 
35 Ibid., 85.  
36 Department of Defense, “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,”  http://www.defense. 
 gov/ pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf [accessed April 15-April 2012],  13. 
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December 2012, 157,000 ANP by February 2013, and 8,000 Air Force by December 
2014).37 Neither the ANA nor the ANP met their end-strength goal by the revisited 
deadline, as shown in Figure 34.        
Figure 34: ANSF Assigned Strength
 
  For the Afghan National Police, the process was the same.38 An April 2011 
SIGAR audit of ANP workforce and payroll strength found that the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) could not determine the number of personnel that work for the ANP because it had 
“been unable to reconcile personnel records or verify data in its personnel systems and 
databases Another challenge has been the inclusion of civilians in counts of ANSF 
personnel.”39 A February 2012 DoD OIG report on the Afghan National Army payroll 
funding “found that ANA finance officers were including civilians in their count of ANA 
personnel for the purposes of payroll reporting.”40 CSTC-A also noted that civilians had 
37 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” 85. 
38 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” 87. 
39 Department of Defense Inspector General, “Semiannual Report to the Congress,” http://www.dodig.mil/ 
 sar/SAR_OCT_2012_web.pdf [accessed April 15-February 2012], 99. 
40 Ibid.,  99. 
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been counted as part of ANSF assigned force strength, but were later removed from those 
counts.41          
 The ANSF is also “struggling with the fact that its recruitment rate is not 
matching its wastage rate which has been pegged at a whopping 30 percent a year.”42 
Given its present strength, the ANSF needs to recruit approximately 60,000 personnel 
every year.43 The “high wastage rate has been attributed to many factors.”44 First is the 
low re-enlistment rate.45 According to the DoD,  
“about one-quarter of all recruits decline to sign up for extended service beyond 
their initial three-year contract for various reasons such as poor leadership, 
inadequate living and working conditions, the lack of a good program for leaves 
and the effects of seasonal demands for harvesting and planting.”46  
 
There is also the issue of desertion. According to the Afghan Defense Ministry 7-10 
percent of Afghan troops desert each year, while other estimates put it as high as 20 
percent.47 
The effective strength of the Afghan National Security Forces has also been 
adversely affected by the casualty rate.48 With progress of the security transition the 
casualty rate of the ANSF has increased.49 The ANA had more than 1,100 casualties in 
the first six months of 2013; “this is almost more than the previous year’s high of 1,200 
41 Ibid., 99. 
42 Monish Gulati, “Afghan National Security Forces-Hiccups Continue,” http://www.irgamag.com/compon 
 ent/k2/item/680-afghan-national-security-forces-hiccups-continue [accessed April 15-December 
 29, 2012], 2. 
43 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” http://reliefweb.int/ 
 sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf [accessed April 15-January 30, 2014], 6. 
44 Monish Gulati, “Afghan National Security Forces-Hiccups Continue,” 2.  
45 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” http://reliefweb.int/ 
 sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf [accessed April 15-January 30, 2014], 6. 
46 Department of Defense, “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,”  24. 
47 Rod Nordland, “Afghan Army’s High Turnover Clouds U.S. Exist Plan,” New York Times, October 15, 
 2012. 
48 Monish Gulati, “Afghan National Security Forces-Hiccups Continue,” http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan  
 national-security-forces/p19122, [accessed April 16-August 19, 2010], 2.  
49 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” http://reliefweb.int/ 
 sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf [accessed April 15-January 30, 2014], 7. 
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in 2012.”50 During this same time period, the ANP suffered more than 2,200 fatalities.51 
ANA Strength 
Widely seen as the most capable branch of the ANSF, the ANA is going to be a 
key player in Afghanistan’s transition after 2014.52 According to Gautam Das (2012), “it 
is a “new-look army, combining elements of organization from the older Afghan Army 
pattern with some completely new elements copied from the U.S. Army.”53 The ANA 
was also responsible for 95% of all reported operations carried out in Afghanistan in 
2013.54 Despite improvement in performance and training, attrition continues to be a 
major challenge for the ANA.55   
 The annual attrition rate for the Afghan National Army in 2013 was 34.4 
percent.56 Between January and November 2013, 38,916 ANA personnel left the 
service.57 The ANA has also suffered serious losses from fighting. Between December 
2011 and November 2013, the ANA had 2,055 personnel killed in action (KIA) and 
10,484 wounded in action (WIA).58 The United States has tried to address all of these 
weaknesses by (1) applying itself to the training of the new recruits and active mentoring 
of ANA units and sub-units in the field, (2) increasing the salaries of ANA soldiers and 
50 The Guardian.com, “Taliban Kill 1,100 members of Afghan Security Forces in Six Months,” http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/23/taliban-afghan-security-forces-nato [accessed April 16- 
January 23, 2013], 1. 
51 Monish Gulati, “Afghan National Security Forces-Hiccups Continue,” http://www.irgamag.com/compon 
 ent/k2/item/680-afghan-national-security-forces-hiccups-continue [accessed April 15-December 
 29, 2012], 2. 
52 Ibid., 2.  
53 Gautam Das, “The Afghan National Army in 2014,” http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-afghan-
 national-army-in-2014 [accessed April 16-December 4, 2012], 1. 
54 Ibid., 1.  
55 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” http://reliefweb.int/ 
 sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf [accessed April 15-January 30, 2014], 7. 
56 Ibid., 8. 
57 Ibid., 7. 
58 Emma Graham-Harrison, “Afghan Troop Deaths up almost 80% in 2013 Fighting Season, says 
 Pentagon,” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/08/afghan-troop-casualties-up-almost-
 80-in-2013-fighting-season-says-pentagon [accessed April 16-November 8, 2013], 1. 
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ANP police officers.59 “When the U.S. first began its army-building effort, it was 
offering a mere three-year term of enlistment and a meagre salary, and the desertion rate 
before completion of their enlistment period was as high as 25 percent of enrollment.”60 
This led to a recruitment crisis that ISAF failed to make public.61 
 It was only in December 2009, that a NATO advisory team announced that a 
disparity in pay was a major problem in recruiting.62 According to the report, “a fighter in 
the Taliban could make $250-$300 a month while the average ANA soldier got $120-
$180 a month.”63 Shortly after, ANA and ANP salaries were raised to levels closer to 
$240 a month. “This raised ANA recruiting from average lows far below the required 
level-and only 831 in August 2009—to 2,659 in the first week of September 2009—
roughly half of the entire monthly quota level.”64 It also led some 60 deserters out of 80 
in one unit to return to service once they learned that the new pay system was in effect.65 
 As of December 30, 2013, the overall end strength of the Afghan National Army 
was 185,386 personnel (178,816 Army and 6,529 Air Force).66 This total includes 
“10,251 ANA personnel and 41 Air Force personnel who were AWOL, 10,905 trainees, 
students and those awaiting assignment as well as 5,010 cadets.”67 Determining ANA 
strength “continues to prove challenging as limited details were available to account for 
59 Gautam Das, “The Afghan National Army in 2014,” 2. 
60 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Afghan National Security Forces: What it Will Take to Implement the ISAF 
 Strategy,” https://csis.org/files/publication/101115_Cordesman_AfghanNationalSecurityForces 
 _Web.pdf [accessed April 16-November 2010], 67. 
61 Spencer Ackerman, “Taliban Pays Its Troops Better than Karzai Pays His,” New York Times, July 27, 
 2010. 
62 Gautam Das, “The Afghan National Army in 2014,” 2. 
63 Spencer Ackerman, “Taliban Pays Its Troops Better than Karzai Pays His,” 1.  
64 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Afghan National Security Forces: What it Will Take to Implement the ISAF 
 Strategy,” https://csis.org/files/publication/101115_Cordesman_AfghanNationalSecurityForces 
 _Web.pdf [accessed April 16-November 2010], 67. 
65 Ibid., 68. 
66 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” http://reliefweb.int/ 
 sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf [accessed April 15-January 30, 2014], 87. 
67 Ibid., 87.  
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the 126,659 personnel assigned to the ANA’s combat forces this quarter.”68 SIGAR 
determined that these forces included personnel in the following categories: (1) Present 
for Duty of “Combat Strength”, 62,753 (50%); (2) Unavailable (including personnel in 
combat, and on leave, but not personnel AWOL) 54,862 (43%); and (3) Absent without 
Leave (AWOL), 9,043 (7%).69 
ANP Strength 
 As of December 31, 2013, the United States has spent $15.8 billion on building, 
training, and sustaining Afghanistan’s National Police force.70 In November 2013, “the 
overall strength of the ANP was 149,466 personnel, including 106,784 Afghan Uniform 
Police (AUP), 20,902 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 13,597 Afghan National Civil Order 
Police (ANCOP), 2,850 in the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and 
5,333 students in training.”71 Like many countries’ police forces, Afghanistan’s police 
force continues to be subject to local politics and national political interference.72 This is 
“exemplified by the high turnover rates of district chiefs, who are appointed directly by 
the President of Afghanistan.”73        
 The overall strength of the Afghan National Police continues to be affected by 
turnover and attrition as well.74 Since October 2013, the overall strength of the ANP has 
68 Ibid., 87. 
69 Gautam Das, “The Afghan National Army in 2014,” http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/13581  
 [accessed April 14-December 4 2012], 1. 
70 Jacob Siegel, “The Afghan Money pit: How Millions of Dollars Were Wasted,” http://www.thedailybeast 
 .com/the-hero-project/articles/2013/10/30/the-afghan-money-pit-how-millions-of-dollars-were-
 wasted.html [accessed April 10-October 30, 2013], 3. 
71 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014, 96. 
72 Jonathan Schroden, Patricio Asfura-Heim. Catherine Norman, & Jerry Meyerle, “Were the Afghan  
National Security Forces Successful in 2013?,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/ files/research/ 
ANSF_in_2013.pdf [accessed April 13-January14], 5.  
73 Ibid., 5.  
74 SIGAR, “Afghan Security Forces: Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain about Literacy 
 Training Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment,” http://www.sigar.mil 
 /pdf/ audits/ SIGAR_14-30-AR.pdf [accessed April 11-January 2014],  4. 
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decreased by more than 3,191 police officers.75 According to CSTC-A, “unlike the ANA, 
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, 
sick, or on temporary assignment in its personnel reports.”76 For this reason, it is not 
known what the actual operational strength of the ANP is at any given time.77 
ANSF Literacy Training  
 Devastated by decades of conflict and neglect, “Afghanistan suffers from low 
levels of literacy among the general population and even more so among recruits in the 
Afghan National Security Forces.”78 The Afghan Ministry of Education estimates that 
only about one-third of the Afghan population can read or write while approximately 13 
percent of ANSF recruits possess these abilities.79 According to the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the overall literacy rate 
among Afghans over the age of 15 is approximately 28%.80    
 This varies from a high of 58 percent in Kabul to a low of 12 percent in Helmand 
province.81 NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) testing shows that fewer than 
14% of the recruits entering the ANA and ANP have a first grade level of literacy.82 
Thus, illiteracy in the Afghan National Security Forces “remains a major obstacle to 
effectively developing a capable and self-sustaining force that can operate independently 
and defend the Afghan people.”83 According to Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, 
75 Ibid., 4.  
76 Ibid., 4.  
77 Ibid., 5.  
78 Ibid.,  4. 
79 Morten Sigsgaard, “Education and Fragility in Afghanistan: A Situational Analysis,” http://www.protecti 
 ngeducation.org/ sites/default/files/documents/education_and_fragility_in_afghanistan.pdf 
 [accessed April 14-September 2009], 15. 
80 Ibid., 15. 
81 Ibid., 15. 
82 Michael J. Faughnan, “Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program,” http://smallwarsjournal.com/ 
 blog/journal/docs-temp/634-faughnan.pdf [accessed April 14- January 4, 2011], 1. 
83 Gopal Ratnam & Anthony Capaccio, “Afghan Military’s Illiteracy Complicating U.S. Departure,” 1. 
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the former commander of NTM-A, “literacy is the foundation of a professional military 
and police force.”84          
 In his article, Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program, Michael J. Faughnan 
(2011), points out that literacy is an enabler (a supporting capability).85 Teaching 
illiterate soldiers through memorization and repetition may work well for some military 
tasks, but not all.86 For example, 
“literacy is not a requirement for accurate rifle marksmanship, but it is required 
for scores of other specialties. Medics must be able to read the labels of a drug 
prior to administering it. Field Artillery fire direction specialists must be able to 
read and perform mathematical functions to compute accurate firing data for the 
guns.”87 
 
Faughnan also points out that literacy can serve as a recruiting tool for the ANSF.88   
“After more than thirty years of warfare, many young Afghans in the prime recruiting age 
group did not have the opportunity to attend school as children.”89 Thus, the ability to 
read is considered by many Afghans to be a badge of honor.90 Providing literacy 
instruction to this group “helps them to overcome this deficit and prepares them for a 
more productive life, whether they make the ANSF a career or move into another 
field.”91  
 Finally, literacy can also help combat corruption within the ANSF.  According to 
Michael J. Faughnan (2012), illiterate soldiers and police are unable to read their 
paychecks to make sure that they are being paid the proper amount. These soldiers also 
84 William B. Caldwell & Nathan K. Finney, “Security, Capacity, and Literacy,” http://usacac.army.mil/CA 
 C2/Military Review/Archives/ [accessed April 14-January & February 2011], 23. 
85 Michael J. Faughnan, “Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program,” 2. 
86 Ibid., 2 
87 Ibid., 2.  
88 Ibid., 2.  
89 William B. Caldwell & Nathan K. Finney, “Security, Capacity, and Literacy,” 24. 
90 Ibid., 24. 
91 Michael J. Faughnan, “Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program,” 2.  
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can’t perform basic inventory tasks because they are unable to count the number of rifles 
on hand or account for the equipment issued to them.92 Being literate would allow these 
soldiers and policeman to carry out these common tasks and make supervisors and 
commanders more accountable.  
 During the last six years, the United States has spent more than $200 million on a 
program to teach Afghan soldiers how to read and write.93 Before the implementation of 
the ANSF Literacy program in 2009, literacy standards for recruits “were virtually non-
existent” as recruits “could literally be pulled off the street and made a police officer.”94  
Currently, the ANSF’s literacy program is based on a 312-hour curriculum.95 According 
to CSTC-A, in order to progress from illiteracy to functional literacy, a student may take 
as many as seven tests.96 The students’ performance determines if he or she progresses to 
the next training level.97   
As seen in Figure 35 below, Level 1 literacy provides an individual with the 
ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole 
numbers.98 At Level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic 
multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement.99 At Level 3, an 
individual has achieved functional literacy and can identify, understand, interpret, create, 
communicate, compute, and use printed and written materials. NTM-A/CSTC-A noted 
92 Michael J. Faughnan, “Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program,” http://smallwarsjournal.com/ 
 blog/journal/docs-temp/634-faughnan.pdf [accessed April 14- January 4, 2011], 2.  
93 Josh Rogin, “After $200 million, Afghan Soldiers Still Can’t Read,” 1.  
94 Tom Vanden Brook, “Inspector General: Literacy lags among Afghan Troops,” USA Today, January 28, 
 2014. 
95 SIGAR, “Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported Success, Concerns Remain about Literacy 
 Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment,”  http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/aud 
 its/SIGAR_14-30-AR.pdf [accessed April 14-January 28, 2014], 1 
96 Ibid., 1. 
97 Ibid., 1. 
98 Ibid., 9. 
99 Ibid., 9. 
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that at Level 3, the student is transitioning from learning to read to reading to learn. Since 
2009, a total of 220,530 ANSF recruits have passed Level 1 of Dari or Pashto literacy and 
numeracy training while 70,350 ANSF personnel have achieved Level Three, or 
functional literacy under the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization standard.100  
Figure 35: Training Provided under NTM-A/CSTC-A’s ANSF Literacy Program 
 
Source: SIGAR, “Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported Success, Concerns Remain about 
Literacy  Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment,” p. 9,http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/ 
audits/SIGAR_14-30-AR.pdf 
 
 Despite these numbers, a report released by SIGAR in January 2014 concluded 
that the program appears to have had a limited impact on actual literacy levels within the 
ANSF.101 According to the report, “the ANSF has a remarkably high attrition rate, 
between 30 and 50 percent a year.”102 Thus, many of the soldiers who have been 
educated at U.S. taxpayer expense are no longer in the Afghan Army. The SIGAR report 
100 Josh Rogin, “After $200 million, Afghan Soldiers Still Can’t Read,” http://www.thedailybeast.com/articl 
 es/2014/01/28. html [accessed April 14- January 28, 2014], 1. 
101 SIGAR, “Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported Success, Concerns Remain about Literacy 
 Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment,”  http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/aud 
 its/SIGAR_14-30-AR.pdf [accessed April 14-January 28, 2014], 1. 
102 Ibid., 3. 
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also identified several other flaws in the literacy program. “The program did not track 
students after their courses to be able to follow up on their progress.”103 Further, the 
program, “which relied on private contractors to teach the courses, did not specify what 
the curriculum should contain or monitor the majority of sites where classes were 
held.”104 This led to what the report called poor implementation by contractors.105 The 
report also found that between July 2012 and February 2013, 45 percent of Afghan 
National Police sent to the field received no literacy training.106     
 Since the release of this report, the United States has cut back on the number of 
sites where literacy courses are being taught in order to promote better oversight.107 
NATO has also worked with the Afghan government to implement new contracts for 
literacy training of the ANSF, with more stringent metrics to measure literacy 
performance and limiting contract scope to encourage better contractor performance.108 
According to recent reports, this new oversight has saved the United States $19 
million.109 CSTC-A also said responsibility for literacy training of ANA personnel in the 
field will transition to the ANA between July 1, 2014 and December 31, 2014. Literacy 
training at ANA training centers will transition by December 2014. 110 
Assessment Levels of Afghan National Security Forces 
 Passed in 2007, the Nation Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 
directed the Department of Defense to report on its assessment of the operational 
103 Ibid., 3. 
104 Mattie Quinn & R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Literacy Program for Afghan Military Comes Up Short,” 2. 
105 Ibid., 13. 
106 Josh Rogin, “After $200 million, Afghan Soldiers Still Can’t Read,” 2. 
107 Ibid., 2.  
108 Ibid., 2.  
109 Heath Druzin, “Watchdog: $200 million literacy program misses mark in Afghanistan,” http://www. 
 stripes.com/news/ watchdog-200-million-literacy-program-misses-mark-in-afghanistan-1.264431 
 [accessed April 14- January 28, 2014], 3. 
110 Ibid., 3. 
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readiness of ANSF units. Specifically, the act requires the DoD to “report on the number 
of ANSF units that are capable of conducting operations independently, units that are 
capable of conducting operations with U.S. and ISAF support, and units that are not 
ready to conduct operations.”111 The assessments also provide updates on the status of 
these units as U.S. and NATO forces continue to hand over more security responsibility 
to the ANSF.112  
Figure 36: History of ANSF Rating Definition Levels, 2010 to Present 
 
Source: SIGAR, “Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 
Capability Assessment Efforts,” p.3, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/Audits/SIGAR_14-33-AR.pdf. 
 
Since August 15, 2013, ISAF has used the Regional Command ASNF Assessment 
Report (RASR) to rate the Afghan National Security Forces.113 This is the third different 
assessment tool used by the United States and ISAF to rate the ANSF. The RASR uses 
111 SIGAR, “Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining Capability 
 Assessment Efforts,” http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/Audits/SIGAR_14-33-AR.pdf. [accessed April 16- 
 February 2014], 3. 
112 Ibid., 3. 
113 Ibid., 3.  
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six color-coded rating definitions-(1) fully capable, (2) capable, (3) partially capable, (4) 
developing, (5) established, and (6) not assessed to evaluate ANSF units at the brigade 
and regional levels each month.114 In addition, “the RASR focuses on assessing specific 
components of the units, such as infantry and communications, against one overall and 
five targeted categories: combined arms, command and control, leadership, sustainment, 
and training.”115  
 The Afghan National Security Forces “as a whole are increasingly capable and 
proactive in conducting security operations and ANSF commanders are improving their 
integration of combined arms.”116 ANSF units are currently leading 95 percent of 
conventional and 98 percent of special operations missions.117 Fifty-seven of 85 ANA 
kandaks are rated as “capable” or higher.118 Two major strengths of the ANA are infantry 
maneuver and small unit execution of operations (at the kandak-level and below) and 
human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.119 
 For the ANA, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 24 brigades (22 
corps brigades and 2 brigades of the 11th Capital Division).120 Of those brigades, 88% 
were “fully capable” or “capable” of planning and conducting joint and combined arms 
operations.121 According to Figure 37, equipment readiness within the ANA Ground 
Forces Command (GFC) continues to improve. Attrition, however, “continues to pose a 
serious challenge to the ANA as 71% of brigades are still considered “developing” which 
114 Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, 44. 
115 SIGAR, “Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining Capability 
 Assessment Efforts,” http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/Audits/SIGAR_14-33-AR.pdf. [accessed April 16- 
 February 2014], 3. 
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118 Ibid., 86. 
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means that attrition in these brigades is 3% or more per month.”122 In other areas, most 
ANA brigades were rated “fully capable” or “capable,” including leadership (96%), 
command and control (100%), sustainment (88%), and training (83%).123        
Figure 37: ANA RASR Assessments, December 2013 
 
Source: SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” p. 87, http://relief 
web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf 
 
 For the Afghan National Police, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 
16 of 21 regional ANP components—the Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniform Police, 
and Afghan National Civil Order Police in seven different zones. Of the 16 components 
assessed, 94 percent were “fully capable” or “capable” of making arrests and prosecuting 
those arrested.124 According to Figure 38, “readiness within the ANP continues to be a 
point of concern and the ANP also struggles with maintaining a manageable level of 
equipment readiness.”125 In addition, attrition continues to be a challenge for the ANP as 
“50% of regional components are still considered “developing” which means that 
122 Ibid., 87. 
123 Ibid., 87.  
124 Ibid., 87. 
125 Ibid., 87. 
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monthly attrition in these units is 2% or more.”126 In other areas, the ANP regional 
components are mostly “fully capable” or “capable”: leadership (94%), command and 
control (94%), sustainment (94%), and training (88%).127 
Figure 38: ANP RASR Assessments, December 2013 
 
Source: SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” p. 88, http://relief 
web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf 
 
Green-on-Blue Attacks: The ‘Last Gasp’ of the Taliban? 
 One of the biggest threats to U.S. and ISAF soldiers in recent years have been 
attacks on Coalition forces by Afghan forces—the so-called green-on-blue attacks.128 
These attacks from within have increased dramatically over the past three years, and in 
2012 they accounted for 15% of Coalition deaths.129 Insurgents’ use of insider attacks as 
a tactic remains a risk to trust between U.S., ISAF, and ANSF forces. In particular, 
126 Ibid., 88.  
127 Ibid., 88. 
128 Bill Roggio, “Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan,” 1. 
129 Bill Roggio & Lisa Lundquist, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” http://www.longwar 
 journal. org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php [accessed April 14-August 23, 2012], 1. 
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“insider attacks risk undermining international support for the mission and long-term 
support for the Afghan government, which could pose a threat to the transition process 
and stability beyond 2014.”130  
Figure 39: Number of Green-on-Blue Attacks per Year (2008-2013) 
 
Source: The Long War Journal, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” p.2,  http://www.longwar 
journal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php p.2 
 
 From 2007 to 2013, there have been 86 documented green-on-blue attacks.131 
“Even though it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the principal causes of 
these attacks given the small total number of incidents, there are discernible trends.”132 
Based on information available from The Long War Journal and the Department of 
Defense’s Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan reports, insider attacks 
have increased in frequency over the past few years before decreasing in 2013. “Although 
130 Institute for the Study of War, “Afghanistan: Green-on-Blue Attacks in Context,” http://www.understa
 ndingwar.org/green-on-blue/ [accessed April 14-October 31, 2012], 2. 
131 Ibid., 2.  
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U.S. and NATO commanders have stated that an estimated 90% of the attacks are due to 
cultural differences and personal enmity, the attacks began to spike in 2011, just after 
President Barack Obama announced his plan to pull U.S. forces out of Afghanistan and 
end combat operations in 2014, transferring security to the Afghan forces.”133 The 
Taliban also have claimed to have stepped up efforts at infiltrating the Afghan National 
Security Forces.134 
 Based on information from the Long War Journal, there were 2 insider attacks in 
2008, 5 in 2009 and 2010 each, 16 in 2011, and 44 in 2012.135 The number of insider 
attacks decreased by more than half in 2013 with only 13 attacks recorded that year. 
Green-on-blue attacks were largely concentrated in the Southern, Southwestern, and 
Eastern regional commands.136 More than half of all attacks in 2012 occurred in 
Kandahar and Helmand, which were the focus of the counterinsurgency campaign during 
the “Surge.”137 
 There are “two main narratives purporting to explain why green-on-blue attacks 
happen and why they are happening more frequently: grievances and infiltration.”138 
Grievance-based insider attacks occur because of cultural misunderstandings between 
foreign and Afghan troops, low morale, and revenge for perceived insults or 
provocations.139 Attacks caused by insurgent initiative are pre-planned violence 
organized by members of the Taliban who have infiltrated the ANSF or influenced 
133 Sajjan Gohel, “Afghanistan: Green-on-blue attacks show there’s no easy way out,” http://www.cnn.com/ 
 2012/09/18/opinion/opinion-afghanistan-green-on-blue/ [accessed April 14-Septemer 18, 2012], 2. 
134 Ibid., 2. 
135 Bill Roggio & Lisa Lundquist, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” 2. 
136 Ibid., 2.  
137 Institute for the Study of War, “Afghanistan: Green-on-Blue Attacks in Context,” 1. 
138 Ibid., 1. 
139 Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” http://www 
 .defense. gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf [accessed April 15-November 2013], 
 24. 
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existing members to execute attacks.       
 The DoD believes that the vast majority of attacks are grievance-based rather than 
a result of infiltration.”140 In August 2012, ISAF Commander, General John Allen, said 
“that approximately 25% of the green-on-blue attacks were due to Taliban infiltration 
and/or coercion of Afghan forces.”141 In contrast, on October 4, 2012, Afghan Deputy 
Foreign Minister Jawed Ludin described “the majority of insider attacks as the result of 
"terrorist infiltration" rather than cultural differences.”142 Another theory cites the rise in 
attacks in 2012 as a result of copycat behavior.143 Meanwhile, the Taliban claims credit 
for nearly every attack144.           
 The U.S. military “became so concerned with green-on-blue attacks in the 
summer of 2012 that it ordered units to designate “guardian angels” in each unit whose 
job is to provide security for troops working with Afghans.”145 In mid-August of that 
year, field commanders were told they could increase the number of “guardian angels” 
depending on the tactical situation.146 The surge in insider attacks also prompted U.S. and 
ISAF forces to expand their counterintelligence capability in Afghanistan.147 In addition, 
“General Allen issued a directive to all U.S. and NATO troops on August 17, 2012 to 
carry a loaded weapon at all times.”148 Announcing these changes, General Martin 
Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that Afghan forces were also trying 
140 Institute for the Study of War, “Afghanistan: Green-on-Blue Attacks in Context,” 1. 
141 Thom Shanker, “General Notes Taliban Coercion in Some Attacks on Troops,” New York Times, Aug  
 23, 2012. 
142 Jamie Crawford, “Afghan Government: Insider Attacks are Terrorism,” [accessed April 14-October 4, 
 2012], 1. 
143 Institute for the Study of War, “Afghanistan: Green-on-Blue Attacks in Context,” 1. 
144 Ibid., 1. 
145 Ibid., 2. 
146 John Reed, “Guardian Angels in Afghanistan,”http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/14/pentag 
 on_looks_to_guardian_angels_in_afghanistan [accessed April 14-August 14, 2012], 1. 
147 Ibid., 1.  
148 Justin Fishel, “Coalition Troops now Armed at all Times on Afghan Bases in Wake of ‘Insider’ 
 Shootings,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/17 [accessed April 14-August 17, 2012], 1. 
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to address the problem and had already discharged "hundreds of soldiers" suspected of 
having been radicalized.149          
 In tabulating the green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan, this study utilizes 
information gathered from The Long War Journal. For the purposes of this report, all 
attacks in Afghanistan in which a person purporting to be affiliated with the Afghan 
National Security Forces—whether, ANA, ALP, ABP, AUP, AAF, other branches, or 
security personnel hired by Afghan authorities—are considered “green.”150 Similarly, all 
persons purporting to be affiliated with U.S., ISAF, or NATO security forces, including 
interpreters and civilian contractors, are considered “blue.”151 The data below indicates 
the number of attacks, the affiliation of the attacker (if known), the location/province 
where the attack occurred, the date of the attack, the number of security forces killed or 
wounded in the attack, and the affiliation of those killed or wounded.152 The data also 
includes the reported fate of the attacker(s). 
 Because ISAF has generally not reported on green-on-blue incidents in which no 
casualties have occurred, “the overall number of attacks is likely to be far greater than 
those reported below.”153 Similarly, ISAF has generally not reported on incidents that 
have resulted only in injuries, not death; these too are likely to be underreported.154 ISAF 
has told The Long War Journal and other news and media outlets that the overall number 
of green-on-blue attacks is “classified.”             
149 Ibid., 1.  
150 Ibid., 1.  
151 Lisa Lundquist, “Senior ISAF Member Killed in Green-on-Blue Attack in Southern Afghanistan,” http:/ 
 /www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/3rd_green-on blue_at.php?utm_source=rss&utm_me 
 dium=rss&utm_campaign=senior-isaf-member-killed-in-green-on-blue-attack-in-southern-
 Afghanistan [accessed April 14-October 5, 2013], 1. 
152 Bill Roggio & Lisa Lundquist, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” 1. 
153 Ibid., 1. 
154 Bill Roggio & Lisa Lundquist, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” http://www.longwar 
 journal. org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php [accessed April 14-August 23, 2012], 1. 
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 According to data gathered by The Long War Journal, more than 143 U.S. and 
ISAF soldiers have been killed in green-on-blue attacks between 2008 and 2013. In 2008, 
only two ISAF soldiers were killed by insider attacks, 12 in 2009 and 16 in 2010.155 The 
number of soldiers killed by green-on-blue incidents almost doubled in 2011 (35) before 
reaching a record high of 61 fatalities in 2012. Green-on-blue deaths accounted for 15% 
of all Coalition fatalities in 2012. Due to new measures put in place by ISAF and the 
ANSF, the number of U.S. and NATO troops killed by Afghan forces (14) dropped by 
more than 23% in 2013.156  
Figure 40: Green-on-Blue Deaths per Year  
 
Source: The Long War Journal, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” p.2,  http://www.longwar 
journal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php  
 
Upon a closer look, a majority of these deaths occurred in the southern, 
southwestern, and eastern parts of Afghanistan. As shown in Figure 41, the province with 
the highest number of green-on-blue deaths is Helmand province with 34 fatalities. The 
155 Ibid., 2. 
156 Institute for the Study of War, “Afghanistan: Green-on-Blue Attacks in Context,” 2. 
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next closest province is Kandahar with 17 reported fatalities. These two provinces alone 
accounted for 26% of the 143 reported green-on-blue fatalities between 2008 and 2013. 
Interestingly enough, the province with the third highest number of insider attack 
fatalities is Kabul, which is supposed to be one the most secure provinces.  
Figure 41: Total Number of Green-on-Blue Deaths per Province (2008-2013) 
 
Source: The Long War Journal, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” p.2,  http://www.longwar 
journal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php.  
 A final analysis also shows that a majority of green-on-blue attacks have taken 
place in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. More than 37% of all insider attacks between 
2008 and 2013 have taken place in these two provinces. The province with the next 
highest number of attacks is Kabul with 12. Rounding up the top five is Kapisa province 
with 10 casualties and Nangarhar, Laghman, Wardak provinces tied with eight.  
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 In conclusion, the mitigation measures adopted by U.S., ISAF, and ANSF forces 
since the surge in attacks during the summer of 2012 appear to be making a difference, 
and to date, the rate of attacks against ISAF forces is significantly reduced.157 That said, 
“these mitigation measures continue to diminish U.S. and NATO resources and hamper, 
movement, speed, and activity on the tactical level.”158 Attacks against the ANSF 
continue to rise, however, and may continue to do as the ANSF assume greater 
responsibility for the security of Afghanistan.159  
Figure 42: Total Number of Attacks per Province (2008-2013)
 
 
Source: The Long War Journal, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” p.2,  http://www.longwar 
journal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php  
157 Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security,” 26. 
158 Institute for the Study of War, “Afghanistan: Green-on-Blue Attacks in Context,” 3. 
159 Bill Roggio & Lisa Lundquist, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” 4. 
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CHAPTER VIII: A FLIP OF THE COIN: COUNTERINSURGENCY’S LEGACY IN 
AFGHANISTAN  
“Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia 
or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.” 
-Robert Gates 
 On September 20th, 2012, the last of the 30,000 surge troops sent to Afghanistan 
two years before were withdrawn. During this time, the “Taliban were pushed out of 
large stretches of southern Afghanistan, the influx of U.S. resources accelerated the 
development of the Afghan security forces, and the billions that were poured into the 
country in the name of reconstruction did provide short-term employment to thousands of 
young men.”1 The surge and its accompanying COIN strategy “also exacted a significant 
cost on the United States and its NATO and Afghan allies – in lives, limbs, and dollars.”2 
 Despite the remarkable progress made by U.S. and ISAF forces in southern 
Afghanistan, eastern parts of the country are still in the grip of the Haqqani Network, a 
“Taliban faction that Admiral Mike Mullen has called a ‘veritable arm’ of the Taliban.”3  
The Taliban have also made gains in parts of the country previously unaffected by the 
insurgency including northern and western Afghanistan. 4 Moreover, the Taliban seems to 
“possess a remarkable capability to regenerate its command structure in Afghanistan 
despite years of night raids and other operations against the group’s senior, mid, and 
1Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Surge is Over,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/25 
 /the_afghan_surge_is_over [accessed April 24-September 25, 2012], 1. 
2 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan,  (New York: Knopf, 
 2012), 326. 
3 Karen DeYoung, “Pakistan backed attacks on American targets, U.S. says,” The Washington Post, 
 September 22, 2012. 
4 Dion Nissenbaum & Habib Khan Totakhil, “Taliban Bombing Campaign Hits Afghan North, The Wall 
 Street Journal, March 15, 2011. 
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lower-level leadership cadre.”1 In addition, “the top leadership cadre of the Quetta Shura 
and the leaders of the four regional military commands, most of whom are based in 
Pakistan, remain virtually untouched in these raids.”2 Thus, the question remains as to 
whether or not the United States’ COIN and accompanying surge strategy was successful 
in achieving the four main objectives identified by Field Manual 3-24 needed to win in 
Afghanistan? And were the gains worth the cost? Let’s examine them one by one: 
1. Securing Afghanistan’s Population and Borders    
 Initially, then-ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal had proposed a plan 
that addressed southern and eastern Afghanistan simultaneously. A counterinsurgency 
strategy was to be implemented in both areas. This would have required adding more 
than 40,000 U.S. troops to the 70,000 already in Afghanistan.3 This plan was not adopted, 
however. Instead, President Obama only approved an additional 30,000 troops. Because 
fewer troops meant that a COIN strategy could not be implemented in the southern and 
eastern parts of the country simultaneously, “the original 2009 plan was modified into a 
two-phase plan.”4 In Phase 1, the South would be addressed, and in Phase 2, the U.S. and 
ISAF would shift its efforts to the East.  
 On June 23, 2011, Obama announced that the withdrawal of U.S. troops would 
begin sooner than the counterinsurgency strategy devised by General McChrystal and 
General Petraeus had envisioned. Originally planned to start in 2014, the drawdown of 
U.S. and ISAF forces began in the summer of 2011, as the entire surge force was 
1 Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, “Analysis The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been broken,” http://www 
 .longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/09/ [accessed March 17-September 6, 2012], 1. 
2 Ibid. 1.  
3 CJ Radin, “Analysis: U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan shifts as forces draw down,” http://www.long 
 warjournal.org/archives/2011/08/the_military_strateg_1.php [accessed January 17 – August 3, 
 2011], 2. 
4 John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, & John K. Wood. From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S. at War 
 in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 231. 
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withdrawn by September 2012.5 This revised timeline had major implications for the 
original counterinsurgency plan. Although most of Helmand and Kandahar provinces had 
been secured by U.S. and ISAF forces by the summer of 2011, “the early troop 
withdrawal made Phase 2 of the counterinsurgency strategy no longer viable.”6 
 By August 2011, most of the units that were to be transferred to eastern 
Afghanistan once Helmand and Kandahar provinces had been cleared were withdrawn. 
Thus, the United States and ISAF were unable to carry out a full-scale counterinsurgency 
strategy in eastern Afghanistan.7 Instead of clearing population centers, “Coalition forces 
focused on conducting counterterrorism operations that would degrade the capabilities 
and infrastructure of the Haqqani Network.”8 Despite sustaining heavy losses, the 
Haqqani Network has been able to infiltrate the neighboring province of Ghazni as well 
as Zabul, Logar, and Wardak provinces.9 The Haqqani Network has also maintained the 
ability to carry out high profile attacks and operations throughout central and eastern 
Afghanistan, especially in the capital city of Kabul.10     
 As seen from above, the original counterinsurgency strategy devised by Generals 
David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal and Admiral Mike Mullen was never fully 
implemented by the Obama administration. Instead of pursuing a strategy that 
simultaneously focused on southern and eastern Afghanistan, the United States was only 
able to carry out the first phase of the strategy as President Obama began the withdrawing 
of troops much earlier than anticipated. “This had an adverse effect on the United States’ 
5 CJ Radin, “U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan: the plan for 2012, 2013, and 2014,”  http://www.longwar 
 journal.org/archives/2012/03/us_withdrawal_from_a.php [accessed April 22-March 18, 2012], 2. 
6 Ibid., 1. 
7 Ibid., 2.  
8 Ibid., 2.  
9 Ibid., 1. 
10 Dion Nissenbaum & Habib Khan Totakhil, “Taliban Bombing Campaign Hits Afghan North, The Wall 
 Street Journal, March 15, 2011. 
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counterinsurgency strategy as the U.S. was no longer able to conduct counterinsurgency 
operations in the eastern part of Afghanistan.”11 Clearing operations in Helmand and 
Kandahar provinces came to a quicker end as well as the U.S. began withdrawing troops 
during the summer of 2011 instead of by the end of that year. The transfer of 
responsibility for security for some of these areas to ANSF also began four months earlier 
than originally planned.12 
 Even if the Obama administration would have stuck to the original timeline 
adopted in 2009, the United States’ counterinsurgency strategy failed to meet the troop 
density levels that are recommended by FM 3-24 to secure the population. Troop density 
levels before the surge translated into some of the lowest troop and police density levels 
in any COIN/stabilization operation since the end of World War II.13 These force levels 
rank with some of the international community’s most notable failures: the UN mission 
of Belgian Congo (1.3 per thousand); the American and UN intervention in Somalia 
(5.7); the U.S. rescue of Haiti (2.9); the French operation in Cote d’Ivorie (0.2); and the 
U.S. war in Iraq in 2005 (5.3).14 
 When compared to the 22 other cases listed in this study, force levels during the 
surge (2010-2012) rank with some of the highest levels reached by U.S. and international 
forces in Kosovo (19.3); Iraq 2007 (18.85); Bosnia (17.3); and East Timor (9.8). These 
campaigns are considered to be some of the more successful counterinsurgency and 
nation-building operations carried out by the United States and international community 
11 CJ Radin, “Analysis: U.S. military Strategy in Afghanistan shifts as forces draw down,” http://www.long 
warjournal.org/archives/2011/08/the_military strategy_1.php. [accessed April 10-August 3, 2011], 
1. 
12 CJ Radin, “U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan: the plan for 2012, 2013, and 2014,”  3. 
13 James Dobbins, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,” http://www.rand.org/con 
 tent/dam /rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/MR1753.pref.pdf [accessed January 20 – 
 February 2004], 7. 
14 Ibid., 7.  
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in recent years.15 Despite reaching similar force levels, the U.S. and NATO were unable 
to generate the kind of success experienced by these other campaigns as violence 
continues to plague eastern Afghanistan and has spread to areas previously unaffected by 
the insurgency. Thus, “having enough forces to reverse increasing insurgent violence 
does not always equate to victory, or even the attainment of low levels of violence.”16 
Other factors such as varying levels of trainining and equipping, as well as limitations on 
force employment imposed by Coalition governments can all have a positive or negative 
impact on the outcome of a COIN operation.17   
 Efforts to secure Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, while gaining the Pakistani 
government’s support in cracking down on insurgent sanctuaries on its soil have not fared 
much better. Although Pakistan “has never been the lone player in Afghanistan’s proxy 
conflicts, it remains the most problematic one for the United States.”18 Pakistan has a 
long history of officially sponsored militancy.19 The reasons for this policy appear to be 
diverse.20 According to Matt Waldman (2010), the Taliban-ISI relationship is founded on 
mutual benefit. “The Taliban need external sanctuary, as well as military and logistical 
support to sustain their insurgency, the ISI believes that it needs a significant allied force 
in Afghanistan to maintain regional strength and ‘strategic depth’ in their rivalry with 
India.”21           
 Since 2001, the “United States has provided the Afghan and Pakistani 
15 Ibid., 8. 
16 Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements,” 56. 
17 Ibid., 56.  
18 Richard Armitage, “U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan,” www.cfr.org/pakistan/us-strategy-
 pakistan-Afghanistan\p23253 [accessed April 22-December 201], 18. 
19Ibid., 20. 
20 Ibid., 20.  
21 Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,” 
 http://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Documents/2010/6/13/20106138531279734lse-isi-taliban.pdf 
 [accessed February 25 – June 2010], 5. 
176 
 
                                                          
governments and militaries with considerable money, equipment, training, and other 
security assistance.”22 The U.S. has also increased the number of cross-border raids by 
Special Operations Forces and drone strikes carried out in Pakistan’s tribal areas since 
President Obama came into office. Between 2009 and 2013, American Predator and 
Reaper drones have carried out more than 308 airstrikes against Taliban, al Qaeda, and 
other militant targets in Pakistan.23 These strikes have taken a significant toll on al 
Qaeda’s leadership cadre and diminished the operational capabilities of allied groups 
such as the Pakistani Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Despite the 
success the United States has had in targeting and killing high-level members of the 
Taliban, al Qaeda, and other affiliated militant groups, the drone program remains highly 
controversial.24  
 In December 2013, the Obama administration put a halt on further drone strikes 
against militant and terrorist targets in Pakistan. Some administration officials now 
believe the drone campaign may be counterproductive to U.S. national security 
interests.25 Counterterrorism experts “argue that because of the decentralized structure of 
terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Taliban, targeting their top leaders is 
ineffective. Thus, killing terrorist leaders is difficult, it is often ineffective and it can 
easily backfire.”26         
 According to Daniel Byman, “even when targeted killings do work to eliminate 
22 Richard Weitz, “Afghan-Pakistan Border Rules,” 4.  
23 Bill Roggio, “The Covert U.S. Air Campaign in Pakistan,” 2. 
24 Gregor Peter Schmitz, “Are Drones Worth Their Drawbacks?” Der Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/ 
 international/world/the-debate-on-push-button-war-are-drones-worth-their-drawbacks-a-
 682645.html [accessed February 14 – March 12, 2010], 1. 
25 David Wood, “Drone War Expansion Sparks Questions about Effectiveness, Oversight in Obama’s  
 Second Term,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/16/drone-war-obama_n_2454901. 
 html.  [accessed April 14-January 16, 2013], 1.  
26 Sara Birkenthal, “U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan: A Strategic Analysis,” http://www.cmc.edu/keck/stude 
 nt/Birkenthal %20Fellowship%20Paper.pdf [accessed February 11 - December 2012], 22. 
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terrorist leaders, they are decidedly a ‘poor second to arrests’ because dead men are no 
help in informing the United States of broader terrorist activities.”27 Finally, drone strikes 
are very unpopular in Pakistan and have put a deep strain on military ties between the 
U.S. and Pakistan.  
 In conclusion, U.S. attempts to curb the flow of foreign and insurgent fighters and 
weapons crossing the Afghan-Pakistani border have proven ineffective as the U.S. 
government has failed to convince the Pakistanis to crack down on these groups or put 
better measures and troops in place to secure its border with Afghanistan. This has done 
much harm to U.S. and ISAF counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, as Taliban 
insurgents and foreign fighters are able to move freely across the border as well as set up 
permanent bases in Pakistan to launch attacks against Coalition and Afghan forces in 
Afghanistan from. Even if the United States was able to convince the Pakistani 
government to take action against these groups, the Pakistani Army has shown it is not 
sufficiently equipped to fight the insurgency in these areas.28  
 While it is true that Pakistan has increased its intelligence sharing with the U.S. in 
support of its drone program, “it does so only in support of those terrorists who challenge 
Islamabad’s authority.”29 Moreover, “there is evidence of Pakistani complicity at some 
level of providing: training, funds, weapons, and shelter to members of the Taliban and 
other Afghan insurgents”30 so that they are able to continue their fight against U.S., 
ISAF, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. Even under the best of circumstances, U.S. 
27 Daniel Byman, “Do Target Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs (June 14, 2009), 95-111 seen in Sara  
 Birkenthal, “U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan: A Strategic Analysis,” 22. 
28 Jayshree Bajoria, “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border,” http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afgh 
 an-pakistani-border/p14905 [accessed February 20 – March 20, 2009], 5. 
29 Anthony N. Celso, “Phase IV Operations in the War on Terror: Comparing Iraq and Afghansitan,” Orbis  
 54, no 2. (Spring 2010): 191.  
30 Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” 17. 
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efforts to secure the Afghan-Pakistani border would still have remained a monumental 
task.  However, until the U.S. with Pakistan’s assistance, is able to stem al Qaeda’s free-
flow of weapons, money, and supplies into and out of Afghanistan, efforts to secure 
Afghanistan’s population or border at any level will remain unsuccessful.                                                      
2. Winning the Hearts and Minds of the Afghan People by Increasing Security 
 Upon review, the United States’ counterinsurgency and accompanying surge 
strategy made substantial progress in the southern parts of Afghanistan. Prior to the surge 
in 2010, the Taliban and its allies made startling gains, “showing an ability to control 
territory in Helmand and Kandahar provinces that they had previously lost.”31 The surge 
reversed these gains as “U.S. and ISAF SOF forces conducted more than 7,100 
counterterrorism missions between May 30th and December 2nd, 2010.”32 During these 
operations, “more than 600 insurgent leaders were captured or killed.”33 In addition more 
than 2,000 enemy fighters were killed, and over 4,100 captured.34  
 To gauge the overall impact of the United States’ COIN strategy this study 
consulted several sources: monthly data compiled by NATO’s International Security 
Assistance Force, data gathered by the DOD for its semiannual annual report to Congress 
(Report on Progress: Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan), and annual reports 
produced by the United Nations. These data, “measure in various ways, the ability of the 
Taliban-insurgency to carry out attacks throughout the whole country as well as U.S. and 
NATO efforts to improve security and protect the population.”35    
 One indicator used by this study to measure security progress made by U.S. and 
31 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Surge is Over,” 1 
32 Joscelyn, Thomas & Bill Roggio. “Analysis: The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been  broken,” 3.. 
33 Ibid., 1. 
34 Ibid., 1. 
35 Ibid., 1.  
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ISAF forces during the surge is the number of IED attacks that occurred between January 
2010 and December 2012. Since 2006, “IEDs have become the Taliban’s favored weapon 
of choice and the biggest killer of Coalition soldiers and Afghan civilians.”36 With the 
start of the surge in 2010, the number of IED events in Afghanistan increased to over 
15,255 that year.37 “This was a 62 percent increase over 2009 and more than three times 
as many as the year before.”38  
The number of IED events continued to rise in 2011, as more than 16,554 IEDs 
were detonated or cleared that year.39 Beginning in 2012, the number of IED attacks 
began to drop in Afghanistan with February 2012 representing one of the best months 
since the beginning of the surge in 2010.40 Overall, there were “15,222 incidents in 2012, 
an 8 percent decline from their record high in 2011.”41 Moreover, fewer U.S. troops (104) 
were killed by IEDs in 2012 than in 2011 (183), a 57% decline.42  
Even though the number of U.S. casualties caused by IEDs dropped by more than 
8 percent in 2012, a decrease in fatalities may not always tell the full story.43 According 
to Bill Roggio of The Long War Journal, “attacks were down overall nationwide in 2012 
as “Afghan forces were pushed to the fore.”44 While the number of U.S. casualties in 
Afghanistan dropped by more than 60% between 2012 and 2013, the number of Afghan 
36 Rob Evans, “Afghanistan war logs: How the IED became Taliban’s weapon of choice,” 1.  
37 DoD, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ 
Section _1230_Report_July_2013.pdf [accessed March 18 – July 2013], 19. 
38 Gareth Porter, “How the U.S. Quietly Lost the IED War in Afghanistan,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2012 . 
.10how-the-u-s-quietly-lost-the-ied-war-in-afghanistan/ [accessed March 17 – October 9, 2012], 2. 
39 Ibid., 2. 
40 Rob Evans, “Afghanistan war logs: How the IED became Taliban’s weapon of choice,” 1 
41 Tom Vanden Brook, “Coalition Death from IED Attacks Soar in Afghanistan,” http://usatoday30.usatod  
ay.com/news/military/2009-03-08-IED_N.htm [accessed December 23-March 9, 2009], 1. 
42 Ibid., 1.  
43 Rowan Scarborough, U.S. troops winning war against IEDs of Taliban, http://www.washingtontimes. 
com/news/2012/may/24/us-troops-winning-war-against-ieds-of-taliban/?page=all [accessed March 
18-May 24, 2012], 1. 
44 Joscelyn, Thomas & Bill Roggio. “Analysis: The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been  broken,” 4. 
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troops killed in combat shot up almost 80%.45 “This is likely in response to ANSF forces 
taking an increased role in combat operations as well as the ongoing decrease in the 
number international forces in the country.”46 In 2013, 95% of all conventional 
operations were carried out by Afghan forces as well as 98% of all special operations 
missions.47 Thus, casualties are not the best way to judge the strength or weakness of an 
insurgency.48 
Another indicator used by this study to track security trends during the surge was 
the number of civilians killed or injured. Surge advocates argued “that behind the 
protective shield of increasing numbers of ISAF and Afghan security forces, good 
government would emerge, the rule of law would take root and prosperity would 
grow.”49 Yet, despite some of the strictest rules of engagement (ROEs) in the history of 
warfare the United States was unable to protect the population, much less win their 
support. In 2009, “more than 1,523 Afghan civilians were killed, this number increased 
to 2,790 in 2010 before reaching an all-time high of 3,131 in 2011.”50 The number of 
civilians killed did decrease in 2012 (2,754), but these numbers are well above pre-surge 
levels.51 According to a report released by the United Nations in 2013, “81 percent of all 
civilian casualties in 2012 were caused by the Taliban and other insurgent groups.”52 The 
heavy use of IEDs by insurgents remained the biggest threat to civilians in 2012, 
“causing 2,531 civilian casualties with 868 civilians killed and 1,663 injured, in 
45 The Guardian.Com “Afghan Troop Deaths up almost 80% in 2013 Fighting Season says Pentagon,” http: 
//www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/08/afghan-troop-casualties-up-almost-80-in-2013-
fighting-season-says-pentagon [accessed March 18 – November 8, 2013], 1.  
46 Rowan Scarborough, U.S. troops winning war against IEDs of Taliban, 1. 
47 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” 7. 
48 Joscelyn, Thomas & Bill Roggio. “Analysis: The Taliban’s ‘momentum’ has not been  broken,” 4. 
49 Karl W. Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan”, 5. 
50 UNAMA “2010` Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” 1. 
51 Ibid., 1. 
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782 separate incidents.”53 This represented a three percent increase from 2011.54 
Moreover, IED incidents accounted for 38 percent of all civilian casualties in 2012. The 
number of Afghan civilians killed by Coalition forces did decrease during this time 
however. In 2012, the number of Afghan civilians killed by ISAF and Afghan forces 
declined by more than 39 percent.55  
As seen from these statistics, the United States and ISAF were able to cut down 
the number of Afghan civilians killed by Coalition and Afghan forces, but were unable to 
protect the population from the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Moreover, the 
number of Afghan civilians killed between 2010 and 2012 are well above levels before 
the surge. Thus, U.S. and ISAF efforts in trying to protect the population are largely 
mixed.  
A final metric used by this study to gauge the overall impact of the United States’ 
counterinsurgency strategy was the number of enemy initiated attacks (EIAs) carried out 
between 2010 and 2012. During much of the period after 2009, “ISAF reporting – and a 
great deal of U.S. reporting as well – focused on the number EIA incidents carried out by 
Taliban and insurgent fighters each month.”56 ISAF and DoD reporting do indicate that 
“the number of enemy initiated attacks did drop between 2011 and 2012, but these 
reports also indicate EIAs did not drop meaningfully in 2012 and remain far higher than 
in 2009.”57 This reporting also shows that the number of EIAs in Kandahar and Helmand 
provinces (the main focus of the surge) continued to remain high in 2012. 
53 Ibid., 1.  
54 Ibid., 3. 
55Ibid., 3. 
56 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The War in Afghanistan at the End of 2012: The Uncertain Course of the War 
and Transition,” https://csis.org/publication/war-afghanistan-end-2012-uncertain-course-war-and-
transition [accessed March 21 – January 22, 2013], 17. 
57 Ibid., 17.  
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 In January 2013, the U.S. and ISAF discovered that a number of EIAs reported 
from independent ANSF operations had not been included in its database.58 These EIAs 
occurred throughout 2012, although most occurred towards the end of the year.59 “The 
ANSF had accurately reported this data, but ISAF mistakenly did not enter the data into 
its main EIA database.”60 An internal audit resulted in a retroactive correction of 2012 
EIA totals, from being down 7 percent compared to 2011 to no change.61   
 In conclusion, the United States and ISAF failed to develop a system of metrics 
that could be used to evaluate progress made by Coalition and ANSF forces during the 
surge. Moreover, some of these metrics have actually backfired. “Rather than showing 
progress made during the surge, metrics such as EIAs  came to show negative trends 
during 2011-2012 and never showed the overall progress above the levels in 2009 when 
the surge in U.S. and NATO forces started.”62 Even though enemy initiated attacks are a 
“measurable combat activity as seen by a force under attack, they are largely irrelevant in 
counterinsurgency analysis.”63         
 As pointed out by Anthony Cordesman, “EIA trends revert to the same kinetic 
focus on tactical victories in regular combat that characterized a great deal of U.S. and 
ISAF reporting before the insurgency reached a crisis level in 2009.”64 Focusing on EIAs 
also ignores the fact that groups like the Taliban are fighting a political war against U.S. 
and other Coalition forces that have already largely eliminated their offensive combat 
58 Robert Burns, Taliban Attacks Drop Reported by ISAF was Incorrect,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
 /2013/02/26/Taliban-attacks-drop_n_2767922.html [accesed March 21-February 26, 2013], 1. 
59 Ibid., 1.  
60 Ibid 1.  
61 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The War in Afghanistan at the End of 2012: The Uncertain Course of the War 
 and Transition,” 18. 
62 Anthony Cordesman, “The Afghan War in 2013,” 2. 
63 Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, “Analysis: The Taliban’s ‘momentum has not been broken,” 4.  
64 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The War in Afghanistan at the End of 2012: The Uncertain Course of the War 
 and Transition,” 18 
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capabilities, but who will no longer be in the country at the end of 2014.65 Thus, it is now 
clear that U.S. and ISAF public reporting and media coverage of the war have relied too 
heavily on EIA reporting as a “scoreboard” for progress.66                        
3. Promoting a More Capable and Accountable Afghan Government 
 According to FM 3-24, good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve 
legitimacy for the Host Nation (HN) government.67 FM 3-24 defines “governance as the 
Host Nation government’s ability to gather and distribute resources while providing 
direction and control for the society.”68 These include the regulation of public activity, 
taxation, maintenance of security, control and essential services, and normalizing the 
means of succession of power.69 Governments “that attain these goals usually garner the 
support of enough of the population to create stability.”70 
Unfortunately, “the assumption that robust and well-designed foreign 
development assistance programs would, over time, yield effective governance and 
popular legitimacy proved to be a bad one in Afghanistan.”71 Since 2002, the United 
States has spent more than $100 billion on promoting good governance and community 
development in Afghanistan.72 This is the most money the U.S. has ever spent to rebuild 
a country.73 Despite these efforts, Afghanistan continues to rank as one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world. In 2008, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 
65 Ibid., 18. 
66 Ibid., 18. 
67U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Washington: Department
 of Defense, 2006), 5-44. 
68 Ibid., 5-44. 
69 Ibid., 5-44. 
70 Elliot Cohen, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of 
Counterinsurgency,” 49. 
71 Frances Z. Brown, “Taking Stock of the Surge: From the Bottom Up,” 1.  
72 Joel Brinkley, “Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of U.S. Aid to Afghanistan,” http://www.worldaffairs 
 journal.org/article/money-pit-monstrous-failure-us-aid-afghanistan [accessed April 24-
 January/February 2013], 1. 
73 Ibid., 1. 
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176th out of 180 countries, only fourth from the worst case. Since then its ratings have 
continued to slip. Between 2010 and 2012, Afghanistan ranked 176th out of 180 in 2010, 
180 out of 182 in 2011, and 174 out 176 in 2012.74 In 2013, Afghanistan tied North 
Korea and Syria as the most corrupt country in the world.75     
 The massive flux of foreign aid for development and other purposes has also 
promoted a “culture of entitlement” among Afghans.76 Those whose jobs “are funded by 
foreign money have come to expect that the cash will continue to flow, and no doubt 
many of them would stop supporting the government and its foreign patrons, and perhaps 
even become insurgents, were the money and their jobs to disappear.”77 According to 
UNODC’s 2012 survey on Afghan corruption, “power brokers in Kabul have sold 
governorships and police and judicial appointments, sometimes for hundreds and 
thousands of dollars, and used them to further their own private interests in the 
provinces.”78 Moreover, ANA soldiers and Afghan policemen have been known to 
switch sides when the Taliban and other insurgent groups come bearing wads of cash.79 
 The total cost of corruption has significantly increased over the past three years as 
well to $3.9 billion.80 In most cases, “bribes are paid to obtain better or faster services, 
while in others, bribes are offered to influence deliberations and actions such as police 
activities and judicial decisions, thereby eroding the rule of law and trust in 
institutions.”81 In 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public 
service and “nearly 30 percent of them paid a bribe for a private sector service, states the 
74 Paul D. Skinkman, “Corruption Plagues Afghanistan Ahead of U.S. Withdrawal.” 2.  
75 Ibid., 2. 
76 Octavian Manea, “COIN- A Culture of Entitlement?” 3. 
77 Ibid., 3. 
78 UNODC, “Cost of Corruption in Afghanistan nearly $4 billion –the UN Survey,” 1. 
79 Octavian Manea, “COIN- A Culture of Entitlement?” 3. 
80 UNODC, “Cost of Corruption in Afghanistan nearly $4 billion –the UN Survey,” 1. 
81 Ibid., 2. 
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survey.”82 Moreover, the bribes that Afghan citizens paid in 2012 were more than double 
Afghanistan’s domestic revenue.83         
 The development of Afghanistan’s judicial institutions continues to pose a 
significant challenge to U.S. and ISAF efforts to promote the Afghan government’s 
credibility and legitimacy among the Afghan people as well.84 Over the last decade, there 
been several challenges to improving Afghanistan’s justice system.  
“First, the central government’s inability to decrease the power of the warlords 
and exert control over the country impacted justice reform. Secondly, the central 
government’s inability and unwillingness to address widespread and deep-rooted 
corruption decreased the effectiveness of the justice system. Thirdly, many 
Afghans have little or no access to judicial institutions.”85  
 
Despite efforts by the international community and Afghan government, data 
from the World Bank suggest that Afghanistan’s rule of law continues to be one of the 
least effective—if not least effective—in the world.86 In comparison to other countries in 
the region—such as Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—
Afghanistan’s justice system was one of the least effective and ranked at the bottom.87 
 The Afghan government also continues to collect an extremely low level of 
revenue (less than ten percent of GDP), and a large share of this comes from customs 
rather than taxation.88 In effect, “Afghans are not really charged by their government for 
the services they are provided.”89 Moreover, the Afghan government neither funds nor 
delivers the key public services offered in the country. According to estimates by the U.S. 
82 Ibid., 2.  
83 Ibid., 2.  
84 Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 85.. 
85 Ibid., 85.. 
86 Kafumann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Governance Matters V, pp. 113-115 seen in Seth G. Jones,  
 “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 85. 
87 Ibid., 86. 
88 Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” http://www.foreignaffa 
 irscom/print/136845 [accessed October 17 – September/October 2013], 5. 
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Government Accountability Office, in recent years, the United States and other donors 
paid for about 90 percent of Afghanistan’s total public expenditures.90 In addition, “the 
provision of many key services remains highly dependent on foreign advisers and 
experts.”91          
 Nonetheless, the Afghan government has made some progress in collecting 
revenue and maintaining a transparent budget.92 In 2012, the Open Budget Index gave 
Afghanistan a score of 59.93 This score was the second greatest improvement in budget 
transparency over all countries in the world that year.94 Compared to other countries in 
South Asia, Afghanistan received one of the highest scores from Open Budget Index in 
2012.95 Only India (68), received a higher score.96 
 Finally, U.S. efforts “to promote local governance and community development 
have not generated the progress envisioned by surge advocates.”97 Since 2010, the United 
States has pumped billions into Afghanistan--- some $30 billion during those three years 
alone.98 According to Brian Glyn Williams, “the average aid going to Afghanistan per 
person was $80, while postwar Bosnians, a far more advanced European people, received 
$275.”99 Yet, Afghanistan “was the poorest country in Eurasia, with a life expectancy in 
the low 40s and one of the world’s highest infant mortality rates.”100Afghanistan also has 
the world’s highest infant mortality rate; one hundred and twenty-two of every thousand 
90 Joel Brinkley, “Money Pit: the Monstrous Failure of U.S. Aid,” 1.  
91 Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” 5. 
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children die before they reach age one.101 UNICEF also “reports that fifty-one percent of 
the nation’s children grow up stunted for lack of nutrition during the early years of life. 
That’s the world’s second-worst rate, behind Ethiopia.”102 Furthermore, Afghanistan still 
ranks near the bottom on per capita income, life expectancy, literacy, electricity usage, 
and on the World Bank’s broad Human Development Index.103       
 Efforts to promote local governance and community have also been stymied by 
the Afghan national government.104 The United States’ counterinsurgency strategy 
“deployed hundreds of civilians and uniformed personnel at the district level to 
encourage district governors to become more accountable to a broader spectrum of the 
population.”105 These attempts were viewed with little enthusiasm by the Afghan 
National Government “as it threatened their heavily centralized patronage system to 
ensure that district-level administrators maintained allegiance to the capital.”106   
 According to Stephen Biddle, “Hamid Karzai depends on the networks’ 
leadership to deliver political support; in exchange, he empowers them with critical 
appointments, protects them from prosecution, and allows them to prey on the public.”107 
The result is a government of informal political deal making rather than rule-based 
administration by publicly accountable institutions.108 Thus, “efforts to increase local 
accountability as well as local governance are hindered by a lack of political will (or 
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abundance of political obstruction) on top.”109      
 Finally, the COIN strategy devised by McChrystal and Petraeus rested upon the 
assumption “that the lack of governance was a universal driver of the insurgency, for 
which service delivery was the appropriate cure.”110 Though this analysis rang true in 
some parts of southern Afghanistan, “in other areas, particularly some remote parts of 
eastern Afghanistan, observers suggested that the presence of U.S., ISAF, ANSF forces 
became a fueling factor.”111 Counterinsurgency has proved more difficult to apply in the 
sparsely-populated mountains of Kunar and Nuristan provinces where tribes view 
outsiders (even Afghans from different regions) with great skepticism. 
4. Efforts to Train & Equip a Competent Afghan National Security Force 
  As the United States prepares to complete the withdrawal of its combat troops 
from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the U.S. military and its Coalition partners are 
increasingly shifting security responsibilities to Afghan security forces. “The success of 
this security transition depends greatly on the strength and competence of the ANSF.”112 
As of January 17, 2014, the United States has spent $59 billion funding the Afghan 
National Security Forces.113 Despite the progress made in training Afghanistan’s security 
forces, “the effectiveness, professionalism, and state of readiness of this security 
apparatus are uneven.”114         
 The Afghan National Security Forces as a whole are increasingly capable in 
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conducting security operations and ANSF commanders are improving their integration of 
combined arms.115 ANSF units are currently leading 95 percent of conventional and 98 
percent of special operations missions. Fifty-seven of 85 ANA kandaks are rated as 
“capable” or higher.116 Two major strengths of the Afghan National Army are infantry 
maneuver and small unit execution of operations and human intelligence collection.117 
 According to the most recent Regional Command ASNF Assessment Report 
(RASR), 88% of the Afghan National Army’s 24 brigades are “fully capable” or 
“capable” of planning and conducting joint and combined arms operations.118 In other 
areas, most ANA brigades were rated “fully capable” or “capable,” including leadership 
(96%), command and control (100%), sustainment (88%), and training (83%).119 
Attrition, however, continues to pose a serious challenge to the ANA as 71% of brigades 
are still considered “developing” which means that attrition in these brigades is 3% or 
more per month.120 
 For the Afghan National Police, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 
16 of 21 regional ANP components in seven different zones. Of the 16 components 
assessed, 94 percent were “fully capable” or “capable” of making arrests and prosecuting 
those arrested.121 Readiness within the ANP continues to be a point of concern and the 
ANP also struggles with maintaining a manageable level of equipment readiness.122 In 
addition, “attrition continues to be a challenge for the ANP as 50% of regional 
components are still considered ‘developing’ which means that monthly attrition in these 
115 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” 85 
116 Ibid., 85 
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units is 2% or more.”123 In other areas, the ANP regional components are mostly “fully 
capable” or “capable”: leadership (94%), command and control (94%), sustainment 
(94%), and training (88%).124       
 Another big problem is illiteracy. In 2010, when Lieutenant General Caldwell IV 
took command of the NATO training mission, he noted that “overall literacy” among the 
Afghan military and police stood at about fourteen percent.125 Between 2009 and 2014, 
the United States spent more than $200 million on a program to teach Afghan soldiers 
how to read and write.126 Before the implementation of the ANSF Literacy program in 
2009, literacy standards for recruits “were virtually non-existent as recruits could literally 
be pulled off the street and made a police officer.”127   
Since 2009, a total of 220,530 ANSF recruits have passed Level 1 of Dari or 
Pashto literacy and numeracy training while 70,350 ANSF personnel have achieved 
Level Three, or functional literacy under the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization standard.128 Despite these numbers, a report released by SIGAR in 
January 2014 concluded that the program appears to have had a limited impact on actual 
literacy levels within the ANSF.129 According to the report, “the ANSF has a remarkably 
high attrition rate, between 30 and 50 percent a year. Thus, many of the soldiers who 
have been educated at U.S. taxpayer expense are no longer in the Afghan Army.”130 
 The SIGAR report also identified several other flaws in the literacy program. The 
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program did not track students after their courses to be able to follow up on their 
progress.131 Further, the program, which relied on private contractors to teach the 
courses, “did not specify what the curriculum should contain or monitor the majority of 
sites where classes were held.”132 This led to what the report called “poor 
implementation” by contractors.133 The report also found that between July 2012 and 
February 2013, 45 percent of Afghan National Police sent to the field received no literacy 
instruction or training.134          
  Since the release of this report, the United States has cut back on the 
number of sites where literacy courses are being taught in order to promote better 
oversight.135 NATO has also worked with the Afghan government to implement new 
contracts for literacy training of the ANSF, with more stringent metrics to measure 
literacy performance and limiting contract scope to encourage better contractor 
performance.136 According to recent reports, this new oversight has saved the United 
States $19 million.137 CSTC-A also said responsibility for literacy training of ANA 
personnel in the field will transition to the ANA between July 1, 2014 and December 31, 
2014. Literacy training at ANA training centers will transition by December 2014. 138 
 Attrition continues to pose a serious challenge to the ANSF’s sustainability and 
operational capabilities as well. “The annual attrition rate for the Afghan National Army 
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in 2013 was 34.4 percent.”139 Between January and November 2013, 38,916 ANA 
personnel left the service.140 The ANA has also suffered serious losses from fighting.141 
Between December 2011 and November 2013, the ANA had 2,055 personnel killed in 
action (KIA) and 10,484 wounded in action (WIA).142 These problems “have been 
compounded by poor leadership, inadequate living and working conditions, the lack of a 
good program for leave, and the effects of seasonal demands for harvesting and 
planting.”143 The overall strength of the Afghan National Police continues to be affected 
by turnover and attrition as well. Since October 2013, the overall strength of the ANP has 
decreased by more than 3,191 police officers.144  
 According to Olga Oliker, “significant Soviet funding went to train Afghan 
soldiers and police fighting anti-government forces”145 during the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan.  The Soviets faced many of the same problems that U.S. and ISAF troops 
are currently dealing with as they “were unable to stem desertions in the military.146  
Despite having sent over 105,000 soldiers to help end the insurgency, “the Soviet Union 
was forced to withdraw, and the Afghan military immediately began to dissolve.” 147   
 Finally, as U.S. and ISAF forces are beginning the final phases of their 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, they are turning more and more of their forward operating 
bases, outposts, and equipment over to Afghan Security Forces. But the SIGAR found 
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that the ANSF do not have the capability to operate and maintain garrisons built for them. 
As a result, “billions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer money will be at risk of going to 
waste.”148          
 Despite these negative reports, the ANSF has shown signs of becoming a 
competent fighting force. In the face of Taliban vows to break them, the Afghan Army 
demonstrated that it can fight well and win firefights on the battlefield in 2013.149 
According to Johnathan Schroden (2014), “the Taliban “tested the army in direct combat 
but increasingly shifted from head-on to indirect attacks because they could not 
overmatch the ANA.”150 Even though ANA forces spent a large majority of its time 
manning checkpoints and conducting patrols, it also showed some ability to plan and 
carry out more sophisticated operations without help from U.S. and ISAF forces.151  
 One such operation was Operation Semorgh, a large-scale effort to clear rural 
areas used as staging areas for insurgent attacks on the capital city of Kabul.152 In 
addition, “Afghan Special Operations Forces have been widely commended by U.S. 
commanders for their competence in leading independent operations and specialized 
missions, including their roles in replacing U.S. forces in conducting night raids that have 
long triggered popular anger and strained U.S.-Afghan relations.”153 Moreover, 
“casualties in Afghan SOF units are minimal, and they have only experienced one 
148 Joel Brinkley, “Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of U.S. Aid to Afghanistan,” http://www.worldaffairs 
 journal.org/article/money-pit-monstrous-failure-us-aid-afghanistan [accessed April 24-
 January/February 2013], 6. 
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‘insider attack,’ which adds to their credibility.”154     
 Should current trends continue, “U.S. and NATO forces are likely to leave behind 
a grinding stalemate between the Afghan government and the Taliban.”155 The ANSF can 
probably sustain this deadlock, “but only as long as the United States and international 
community continue to pay the multibillion dollar annual bills needed to keep fighting 
the Taliban.”156 The war will thus become a contest in will between the U.S./international 
community and the Taliban.157 However, the ANSF has shown signs of becoming a 
competent force capable of conducting security operations on their own.158 Despite 
sustaining significant casualties in 2013, ANSF forces largely held their own as no major 
population centers fell to the Taliban or other insurgent groups.159   
 As seen from this study, the United States was largely successful in achieving its 
primary objective of reversing the Taliban’s momentum. Despite this progress, eastern 
parts of the country are still in the grip of the Haqqani Network.160 The Taliban have also 
made gains in parts of the country previously unaffected by the insurgency, including 
northern and western Afghanistan. Moreover, Afghanistan continues to be one of the 
most corrupt countries in the world as the Afghan Government struggles to rein in 
corruption and provided services to the Afghan people. Thus, the counterinsurgency 
strategy devised by Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus has had very mixed 
154 Ibid., 1.  
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success in achieving the four main objectives identified by Field Manual 3-24 needed to 
win in Afghanistan.          
 In particular, this study found three reasons why the United States’ COIN strategy 
failed to achieve the objectives identified by FM 3-24 needed to win:            
(1) The counterinsurgency strategy devised by Generals McChrystal and Petraeus 
was never fully implemented and this set the mission up for only partial success. 
 On June 23rd, 2011, President Obama announced that U.S. troops would begin 
withdrawing much sooner than the December 2009 counterinsurgency plan had 
envisioned. This had major implications on the United States’ counterinsurgency strategy 
as U.S and ISAF commanders no longer had the time, resources, or troops needed to 
secure the rest of southern Afghanistan.161 In particular, Coalition forces had to end 
clearing operations in Helmand and Kandahar provinces during the summer of 2011 
(only 18 months into the surge) instead of at the end of the year.162 Moreover, U.S. and 
NATO forces were unable to conduct counterinsurgency operations in eastern 
Afghanistan to clear population centers held by the Haqqani Network because they did 
not have enough troops.163 Thus, the security gains made by the United States and NATO 
in southern Afghanistan were largely negated as Coalition forces did not have the troops 
or resources needed to secure population centers in other parts of the country, especially 
eastern Afghanistan.          
 In “Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary of War,” former U.S. defense secretary Robert 
Gates writes that although President Obama ordered a surge of 30,000 additional troops 
161 CJ Radin, “Analysis: U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan shifts as forces draw down,” http://ww  
 w.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/the_military_strateg_1.php [accessed January 17 – August
 3, 2011], 2. 
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to stabilize Afghanistan, the president came to believe that the strategy would not 
work.164 “As I sat there, I thought: the president does not trust his commander, cannot 
stand Karzai, does not believe in his own strategy and does not consider the war to be 
his.”165 Gates also writes about a March 2011 White House meeting. “For him, it’s all 
about getting out.”166 Even though President Obama cannot be fully blamed for the 
counterinsurgency strategy’s failure in Afghanistan, the timetable imposed in June 2011 
made it impossible for U.S. and NATO forces to secure all off Afghanistan’s vital 
population centers before the troops began withdrawing later on that year.  
(2) The population-centric COIN strategy was the wrong strategy to implement due 
to conditions on the ground. 
 The United States’ COIN strategy “rested upon the assumption that a ‘lack of 
governance’ was a universal driver of the insurgency, for which service delivery was the 
appropriate cure.”167 Though this analysis rang true in some parts of southern 
Afghanistan, in other areas, particularly some remote parts of eastern Afghanistan, 
observers suggested that the presence of U.S., ISAF, ANSF forces became a fueling 
factor.168 COIN has proved more difficult to apply in the sparsely-populated mountains 
of Kunar and Nuristan provinces where tribes view outsiders (even Afghans from 
different regions) with great skepticism.169 Moreover, “improving the Afghan 
government’s capacity to deliver services to populations will not necessarily make the 
government more legitimate—the strategic objective of COIN.”170   
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 Secondly, U.S. and ISAF officials were unable to convince Hamid Karzai or his 
advisors that a counterinsurgency strategy was the right strategy to carry out in the first 
place. This created a lot of friction amongst U.S. officials and Karzai, who believed that 
his government “was fighting a proxy war started by Pakistan, not a contest of domestic 
legitimacy.”171 Despite these differing points of view, U.S. and ISAF forces were still 
able to reclaim large stretches of territory lost to the Taliban and improve security in 
Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Yet, none of these victories or improvements in 
security seemed to matter to Karzai as he “seemed both uninterested in and 
unappreciative of what the COIN advocates took as mounting evidence that all was going 
according to plan.”172 Thus, as pointed out by General Karl Eikenberry, “in its 
implementation of COIN doctrine in Afghanistan, the U.S. military was playing 
American football, so to speak. It was not at all clear what sport Karzai was playing, or 
indeed whether he was even in the same stadium.”173 
 Finally, the U.S.’s COIN strategy could not resolve the “whole of government” 
issue.174  
“The U.S. military can deal with armed insurgents and help partner security forces 
do the same. But the military cannot do all the other things needed for lasting 
success at counterinsurgency, like helping the government develop an effective 
police force, good governance, a fair legal system, and a prosperous economy.175 
 
Even though there have been real improvements in interagency coordination and 
collaboration over the past 10 years, agencies such as the State Department and USAID 
171 Robert D. Lamb & Brooke Shawn, “Is Revised COIN Manual Backed by Political Will?,” http://csis.org  
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continue to lack the capacity and resources to compliment the Defense Department’s 
efforts.176 Thus, “the U.S. military can plead for greater interagency assistance during a 
counterinsurgency or stabilization campaign, but it very rarely gets the help or support it 
needs.”177                   
(3) The United States’ COIN strategy significantly overestimated the political will 
that existed in the U.S. to engage in costly long-term nation-building operations.  
 According to Carl von Clausewitz, “war is a contest of political will executed 
through violence.”178 Even though warfare has changed exponentially since Clausewitz 
wrote his essay on war in 1832, his observation on the importance of political will is still 
accurate: “Not only does war serve to achieve political ends, but they are waged by the 
political will of citizens.”179 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have served as a reminder 
of the importance of maintaining political will.  
 According to Justin Lynch (2014), “if the population of a democracy is to 
maintain its passion for a military campaign, the people need to believe that the campaign 
will provide a worthwhile victory at a reasonable cost. Unfortunately, large 
counterinsurgencies are typically costly and often do not provide clear rewards.”180 One 
of the most famous T.E. Lawrence quotes, so often used to discuss proper counter-
insurgent tactics, is “making war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like learning to eat 
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soup with a knife.”181  Thus, skeptics argue that an American public worn after a decade 
of continuous war “will never support long-term deployments of U.S. soldiers, and so 
serious counterinsurgency campaigns are a nonstarter.”182  
In order to garner and maintain public support for future long-term conflicts such 
as counterinsurgency operations, U.S. civilian and military leaders should only wage 
wars that have clear political goals and provide the American people with a “meaningful 
material or emotional reward.”183 Moreover, “questions need to be asked about potential 
negative consequences of adopting a doctrine that would require consistent, high-level 
support across multiple changes in presidential administrations.”184 Finally, there needs 
to be major changes in the institutional culture of the military as well as the United 
States government.185 
Even if U.S. policy makers are able to make the case for a large-scale 
counterinsurgency campaign to the American public, these conflicts are very costly.186 
Between 2010 and 2012, “it cost $1 million to keep one American service member in 
Afghanistan for a year.”187 That meant the annual bill for the war during this timeframe 
was about $100 billion a year.188 With the fragile state of the U.S. economy during , “the 
Obama administration found it very hard to justify spending another $300 to $400 billion 
(borrowed to boot) to keep Hamid Karzai’s corrupt government in power and the Taliban 
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at bay with so many Americans struggling at home.”189 
Finally, the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it much more difficult 
for U.S. policy makers to convince a skeptical public of the need to participate in future 
and currently ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Africa. According to 
Justin Lynch (2014), “the American people’s support for war receded so much that they 
doubt the wisdom of invading Iraq and Afghanistan at all, much less engaging in a 
protracted insurgency.”190 Lynch points to data gathered from multiple Gallup polls taken 
from November 2001 to March 2013.191 These polls show that “the percentage of the 
American population who believed it was a mistake to invade Afghanistan gradually rose 
from 11 percent in 2001 to 49 percent in 2013.”192  
 Moreover, a poll released by CNN on December 30, 2013, showed that only 17% 
of those questioned supported the 12-year-long war, down from 52% in 2008.193 
According to CNN Polling director Keating Holland, those numbers show the war in 
Afghanistan with far less support than any other conflict.194 “Opposition to the Iraq War 
never got higher than 69% in CNN polling while U.S. troops were in that country, and 
while the Vietnam War was in progress, no more than six in 10 ever told Gallup's 
interviewers that the war was a mistake.”195   
The public response to the ongoing conflicts in Libya and Syria also illustrates the 
189 Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” 6. 
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American people’s unwillingness to participate in future counterinsurgency operations or 
long-term conflicts. According to Justin Lynch (2014), 
“A Gallup Poll taken in March 2011 during the air intervention in Libya,  
only 28% of Americans approved of sending in ground troops, even as thousands 
of surface to air missiles sat unguarded after the fall of the Qaddafi  regime. 
Popular support for an intervention in Syria a year and a half later was even 
lower.”196  
A Gallup poll released on September 6th found that “only 36% of Americans supported 
the use of military force in Syria, despite reports surfacing in mid-August 2013 that 
Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad had used chemical weapons against his own people, 
potentially killing hundreds or even thousands of civilians.”197 As seen from these polls 
“the lack of clear victories and high financial and self-perception costs in large 
counterinsurgencies reduces the probability that the American people will support future 
military action, or maintain support once it has begun.”198 Thus, as pointed out by the 
ancient Chinese military sage Sun-Tzu, “there has never been a protracted war from 
which a country has benefited.”199 
Conclusion 
There appears “to be a growing sense that the era of counterinsurgency that began 
shortly after 9/11 is drawing to a close.”200 The American people have made it clear that 
after a decade of war in both Iraq and Afghanistan, they are tired of foreign military 
196 Rebecca Stewart, “Polls: Americans approve of military action in Libya.” Central News Network, April 
19, 2011 seen in Justin Lynch, “Counterinsurgencies and Deterrence,” http://smallwarsjournal.co 
m/ jrnl/art/counterinsurg encies-and-deterrence [accessed July 2-January 21, 2014], 3. 
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202 
adventures and are unwilling to provide political support for any large-scale COIN 
campaign. There is also the belief that the United States cannot afford to fight these 
campaigns anymore, “not in an age of austerity and fiscal cliffs.”201 Moreover, too many 
political and military leaders have lost confidence in the current counterinsurgency 
strategy.202 Thus, as American and NATO forces continue their withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, it appears unlikely that the United States will find itself engaged in another 
pro-longed counterinsurgency conflict any time in the near future.  
On January 5, 2012, “the Obama Administration gave new strategic guidance as a 
roadmap to the United States’ priorities in engaging the Pacific region, Africa, and 
Middle East.”203 According to the new guidance, U.S. forces 
“will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations of 
the type undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instability will be addressed by the 
U.S. through non-military means and military to military cooperation. U.S. forces 
would only consider limited stability and counterinsurgency operations if required 
operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. They will, of course, 
maintain a presence abroad including rotational deployments and training 
exercises designed to build capacity and interoperability.”204
Simultaneously, the Department of Defense began reducing the overhead cost within the 
military services and across the defense enterprise by an estimated $200 billion which is 
projected to last through FY 2017.205 Currently, the DoD is requesting $495.6 billion for 
201 F. Stephen Larabee, “NATO Forces Approach Financial Day of Reckoning,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
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the base budget in FY 2015.206 This is “22 percent lower than the Pentagon’s all-time 
budget highs of $716 billion in FY 2008, $718 billion in FY 2009, and $742 billion in FY 
2010.”207 The Defense Department has also publicly stated its intention to reduce the size 
of the active-duty Army to between 440,000 and 450,000 troops and reduce the Marine 
Corps to 182,000 troops.208   
Even though the United States is currently shifting away from long-term 
counterinsurgency and nation-building operations, the U.S. military must not simply 
forget the experiences and lessons learned during the last decade.209 In Libya, Syria, 
Nigeria, Yemen, and Somalia, “we are witnessing many of the same insurgency concerns 
seen in Afghanistan and Iraq: non-state actors, ineffective governments and civil 
institutions, military incompetence, tribal conflicts, and instances where conflict effects 
spread across sovereign borders.”210 Despite having a vested interest in ensuring the 
effects of insurgency and terrorism do not spill over from these conflicts, the U.S has 
resisted direct military participation thus far.211 
When domestic upheavals rocked the Middle East in the spring of 2011, “the 
Obama administration tried to avoid getting deeply involved.”212 During Operation 
Odyssey Dawn and the campaign to help Libyan rebels remove Muammar Gaddafi from 
power, the U.S.’s participation was mostly limited to 
206 Paul D. Shinkman, “Massive Budget Cuts Would Redefine U.S. Military,” http://www.usnews.com/ 
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“providing air and missile strikes and assisting the U.S.’s NATO partners with 
intelligence and command and control – ‘leading from behind,’ in the words of an 
anonymous administration official – and the United States showed no appetite for 
participating in an effort to stabilize, much less rebuild, Libya in the aftermath of 
Gaddafi’s fall.”213  
U.S. policy toward the civil war in Syria has been even more cautious.214 Since 2012, the 
United States has thus far avoided direct military participation in support of the various 
groups fighting Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Moreover, U.S. officials have been very 
reluctant and unwilling to provide weapons and funding to the Syrian Opposition.215 
Finally, “conflicts will continue to break out and the United States will continue 
to be under frequent pressure to intervene in them.”216 Thus, the U.S. may once again 
need a counterinsurgency strategy to defeat an insurgency or terrorist group.217 However, 
before that day comes, two things must happen: (1) The United States must recognize 
that counterinsurgency and nation-building operations take time. Thus, civilian and 
military leaders must come up with clear political objectives before contributing U.S. 
blood and treasure to overseas conflicts. More importantly, policy makers must do a 
better job of explaining to the American people why it is important to support a conflict 
or operation that could last years. (2) U.S. military leaders must continue to revise current 
counterinsurgency doctrine so that it adopts a more realistic approach to what U.S. forces 
are currently experiencing on the ground. Only then will the United States know whether 
the lessons it has learned this past decade are adequate enough in meeting the challenges 
posed by future counterinsurgency campaigns.  
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